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Abstract
This thesis employs in situ research at two cinemas in London with women who 
attend matinees for the over-60s to think through the nature of cinema as practice. 
It combines interview and observation data to explore how what we do at the 
cinema works to co-constitute particular modes and spatialities of cinema, and co­
produce films. The analysis is informed by debates in geography, film and cinema 
studies, and gerontology - all read through an engagement with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
(1977,1990) theory of practice. Cinema is also understood as a public space with 
which collective identities are pre-reflexively formed among the audience members 
through the body, suggesting an understanding of ‘old age’ as an emergent and 
heterogeneous but nevertheless enduring social identity. As such, this thesis 
argues for an understanding of cinema as a spatial and embodied practice that 
constitutes and is constituted by the film on the screen, the bodies of the audience 
and the spaces of viewing. This emphasis on practice attempts to build on the 
strengths in existing literature by moving beyond decontextualised studies of both 
films and audiences common to much academic writing on cinema by exploring 
the politics of representation, theories of embodied spectatorship, and the 
geography of films in the moment of viewing. In doing so, the thesis suggests that 
we develop a ‘cinematic habitus’ across life and that this in part shapes the film we 
experience in the moment of practice. It suggests that the spaces of cinema -  both 
on and off the screen -  are co-constituted not just by different practices, but 
different practicing bodies. In the specific research context this suggests the 
constitution of a new space of ageing appropriate to the mode of generation 
enacted by participants. As such, the understanding of cinema as practice offers a 
methodological and theoretical contribution to existing understandings of film and 
audiences by acknowledging cinema’s embodied spatio-temporalities in practice. It
concludes by proposing a geography of cinema that pays attention to the co- 
constitutive interaction between the material spaces of viewing, the film on screen 
and the embodied audiences.
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Chapter One. Introduction
In the past decade a ‘quiet revolution’ has occurred at the cinema (Cox, 2012). 
Long the realm of the young, a palpable shift has taken place and retirees are 
flocking to their local screens in such numbers that the over-45s now represent the 
fastest growing cinema audience in Britain and America (Cox, 2012; BFI, 2011;
UK Film Council, 2009; FAME, 2007; Macnab, 2007). While the numbers are 
nowhere near close to overtaking those in the 15-24-age bracket, the over-45s are 
proving significant to an industry struggling to survive in a competitive climate in 
which it must battle the increasing threat of smart phones, games consoles, online 
streaming and piracy (BFI, 2011; Lobato, 2010; McNary, 2010). So much so, that 
over the course of writing this thesis, Hollywood and British film production have 
woken up to the older market and begun to make films with it in mind (Cox, 2012, 
Gant, 2012; Chivers, 2011, McNary, 2010). What concerns me here, however, is 
not this shift in film content. It is that the over-45 audience group expanded despite 
the far more common tendency, identified by work in cultural gerontology, for films 
to ignore or denigrate older people (Robinson et al., 2007; Markson and Taylor, 
2000).
That the viewing figures rose in the face of such apparently negative 
representations points to a discrepancy that exists in much work on film and 
cinema: that between theory and practice; between decontextualised analyses of 
films and the way that we watch them (Kuhn, 2011, 2002; Maltby and Stokes,
2007; Staiger, 2000). Why, if they are more often than not confronted by images 
that offer stereotyped portrayals and/or absent them from society’s visual 
consciousness, are older audiences flocking to the cinema? In this thesis I attempt 
to address this question by adopting an approach to cinema as social practice,
explored through a case study of women who attend matinees for the over-60s. In 
doing so, my intention is that this project talks to issues of cinema with relevance 
beyond the audience group under study.
1.1 Studying cinema as practice
Adopting a practice approach requires a ‘shift in emphasis away from thinking 
through a range of social theoretical ‘familiars’ (such as structure, system, 
representation, identity, meaning)’ -  themes common in work on film, including the 
geography of film (Dixon et al., 2008) -  ‘towards attending to activity, action, 
embodiment, as well as shared practical reason’ (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011: 
212). Taking social practice as my starting point suggests a concern with 
‘embodied or practical knowledge and its formation in people’s everyday lives, with 
the world of emotions, desire and imagination and with the infinitude of encounters 
through which we make the world and are made by in turn’ — an approach and 
focus surprisingly rare in studies of cinema (Simonsen, 2003:157). The 
discrepancy described above, between theories of the politics of representation of 
ageing and the nevertheless increasing number of over-45s going to the cinema, 
suggests that when we go to the cinema we don’t engage the same practices of 
viewing as those of film theorists. Something happens in the moment of practice 
that means negative portrayals are not experienced as alienating in the moment. 
This enduring discrepancy implies the need for new methodologies and differently 
formulated questions.
1.1.2 Research questions
In light of this discussion, then, a key question for this thesis is:
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• How is film representation experienced in practice?
Although I consider this question through a case study of women who attend 
matinees for the over-60s, asking and addressing it has significance for film 
studies wider than those concerned by the representation of ageing or film 
representation more generally. By bringing a practice approach to bear on 
understandings of film, our engagement is changed from decontextualised 
analyses of one or more films (the approach still dominant in geography) to one 
drawn from lived, situated understandings, embedded in the ‘everyday’. I do not 
propose that one is superior to the other, but I am interested to see what happens 
when we approach an old problem from a new perspective.
While the quotations above summarise well the general approach offered by all 
theories of social practice, the ways in which the themes outlined are dealt with by 
different theorists vary widely. Schatzki (2001) points out that there is no one 
single theory of social practice and clearly the one adopted has significant impact 
on our subsequent research. As my title suggests, the theory of practice I adopt in 
this thesis is that offered by French theorist Pierre Bourdieu (1977,1990a). 
Bourdieu’s approach, developed to combat the enduring division between 
subjectivism and objectivism in the social sciences, emphasises the importance of 
embodied action and pays attention to the doing of everyday life. Significantly, 
though, Bourdieu argues that practice is co-constituted with social structures — as 
we move through the world, we inculcate implicit expectations appropriate to our 
social position, expectations that more often than not serve to reproduce that 
position and maintain social hierarchies (1977: 81). Along with these inculcated 
expectations, we develop congruous bodily dispositions so that our material body 
is also and inescapably a social one (1977: 94).
With this understanding of, and concern with, social difference embedded at the 
heart of his theory, engaging Bourdieu (1977,1990a) is to adopt a commitment to 
incorporate such issues into understanding any practice. As such, while I am keen 
to explore film representation from a different perspective to that often offered, in 
doing so I do not intend to abandon such work’s consideration of the significance 
of social identity to cinema. This, then, poses a second question without which, 
Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) work implies, we cannot really consider the first:
• How might differentiated bodies practise cinema differently?
This question relates to Bourdieu’s (1990a) concept of practical logic, which 
suggests that practices are only maintained if they serve a practical purpose for an 
individual or group. This is not a purpose that is consciously assessed — practical 
logic is understood as a bodily process, engaged in the moment by a sense of 
knowing what to do, or not -  a sense that serves to differentiate us. The logic of 
cinema-going in contemporary society, where many other viewing opportunities 
exist, is irreducible simply to a desire to watch particular films. As such, it 
encourages an understanding of cinema that moves beyond the focus on films to 
consider other possible logics of the practice. Understanding how differentiated 
bodies practice the cinema differently becomes vital to understanding the 
resurgence of older cinemagoers, but also suggests that considering such a 
question requires more than Just analysing the images screened.
To think through this question, I conducted empirical work with women who attend 
matinees for the over-60s, and it is from my work with them that the understanding 
of cinema offered in this thesis was developed. Essential to Bourdieu’s theory, 
however, is that structures of difference remain implicit and emergent, and are
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(re)produced through practice precisely because they are not consciously 
registered in everyday life, nor brought out by interviews with social scientists 
(1977: 79). Bourdieu’s approach to practice emphasises pre-reflexive, emergent 
knowledges. The social world is not governed by a series of explicit rules waiting 
to be uncovered by a social scientist. It is instead enacted in the moment, co­
constituted by practice. This highlights an important repercussion of adopting 
Bourdieu’s theory — a commitment to robust empirical research that avoids the 
tendency of ‘conventional’ research methods such as interviewing or observation 
to present practical logic as a pre-existing ‘fait accompli’ (1990a: 55; Wacquant, 
2005).
It was this fluid, fragile, embodied and distinctly temporal way of understanding 
practice that first led me to adopt such an approach, interested as I was in offering 
a lived understanding of cinema. Unfortunately those elements that I found so 
productive in Bourdieu’s work are also those that prove most ephemeral, 
especially in a research context. Adopting Bourdieu’s framework perhaps made 
me particularly sensitive to the difficulty in capturing such elements during 
fieldwork, but as practice approaches become increasingly common in the social 
sciences innovative methodologies are being adopted to try to tackle precisely this 
problem. Engaging such arguments and ideas in this thesis, I wanted to ask with 
them: J
• How might we explore practice empirically?
At the simplest level, Bourdieu’s emphasis on lived experience, and the 
corresponding ambiguity provided by practical time, for me generated a 
commitment to being present in the moment of practice. As such, for my research I
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adopted a relatively new method: the go-along (Kusenbach, 2003) -  and 
accompanied participants on their trips to the cinema at two venues in London -  
the Clapham Picturehouse and the Dalston Rio. This methodology is outlined in 
full in Chapter Four and is fundamental to the understanding of cinema generated 
in this thesis.
I chose to limit my case study to female attendees because an engagement with 
feminist gerontology suggests that women face a ‘double standard of ageing’ in 
which they are understood to suffer twice -  already denigrated as ‘woman’, old 
age brings with it a further marginalisation (Vares, 2009; Markson, 2003; Sontag, 
1972). This is reflected in the literature deconstructing film representations of later 
life, which emphasise the inequalities between male and female characters 
(Vares, 2009; Calasanti, 2007; Markson and Taylor, 2000). Going to the cinema 
with older women brought to the fore the temporalities of practice and emphasised 
the significance of embodied biographies, understood through Bourdieu’s (1977,
1990a) concept of habitus -  ‘a set of dispositions [inculcated across life] which 
generate practices and perceptions’ (Jenkins, 1992: 74). But being there, in the 
moment, watching participants and tuning in to my own engagement with cinema 
also drew out the spatialities of practice.
The significance of space to cinema has long been a concern of geographers of 
film, and it was their work alongside that of film theorist Giuliana Bruno (2002) that 
drew me to thinking about the spatialities of cinema (Orueta and Valdes, 2007; 
Dixon and Aitken, 2006). However, this work is predominantly concerned with 
space in film, with analyses of spaces of cinema conspicuous by their absence — 
an absence that is made more tangible by the very few but insightful exceptions
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(Jancovich et al., 2003; Hubbard, 2002). A key question for my research, then, 
became:
• How are the spaces of cinema constituted?
This question both drove my adoption of the go-along and was emphasised by my 
experience of it. It is a question I posed before my fieldwork, but the significance of 
which only became clear across the course of my trips to the cinema. As I went 
with participants I was repeatedly struck by the co-constitution of space through 
embodied practice. My analysis of this constitutive relationship between bodies 
and spaces became key to the understanding of cinema developed through these 
four questions, and outlined across the following pages. To give a better sense of 
the shape this takes, this chapter concludes with a brief outline of the structure it 
follows.
1.2 Structure of the thesis.
The following chapter takes these formative discussions as its starting point to 
more fully outline the ideas engaged in this thesis. Drawing on work from 
geography, gerontology alongside film, cinema and audience studies, I try to carve 
out where insights from these literatures can be usefully combined to develop an 
understanding of cinema as practice. I conclude with an attempt to synthesise 
such arguments into a broad-strokes description of the understanding of cinema 
that is fleshed out across the thesis, as well as evidence the contribution such an 
understanding makes to existing literature.
In Chapter Three I explain my reasons for adopting a practice approach to cinema 
and offer a more substantial engagement with Bourdieu’s theory. I outline the
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elements of his framework that proved fundamental to my understanding of 
cinema and show how the key concepts adopted in this thesis offer useful 
theoretical tools through which I can combine many of the insights from literatures 
discussed in Chapter Two. ^
As suggested above, Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) theory poses significant questions 
about the validity of fieldwork. In Chapter Four I outline my methodology and think 
through where it might address some of his concerns. Engaging the go-along, 
alongside informal interviews, means that the first part of this chapter is given over 
to outlining and explaining the theory behind my methodology, as well as 
positioning it in the wider literature. The second part of the chapter outlines in 
detail how my methodology played out in practice and the ways in which it 
influenced my engagement with the questions posed above.
In Chapters Five to Seven I engage data from my empirical work through the 
theoretical frameworks thus far discussed. In so doing I attend to the questions 
outlined above, and attempt to provide evidence for the understanding of cinema 
that I am posing. Chapter Five is predominantly concerned with asking how 
differentiated bodies practice cinema differently, and I explore the practical logic of 
cinema-going for the women I attended matinees with. Doing so suggests a 
significant influence of such embodied logic on the cinema enacted in practice, 
and I explore this through a series of discussions related to modes of generation -  
one of Bourdieu’s (1984) lesser used concepts. Chapter Six considers how 
representation is experienced in practice and engages my data through work on 
embodied spectatorship alongside Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Doing so 
develops an understanding of film viewing that considers the embodied, temporal 
and spatial elements that come in to play in cinema as practice.
Chapter Seven leads on from these discussions to ask how the spaces of cinema 
constituted. Here I draw on my observations of participants as we moved around 
the material space of the cinema with the help of Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990a) 
analysis of the Kabyle House as well as work from the critical geography of 
architecture (Lees, 2001) to draw out the active, fluid and co-constitutive nature of 
space and embodied practice at the cinema. I engage both my own and 
participants’ responses to the film during and after the moment of viewing to 
explore the journeys we take at the cinema, and to think through the spatiality of 
the screen. This ‘virtual mobility’ (Bruno, 2002) was in practice at odds with a 
sense of being at home generated by the women at the cinema. Rather than see 
these two apparently opposing forces (of home and away) as contradictory, 
however, my research suggests that their mutually constitutive relationship is vital 
to understanding cinema-going as practice.
I conclude by addressing each question with the arguments made in the previous 
chapters, bringing them together to offer a tentative framework for exploring 
cinema as practice and propose that it is necessary to develop a geography of 
cinema alongside the geography of film. Such a geography could help enrich our 
understanding of film by offering an active, lived engagement with the ways in 
which screens are embedded in everyday (public) practice.
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Chapter Two. Shaping cinema as practice: building an embodied 
and spatial analysis
This is a thesis about cinema. The term ‘cinema’, however, has a number of 
meanings: it is a place, both generic and specific; a corpus of films by a particular 
director or from a specific country; and is also used to refer to film as an art form. 
But to me it implies something that moves beyond these meanings. It connotes a 
lived practice that integrates cinema as space and cinema as film, emphasising 
the audience gathered in cinema’s public space ready to engage the cinema on 
the screen. It is this understanding to which my empirical work led me, and that I 
try to develop throughout this thesis.
Thinking about cinema in this way leads to engagement with a wide-range of 
literatures offering multiple approaches to the major themes with which my work is 
concerned. While the research questions set out in the previous chapter are as yet 
without a sustained consideration, the areas of interest they suggest - including 
film, exhibition, practice, the (ageing) body and space - have long been the focus 
of cross disciplinary attention. As such, my questions are driven by a desire to 
contribute to the ever-growing and diverse work on the various elements of 
cinema. While it would be impossible to outline all of the relevant work here, this 
chapter is an attempt to show that at the intersections of cultural gerontology, 
geographical gerontology, film studies, geography of film and audience studies, a 
gap in knowledge emerges. It is here that my project, and subsequent 
understanding of cinema, sits.
While I am working to offer an alternative to the ‘tunnel vision’ focus on film texts in 
much work on cinema (Allen, 2011; Maltby and Stokes, 2007), films are
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nevertheless a defining part of the practice. This chapter begins with an outline of 
cultural gerontology’s engagement of the medium to explore the constitution of 
ageism in contemporary society. Gerontology’s analyses of films offer critical 
understandings of film representations, and the significance of such 
representations for how we live the world away from the screen (Robinson et al., 
2007; Markson and Taylor, 2000). Despite making a clear contribution to our 
understandings of ageing in contemporary society, this work also offers a good 
example of the tendency within film studies — including the geography of film — to 
engage an imagined spectator. Discussions of emotion and sensation, elements I 
found fundamental to participants’ film viewing, are absent in this literature. The 
spectator’s body is present only as a canvas onto which stereotypes are projected 
(Twigg, 2004). The material body -  fundamental to my formulation of cinema — is, 
however, a concern elsewhere in gerontology. Indeed, cultural interpretations of 
corporeal ageing provide a good indication of the understanding of embodiment 
engaged in this thesis. In the second section I draw on this smaller body of 
literature to begin an outline of the approach I take (Laz, 2003; Phinney and 
Chelsa, 2003).
I am of course not the first person to suggest our sensing body is significant as we 
watch films. A scattering of geographers (Lukinbeal and Zimmerman, 2008; Carter 
and McCormack, 2006; Crang, 2002) have begun to consider film’s affect, for 
example, and the understanding of cinema generated here is influenced by a 
group of theorists writing in film studies who are concerned with bringing 
corporeality to bear on understandings of the medium (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 
2004; Marks, 2002, 2000). Such literature draws attention to and theorises the 
embodied spectator, exploring the haptic qualities of film. In the third section I talk
l i
through exemplary analyses. In doing so I hope to show that this work argues 
persuasively for the need to ‘flesh out’ our understanding of the spectator and 
consider how the viewing body interacts with the screen -  an approach 
fundamental to cinema, as I understand it.
While I found literature on embodied spectatorship a powerful resource in my 
work, the ‘body’ under discussion remains, for the most part, imagined. In 
conducting empirical research with women aged over-60 and exploring their 
practice through Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990a) theory, an emergent social difference 
became significant to my understanding of cinema. There is of course a strong 
tradition of audience studies, a tradition that has led to an acknowledgement of the 
importance of social positions to practices of viewing. Although dominated by 
studies of television audiences, in the fourth section of this chapter I discuss the 
small but significant body of work engaging film audiences (Morley, 2009; Barker 
and Brooks, 1998; Moores, 1993).
The understanding of cinema that emerged out of my research is most closely 
represented by Boyle’s (2010, 2009) study of ‘watch with baby’ screenings. In her 
work Boyle, too, explores cinema in the moment, conducting observation and 
interviews with a collection of the mothers that attend. In doing so, she draws out 
the significance of cinema space to their practice. Such attention to the material 
space of viewing is rare in work on contemporary cinema-going but in offering her 
analysis, Boyle (2010, 2009) is influenced, as am I, by film history -  a sub­
discipline that explores historical exhibition practices, frequently with a spatial 
dimension to their analyses (Maltby, 2011; Maltby and Stokes, 2007). While I draw 
from this work, and discuss it in the fifth section of this chapter, the understanding
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of cinema space proposed throughout this thesis is predominantly the result of my 
observations of participants and myself at the cinema.
In geography, Hubbard (2002, 2003a, 2003b) has explored the significance of 
cinema spaces in a contemporary context, and I discuss his work alongside the 
studies of historical exhibition practices in section five, but neither quite offered the 
relational understanding of space and embodied practice that my empirical work 
evoked. Geographical gerontology, however, has long considered spaces of 
ageing and the co-constitution of ageing and place, an approach significant to my 
understanding (Laws, 1996). I outline this in the sixth section, while drawing on 
recent work from the critical geography of architecture exploring the constitution of 
buildings in practice in order to expand on the lived nature of cinema and the 
enactment of space in the moment (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Lees, 2001).
There is of course another spatiality significant to cinema, that of the film. It is to 
this that the geography of film has devoted itself. The final section outlines the 
work in the sub-discipline that has been most influential to this project -  that which 
argues the relationship between cinema and the city, a debate that has seen an 
on-going productive conversation between film studies and geography (Clarke, 
1997). While still accessing questions by engaging with film, such analyses 
consider the haptic nature of the medium and emphasise its ‘virtual mobility’; 
relating the space on screen to that of the city streets, bringing material space into 
analyses (Bruno, 2002; Friedberg, 1993).
Each of these literatures contributed to my questions and the resulting formulation 
of cinema that is developed in this thesis. I conclude by attempting to synthesise
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this work and begin to offer the foundations of my approach, before moving on in 
the following chapter to better outline the theory of practice that shaped it.
2.1 Gerontology and representation: constructing ageism in contemporary 
culture.
Frustrated with the dominance of biomedical approaches to ageing, cultural 
gerontology arose in the 1970s and set about deconstructing contemporary 
understandings of old age as a fixed and negative category (cf. Gullette, 1997; 
Featherstone and Wernick, 1995; Gubrium, 1975). As constructionist theories of 
ageing became common, there was a parallel increase of interest in the 
representations of older people in the media (Calasanti, 2007; Calasanti and 
Slevin, 2006; Powell and Longino, 2001; Bytheway, 2003; Twigg, 2000). This 
research was predominantly undertaken to provide empirical evidence in support 
of the social constructionist thesis, to emphasise that what is thought of as ‘old 
age’ is historically and culturally contingent (Blaikie, 1999).
An early example of this approach is Featherstone and Hepworth’s (1991) ‘Mask 
of ageing’ thesis in which they explore the mismatch between internal age (how 
we feel) and external age (how we look). They conclude that this incongruity stems 
from the negative images of ageing that predominate in contemporary society, 
causing us to reject our external appearance as it becomes closer to that of an 
‘older person’ (1991: 378). There are problems with this thesis, not least in that it 
implies an unchanging essential ‘self’ that dwells in a body whose only relevance 
is as an increasingly decrepit container (Oberg and Tornstam, 1999; Oberg, 1996). 
But since this ground-breaking article was published, analyses of images of later 
life have flourished within gerontology and it has become the norm to accept the
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power of representations in defining how the aged body and ‘being old’ is 
understood and experienced in everyday life (Featherstone and Hepworth, 2005: 
360).
Gerontology’s work on film fits within this framework and offers textual analyses 
through which the portrayal of older characters is deconstructed and critically 
assessed (Robinson, et al., 2007; Markson and Taylor, 2000). This has been used 
to explore representations of older characters in cartoons (Blakeborough, 2008; 
Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson and Anderson, 2006; Bishop and Krause, 1984) 
and in feature films (Woodward, 2006, 1999; Markson, 2003; Markson and Taylor, 
2000; Bazzini et al, 1997). Robinson et al. (2007), for example, explored the 
appearance of older characters in animated Disney films. Despite these 
animations containing relatively positive portrayals of older characters, they found 
that the older villains making up just 22% of characters were the ones that 
dominated children’s perception of older people, as children learned to identify 
them through stereotyped appearance (2007: 204). Robinson later undertook a 
similar analysis of older characters in teen films and found that, despite the 
majority having positive physical attributes, it was the stereotypical character traits 
that matched those expressed by teenagers when asked about older people 
(2009: 700, 705).1
In their analysis of characters played by actors and actresses aged over 60, 
Markson and Taylor (2000; see also Markson, 2003) found that such stereotyping 
is gendered: men are represented as heroic while women are more often than not 
cantankerous spinsters (2000:155; 150). Men tend to remain active in films, and
1 In conducting these opinion surveys, Robinson et al.’s (2009, 2007) offer a rare indication that 
analysis drawn from a film text on its own cannot necessarily predict the impact of representations, 
or the audience response.
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thereby maintain their source of power, while women are shown to embody ageist 
stereotypes, losing their sense of ‘self’ as youth slips away (2000:156). Markson 
and Taylor argue that this reflects and reinforces the cultural belief that a woman’s 
social value lies in her ability to procreate. The loss of this function becomes 
represented on the body by increased wrinkles and greying hair and, as such, 
visibly older women become devalued by society (2000:156). In her study of older 
women in French cinema, film theorist Martine Beugnet (2006:11) concludes 
similarly that these marginal representations reinforce western society’s view of 
older women as ‘death-like other’. Such analyses serve to identify important 
gender discrepancies in representation; showing that older men are often 
valorised while the visibly aged woman is presented as moral failure (Markson and 
Taylor, 2000:156).
As such, film representations are understood to contribute significantly to the 
‘double standard’ of ageing served to women in later life, as sexist stereotypes 
become compounded by ageism and the older woman is twice marginalised 
(Woodward, 1999; Sontag, 1972; de Beauvoir, 1972). But just as the 
representation of older people is seen to be problematic, cultural gerontology also 
cites what Beugnet terms ‘the exclusion of the old from the realm of the visible’ — 
the overwhelming absence in mainstream media of any representation at all — as 
contributing to marginalisation in later life (Beugnet, 2006: 3; Bildtgard, 2000; 
Markson and Taylor, 2000). And while recent hit films such as Best Exotic 
Marigold Hotel (2012) and Expendables (2010) -  featuring casts dominated by the 
over-50s -  suggest that this absence seems to be changing (Cox, 2012a; McNary, 
2010), Chivers (2011) argues that the growing number of older actors on screen is 
yet to resolve any problem: ‘old’ age is still reduced to a fixed and manageable
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stage of life that can be sufficiently represented through a series of stereotypes.
As she explains, ‘Although the plots have changed, the idea that age is physical, 
and physically demeaning, has not... a crows foot still signifies the passage of 
time, and symbolises decay rather than improvement’ (2011: XVIII).
One continued absence is that of sexually active older characters and this, too, 
has been shown to have a gendered dimension: older men are more likely to be 
presented on screen as sexually active, but in relationships with younger women 
(Vares, 2009). Thus, in the absence of wider narratives about the sex lives of older 
people, representations turn to stereotypes to fill the void in information (Walz, 
2002:111). Significantly, Walz (2002) and Bildtgard (2000) argue that this dearth 
results in a cultural climate whereby in order to stay sexualised, older people must 
strive to avoid physical signs of ageing. This is a theme that is taken on and 
explored in work on representations associated with the anti-ageing industry and 
active-ageing policies. The general thrust of this work is important for this project 
as it frames issues around ageing in contemporary society that are significant to 
the increase in older audiences at the cinema.
Such literature emphasises that in consumer culture old age is presented as a 
matter of individual choice — as something that can, and should, be avoided by 
use of the appropriate product. This work often takes as its starting point the 
acknowledgement that since the late 20th Century there have been substantial 
changes in our experience of later life and its representations (Katz and Marshall, 
2003; Gilleard, 2005). No longer are age groups standardised or chronologically 
determined (Woodward, 1999). Instead, the boundaries have been blurred and a 
sense of timelessness constructed, supported by the new body technologies 
designed to resist the physical signs of chronological age (Calasanti, 2007;
Featherstone and Hepworth, 2005; Katz and Marshall, 2003). The growth of the 
Third Age’2 has resulted not just in the anti-ageing industry but also in a new 
policy drive for ‘active ageing’: the ‘young-old’ are encouraged to stay active to 
stay ‘young’, with youth now defined more through appearance, attitude and health 
than birth year (Hugman, 1999).
Until the 1980s when active ageing arose as a concept, the infirm minority of 
people over 60 had dominated public narratives of later life, and the shift in focus 
to the ‘young-old’ and ‘agelessness’ was initially welcomed by cultural gerontology. 
However, it has since been argued that rather than improve cultural perceptions of 
older age, these representations serve to further stigmatise ‘natural’ ageing and it 
becomes a moral duty to remain active as we grow older (Clarke and Warren, 
2007; Boston and Davey, 2006; Katz, 2000; Hugman, 1999). Similarly, in 
reinforcing the idea that ageing well is ageing youthfully, this representation — in 
policy, the media and gerontology alike — continues to valorise youth over age 
and does nothing to reclaim the physical signs of ageing as positive. Instead, it 
once again encourages us to avoid them for as long as possible (Calasanti and 
Slevin, 2006; Katz and Mashall, 2003; Bytheway, 2000).
The main focus of the work discussed here is to identify, deconstruct and
challenge the stereotypes of older people (particularly older women) propagated
by the media through representations and their absence. Film here, then, offers a
powerful tool to cultural gerontologists exploring and evidencing a wider argument
2 The Third Age is a concept first suggested by Laslett (1989) to reflect a ‘new’ stage in life that has 
come with increased longevity. The Third Age sits between the Second Age (defined by 
responsibilities such as childcare and work) and the Fourth Age (dependency in later life), with the 
First Age being the dependency of childhood. In this framework the Third Age is understood as a 
time of independence and freedom, as the post-retirement generation have fewer responsibilities 
than those in the Second Age and but are still physically able and have an income in the form of a 
pension.
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about the social construction of old age as a fixed, knowable and stable category. 
Such work is important for this project because it helps to break down normalised 
assumptions about ‘old’ age and suggests film’s complicity in constructing them. 
However, the overwhelmingly negative engagement with film representation by 
gerontologists is complicated by the ‘quiet revolution’ with which I opened this 
thesis: the continual expansion of older audiences at the cinema, at a rate faster 
than any other age group. While the increase in films with older stars, and a 
growing number of films aimed at this market, is thought to relate to this audience 
expansion, this seems to be more the industry’s reaction to the growth rather than 
its cause (McNary, 2010). With this in mind, such literature raises the question why 
such audiences are flocking to the cinema to watch films that have been shown to 
marginalise their age group. It problematises the focus on the abstracted film text 
and suggests that something happens to such negative portrayals in the moment 
of viewing. How, then, is film representation experienced in practice?
One of the ways in which this can be explored is by thinking through the body in 
the audience, as well as the body on the screen. If, as the above suggests, 
stereotyped representations or the absence of the older body in films mean that in 
‘real’ life the ageing body is read negatively, then it seems important to consider 
that ‘real’ body more closely (Twigg, 2004; Bildtgard, 2000). This is particularly 
important because, as I discuss below, the sensing body is fundamental to the 
understanding of cinema being formulated here. In fact, all of the articles and 
chapters referenced above include a short sentence or two toward the end 
acknowledging the importance of the corporeal body in representation — but it is 
neither theorised fully nor empirically explored (Walz, 2002:102; Bildtgard, 2000: 
172; Markson and Taylor, 2000:139; Hugman, 1999:194). There is, however,
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some evocative work elsewhere in gerontology exploring the materialities of the 
ageing body within a cultural framework that are of use in thinking through the 
older body at the cinema.
On the whole, work on the material body argues for a resistance of mind/body 
divisions and the recognition of the body as both receptor and generator of 
meaning (cf. Phinney and Chelsa, 2003; Wahidin, 2002; Twigg, 2000). As yet, the 
latter perspective has not been utilised in analyses of media representations, 
although there have been some moves in this direction (Walz, 2002; Bildtgard, 
2000). I hope to show that by combining these approaches in an analysis of 
cinema as practice, we can consider not just how representation is written onto 
older bodies but also how the lived bodies of the audience impact on a film’s 
meaning. The next section outlines some of the key work being done in this area, 
before I move on to discuss studies of embodied spectatorship with which such an 
understanding can be usefully combined.
2.2 Gerontology and the material body: exploring the corporealities of 
ageing.
As the above suggests, in order to escape the biomedical understanding of old 
age as natural decline, cultural gerontology turned away from the corporealities of 
ageing and engaged the material body only as receptor of culturally constructed 
meaning (Calasanti, 2007; Powell and Longino, 2001; Bytheway, 2000). In the last 
couple of decades, however, a number of researchers have been turning to 
alternative epistemologies to ‘bring the body back in’. As Twigg explains, the drive 
towards such analyses is the acknowledgement that ‘we need to recognise 
how...discourses [of ageing] are formed and take shape in a dialectical relationship
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with real bodies that experience real pain, sickness and death -  as well as other 
more enjoyable sensations’ (Twigg, 2004: 70). To this end there have been a 
number of studies exploring what it is to ‘be’ an ageing body (Phinney and Chelsa, 
2003; Wahidin, 2002), or to be a younger body working with older bodies (Twigg, 
2000). These empirical studies are supported by a growing number of theoretical 
arguments, calling for the incorporation of the corporeal into gerontology (Twigg, 
2004; Hockey and James, 2003; Harper, 1997). Developing a nuanced 
understanding of the physiological body as existing in a co-constitutive relationship 
with culture, this literature offers an opportunity to draw from the cultural analyses 
above while thinking through the body, engaging the theories of embodied 
spectatorship outlined below in such a way to make room for a consideration of 
social difference.
Harper (1997) was an early proponent of this perspective. Engaging with ideas 
developed by the feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz to overcome the 
constructionist/essentialist division in approaches to the body, Harper argues that 
the corporeal ageing body is key to the social construction of later life. In her 
understanding, negative corporealities are defined as such through the patriarchal 
discourse of control in which rational mind is valued over emotional body. Harper 
suggests that as men age physically they become less able to control their bodily 
functions, bringing them closer to the irrational body (and femininity), a status that 
corresponds to a loss of power and their lower status in society (1997:169, see 
also Calasanti, 2007). By (re)introducing the material body into analyses of the 
cultural construction of old age, Harper (1997) shows the importance of integrating 
corporeality to generate an understanding of the lived constitution of social 
difference along age lines. Her emphasis on overcoming the
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constructionist/essentialist division in understandings of the body resonates with 
the conception of embodiment that I attempt to incorporate into my understanding 
of cinema via Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990a) theory of practice, which shares with 
Harper (1997) a desire to avoid such binaries.
In calling on gerontologists to ‘theorise age and embodiment as mutually 
constituting accomplishments,’ Laz (2003: 503) further encourages such an 
approach. Drawing on interview data, she shows that her participants understand 
‘their experiences of embodied ageing as both material and representational’ 
(2003: 518). As such, she suggests, neither foundationalist arguments (in which 
the differences in bodies are seen as a pre-social explanation for the differences in 
society) nor anti-foundationalist arguments (in which the body becomes a product 
of representation) are sustainable. While she agrees with the understanding of age 
as a cultural construction that is ‘accomplished’, Laz is keen to emphasise the 
importance of recognising the corporeal body’s contribution to this 
accomplishment -  something lacking in analyses of representation (2003: 505). 
Bodies, then, are at once culturally produced and material entities, with neither 
state precluding the other (2003: 508). Laz (2003) points out, though, that people 
experience the ‘same’ embodiment differently: ‘corporeal facts never speak for 
themselves. Individuals experience and interpret these facts and act on them in 
concrete settings and in the context of highly varied biographies’ (Laz, 2003:517).
Both Laz (2003) and Harper (1997) provide valuable insights for this exploration of 
cinema as, when the body becomes an active participant in the construction of 
meaning, a co-constitutive relationship between embodied audience and 
representation is suggested. Their work shows that in generating an 
understanding of the impact of film representations of later life without considering 
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the material body, gerontology leaves an important element of cultural ageing 
unexplored. I believe that this calls for further research into the lived experience of 
representations and the meaning making process that occurs in the moment of 
viewing, a key concern of this thesis. The lack of attention to the sensing body is a 
problem that film studies also suffers from, but which has begin to be challenged 
by theories of embodied spectatorship. This approach has proved fundamental to 
the formulation of cinema as practice developed in this thesis, and the next section 
discusses it in some detail.
2.3 Bringing the body back in: theories of embodied spectatorship.
Despite the sensing body being a focus of early work on film, with the rise of 
screen and apparatus theory in the 1970s a (‘disembodied’) semiotic- 
psychoanalytic framework came to dominate the newly institutionalised discipline 
(Sheil, 2001; Stam and Miller, 2000; Shaviro, 1993). However, in the early 1990s a 
range of theorists challenged what they argued was an unacknowledged and 
unjustified idealist epistemology that took for granted the importance of a knowing 
mind at the cost of the body (Shaviro, 1993: Viii; Sobchack, 1992: xvi; Casebier, 
1991:1). Some attempted to remedy this from within the psycho-semiotic 
framework (Williams, 1991), but more turned to alternative philosophies (Shaviro, 
1993; Sobchack, 1992; Casebier, 1991). In this section I focus on three key 
manifestations of the encounter between film and the body: Laura Marks’ Deleuze- 
influenced concept of haptic visuality;3 Vivian Sobchack’s phenomenological film
3 Deleuze’s theory of film (1989, 1986) understands cinema as an event, in which the film is not a 
text to be interpreted but is instead an abstraction of movement and temporality that intersect in 
fluid ways. There is no fixed meaning in this theory. Instead, the film-image ‘becomes’ in the space 
between subject and object, dissolving the borders between them and generating a haptic 
encounter (Herzog, 2000: 85).
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theory;4 and Christiane Voss’s use of Sartre’s understanding of affect to think 
through film’s ‘surrogate body’.5 In different ways they all emphasise the 
importance of the corporeal body’s experience of moving images and in so doing 
begin to expose limitations to the media analyses from gerontology described 
above, in which the body is theorised as discursive construct. In short, these 
approaches begin to point toward the productivity of conducting an embodied 
analysis of cinema such as that adopted in this thesis.
Adopting a theoretical framework that takes in history of art and Deleuze’s film 
theory, Laura Marks (2002: 2) develops the concept of ‘haptic visuality’, in which 
we feel with the eyes and are drawn close to the image. This she opposes to ‘optic 
visuality’, in which we are distanced from the image and are able to apprehend it 
cognitively. Although Marks acknowledges that both the optic and haptic are 
involved in most ‘processes of seeing’ she argues, following Deleuze, that this is 
not a quality contained by all moving images (2000:184).6 Instead, it is an image-
4 Sobchack (2000) draws on Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, particularly his work on 
perception. Two key strands of his work are relevant here: first, that we are always already a 
sensing body-in-the-world but our awareness of this recedes with the development of the social 
mind (1962: xviii); second, we perceive the world synaesthetically -  with all of our senses. 
Importantly, these senses do not require intervention by knowledge to amount to perception. 
Instead, ‘the senses translate each other without any need of an interpreter, and are mutually 
comprehensible without the intervention of any idea’ (1962: 235).
5 In Satre’s understanding, affect becomes a dimension of belief based on ‘impressions’ and feeling 
whether something is believable, rather than reasoning that it is. Voss (2011) argues that if 
understood in this way the ‘affectation-by-something includes a temporary (and not automatically 
irrational) belief in the being thus of an object that appears’ (2011:138). It is through affect, then, 
that we can understand how we come to be immersed in film.
6 Fundamental to Deleuze’s (1989,1986) work on film is a distinction between the movement- 
image, which relies on cliche and on the sensory-motor-schema (cause and effect logic), and the 
time-image, which engages the senses to convey the inherent unknowability of the world (1989: 5, 
17 ,20).
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affect actively sought out by particular filmmakers, often artists, who are engaging 
the skin to make a point about the limits of representation (2000:12). In describing 
the films by video artists (2002) or intercultural cinema (2000), Marks often uses 
examples of images that are disrupted in some way. The argument here is that if 
an image is unclear then the mind cannot apprehend the object on the screen and, 
thus, can only make sense of it by way of the body, resulting in haptic visuality. 
There is an inherent spatiality to haptic perception, it ‘privileges the material 
presence of the image’, and in these instances we feel the image as we cannot 
‘see’ it (2000:163).
Arguing that ‘sense organs are the site where culture crosses the body’ (2000: 
199), Marks suggests that different cultures develop different hierarchies of 
sensoria, and these ‘sensoria can be translated into, and translate, cinematic 
languages’ (2000:206). Her use of the term haptic visuality, she explains, 
‘emphasises the viewer’s inclination to perceive’ haptic images as such, a 
response that depends on our culturally generated sensoria (2000:162). This 
suggests that the meaning of film representation cannot be understood as fixed, 
as certain films will resonate with certain cultural sensoria and not others: ‘the 
more one is able to engage with the sensuous memories called upon by the film, 
the more its audio-visual medium becomes merely a means of access to an 
ultimately synesthetic experience’ when it does not, we revert to a reflexive 
engagement (2000: 223, my italics).
This begins to challenge gerontology’s film analyses described above since Marks’ 
(2002, 2000) work indicates that the meaning made by (or with) film cannot be 
reduced to an analysis of representation ‘on screen’. Instead, the viewing body 
impacts upon such a representation in the moment of viewing. But while this is
relevant to my understanding of cinema, in her work Marks (2002, 2000) argues 
that haptic visuality is most relevant, indeed almost unique to, intercultural and art 
cinema. The application of her work by other researchers similarly relies on 
particular examples of haptic images, praised for this quality (the majority of work 
engages French art-house cinema. Cf. McMahon, 2008; Newton, 2008; Scholz 
and Surma, 2008; Beugnet, 2007). There has been some attempt at applying the 
argument to mainstream cinema but haptic visuality continues to be accepted as 
an extra-ordinary quality of particular (moving) images (Turnock, 2000: 263). This 
seems to add limits to an approach that, I believe, has a wider applicability. To me, 
the notion of haptic visuality can be used to expose a tactility and sensuality that is 
immanent in all moving images and I engage significantly with Marks’ work in 
formulating my understanding of cinema (see Kracauer in Hansen, 1993; Williams, 
1991).
My suggestion that our sensing body matters in film viewing contexts beyond 
those explored by Marks (2002, 2000) is supported by a number of other theories 
of embodied spectatorship. While Marks’ (2002, 2000) work emphasises touch, 
Sobchack (2004, 2000, 1992) adopts Merleau-Ponty’s concept of synesthetic 
perception — in which all of our senses are seen as working simultaneously and 
together — to explore the nature of spectatorship.7 As Sobchack explains, to
7 It is perhaps important to note that Deleuze has posed significant criticism of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. He argues that, despite claiming the opposite, Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
phenomenology of perception maintains a split between subject and world (Fielding, 2009: 85; Del 
Rio, 2005: 62). The key difference being that while Merleau-Ponty maintains that there is a 
‘methodological bridge’ between the thingness (for example, the film) and (always bodily) 
consciousness, for Deleuze, no such bridge is possible because thing and body dissolve into one 
another (Del Rio, 2005: 62). For Deleuze, we cannot be conscious of or perceive an image -  
‘consciousness already is the image’ and vice versa (Mullarkey, 2009:179).
26
Merleau-Ponty our senses are not a possession of the body; they constitute it. The 
lived body is ‘sensible. It is, from the first, a perceptive body’ (1992: 77). For him, 
the project of phenomenology is to tune into this perceptive body and offer ‘pure 
description’, free of too much theorising or analysis. It is to this end that Sobchack 
(2004, 2000) provides an analysis of the lived body in film viewing by offering an 
account -  from her body -  of watching Jane Campion’s film The Piano.
Through her analysis, Sobchack suggests an understanding of spectatorship as 
‘cinesthetic’, arguing that initial engagement with film is sensual, not cognitive, 
although the two always and necessarily co-exist (2000: 3). To Sobchack, the 
body is a carnal, messy, sensuous thing that would not be silenced by the mind. 
Instead, she argues that the lived body of the cinesthetic subject experiences an 
ambiguous oscillation between the ‘real’ and the ‘as if real’ that serves to 
momentarily conflate the lived body of the spectator and the representation on the 
screen (2000: 23). This again challenges notions of film representation that 
maintain a de facto division between film and sensing corporealities, discussing 
the body only in relation to the impact of negative representation. Instead, to 
Sobchack, the meaning of the body and the meaning of the film are seen to be 
fundamentally co-constitutive in the moment of viewing. This present tense, 
implicit experience, Sobchack argues, comes to be seen post-hoc as a cognitive 
representation because sense is ‘at once carnal matter and conscious meaning’, 
with the former devalued in scientific discourse (2000: 22).
Fundamental to Sobchack’s (2004) argument is her emphasis on embodiment as 
distinct from ‘the body' Rather than being reducible to the body, ‘embodiment is a 
radically material condition of human being that necessarily entails both the body 
and consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, in an irreducible ensemble’ (2004:
4). Both Marks (2002, 2000) and Sobchack (2004, 2000, 1992), then, suggest that 
the sensing body is of fundamental importance to our experience of representation 
-  and film -  in practice. All of this challenges the understanding of representation 
arrived at by conventional film studies. Rather than something separate from us, 
representation becomes constituted in the moment through the body.
Further reinforcing such an approach, French film theorist Christiane Voss (2011) 
argues that as an ‘illusion forming medium’, cinema relies on the spectators’ belief 
in that illusion -  a belief reached not just through rational assessments, but also 
through affect. Echoing the ideas discussed above, she argues that:
‘a certain degree of affective entanglement is necessarily part and parcel of 
the cinematic formation of illusion and... the spectator is neither object nor 
viewing subject of a technique of illusion that could be described 
independently of him or her. Rather, the film spectator constitutes, as a 
resonating body in need of further determination, the illusion-forming 
medium of cinema' (2011:139; my italics)
Like Marks (2000) she suggests that this means a different film might be made 
through a different resonating body. For Voss, though, this body can be 
understood as a ‘surrogate body’ which, by virtue of the ‘mental and sensorial- 
affective resonance’ of the film, "’loans” a three-dimensional body to the screen 
and thus tips the second dimension of the film event over into the third dimension 
of the sensing body’ (2011:145).
The body, then, becomes ‘a constituent feature of the filmic architecture’ (2011: 
145). Importantly for Voss, this ‘entanglement’ does not represent the loss of a 
sense of empirical reality. While we might loan our affective-belief system to the 
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film narrative, we still know that it is not real, as at the cinema we are ‘relieved of 
action’ — we know, for example, that we do not need to escape the fire on the 
screen (2011:140). This is because cinema’s affect comes not from verisimilitude 
but from illusory stimulation (see also Shaviro, 1992: 32). As such the ‘surrogate 
space’ produced by the resonant body of the spectator ‘necessarily features a 
temporal dimension that is at the very least double’, taking in the ‘temporal flow’ of 
the narrative on the screen, and that of the ‘empirical environment’, with perception 
of the latter significantly reduced during a successful illusory immersion (2011: 
145).
Voss (2011) engages notions of creative projection to think through an active 
embodied perception. Creative projection represents the additions provided to a 
film’s narrative by the surrogate body in the creation of cinema. One example of 
these ‘projective additions’ is the ‘disposition to endow film characters with one’s 
own biographical experiences and memories’, suggesting that different 
biographies and memories -  both with differentiating qualities -  enact different 
cinema, much like Marks’ (2000) cultural sensoria but on a localised level (2011: 
143). However, while these details may contribute to the illusion, if we start 
rationally thinking about them as we watch then we disintegrate the ‘surrogate 
corporeality’ so that the pleasure forming illusion is broken (2011:149). In my own 
research such biographical details emerged as significant to the embodied 
constitution of cinema and they are explored in Chapter Six.
Although I have focussed here on the in-depth exploration of embodied 
spectatorship undertaken within film studies, it is important to acknowledge that 
the spectator’s sensing body is not entirely absent from the geography of film 
(Lukinbeal and Zimmerman, 2008; Moreno and Aitken, 2008; Carter and
McCormack, 2006; Crang, 2002). Arguing against the ‘occularcentrism’ of work on 
film, Crang (2002), for example, joins Marks in drawing on Deleuze’s film theory 
and calling for recognition of film’s visuality as offering haptical engagement, ‘a 
practice of grabbling hold of, reaching out, apprehending and touching’ (2002: 
301). Furthermore, many emphasise the fluidity of meaning in the moment, 
depending on who is watching and the context in which they watch (Escher, 2006; 
Crang, 2002; Schonberg, 2002).
Escher (2006) argues, for example, that when watching a film, regardless of the 
landscape shown, ‘the audience perceives a landscape it has seen before’ 
processing ‘this substitute into its own subjective sense of perception’ (2006:309). 
What Escher (2006) argues here is that ‘representation’ should not be understood 
as fixed -  as easily classifiable as realistic or unrealistic. Instead, like Voss (2011), 
Marks (2002, 2000) and Sobchack (2004, 2000,1992) suggest, these are decided 
in the moment of viewing, in relation to the lived audience. This relates back to 
Crang’s (2002) Deleuze-influenced work as he claims that film flattens space so 
that it becomes removed from ‘historico-material narrative’. Once confronted with 
this ‘any-space-whatever,’ the spectator supplies its quantification. Here, then, the 
spectator stands among images, creating them, rather than ‘standing over them’ 
(2002: 23).
Taken together, the work from Marks (2002, 2000), Sobchack (2000), Voss (2011) 
and the scattering of articles in the geography of film indicate the importance of 
‘fleshing out’ our understandings of film meaning. In doing so, they emphasise the 
polysemy found through emotional and sensual responses, and persuasively 
suggest a working body that is actively involved in the moment that film becomes 
cinema. In bringing the body back in to work on film, this literature begins to
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suggest ways of understanding what Janet Staiger (2000: 37) terms the ‘perversity 
of spectators’: the ability of spectators to get something completely different out of 
a film text than that which is found there by film scholars.
Such an analysis read alongside gerontology’s work discussed above and 
Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) framework outlined in the following chapter raises the 
question of social difference to this formulation. If our bodies are fundamental to 
meaning made in the moment, what, then, is the significance of bodily difference 
at the cinema? How might differentiated bodies -  such as those of older women -  
practice cinema differently? While the work outlined here offers ways of thinking 
about the perversity of spectators through the body, and raises issues of social 
difference, it does not access either in practice. Indeed Voss (2011) acknowledges 
that she engages an ‘ideal case’ to explore her theoretical arguments and the 
same is true for all of the work described here. The spectator -  now embodied -  
remains imagined, with the exception of Sobchack’s (2004, 2000) description of 
her own film viewing. Perhaps because of this, while all, and Voss (2011) and 
Marks (2000) in particular, offer useful ways of thinking through the significance of 
social and cultural difference to embodied spectatorship or haptic viewing, this 
difference -  fundamental to my work — is left relatively unexplored.
Literature on embodied spectatorship offers one more insight for this thesis. By 
engaging the spectator’s body, it suggests a spatiality of viewing that is significant 
to cinema. Both Marks (2000) and Voss (2011) argue that despite co-immersion of 
body and film, the exhibition site (be it a bedroom or a cinema) remains important 
in the moment of viewing. Marks (2000) suggests that as we watch a film we 
simultaneously absorb extra-diegetic information from the viewing environment. ‘In 
short,’ she explains, even before the film starts ‘the cinema viewing experience is
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already multisensory’ (2000: 212). This sensuous viewing context, for Marks, 
inevitably offers materially constituted meaning to the work on display. Sobchack 
supports this by arguing that ‘our lived bodies (and our experience of them) is 
always also mediated and qualified by our engagements with other bodies and 
other things’ (2004: 4). To me this strongly implies the need to explore such 
spatiality to understand cinema as practice and this became significant in my own 
work. But Voss (2011), Marks (2002, 2000) and Sobchack (2004, 2000, 1992) 
remain predominantly concerned with the film itself and its relationship to the 
(mainly imagined) body, nodding towards but leaving unexplored the significance 
of material space to such a relationship. Perhaps surprisingly, the geography of 
film pays equally little attention to spaces of viewing.
In an attempt to develop a spatialised embodied analysis of cinema as practice 
that learns from the work outlined thus far and pays attention to social difference 
my work focuses on a particular audience group — women who attend matinees 
for the over 60s. Audience studies has long shown the different knowledge 
produced when we engage empirical audiences, and in the next section I turn to 
recent work on film audiences, particularly Boyle’s (2010, 2009) work which offers 
a closer interaction with cinema space, and with the viewing body -  offering an 
approach similar to that which I am adopting here.
2.4. Engaging the empirical audience: moving beyond the text and 
generating a sense of social difference.
Despite a strong tradition of work with television audiences (Hermes, 2009; 
Morley, 2009; Kim, 2006; Gillespie, 1995; Liebes and Katz, 1990; Ang, 1985), 
comparatively little work has been conducted with those of film (Thornham, 1999;
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Barker and Brooks, 1998; Stacey, 1994): Much that does exist is historical in 
focus, including a significant number of oral histories of cinema-going (Bowles, 
2007; Puwar, 2007; Labanyi, 2005; Martin-Marquez, 2005; Kuhn, 2002). Most of 
those concerned with contemporary audiencing focus on individual film texts or fan 
cultures, such as Barker and Brooks’ (1998) formative study of audiences of Judge 
Dredd. As a consequence the scattering of scholars undertaking research into 
contemporary cinema-going provide long overdue insight into audience members’ 
engagement with the practice (Barker, 2009; Rao, 2007; Fernandes, 2006). Of 
particular relevance to this project is Boyle’s (2010, 2009) study of screenings for 
new parents, predominantly mothers, and their babies held at the Grosvenor 
cinema in Glasgow.
Unlike the majority of film-audience studies which tend to engage audiences of 
particular texts, Boyle’s ‘begins with a cinema and an audience gathered within it’ 
(2010: 277). A new mother herself, Boyle conducted five months of participant 
observation as well as interviewing 25 fellow attendees in order to explore the 
intersections between these cinema events and the negotiation of recent 
parenthood. In this way, Boyle is interested in ‘what cinema is, or can be, for" 
(2010: 277; 2009: 262). While she found that films were not irrelevant, many of the 
women would go to the screenings regardless of what film was showing (2010: 
280). Going to the cinema, participants explained, helped them to feel ‘normal’ 
despite the big changes that they were experiencing as new parents (2009: 271; 
2009: 266; 2010: 283).
In finding that the women related to the films on the screen as much through 
discussions of the visual spectacle as those of narrative, Boyle argues that they 
occupy a space similar to that described by Gunning (1989) in his classic study of
the ‘cinema of attractions’ constituted by early film (2009: 261). Boyle suggests 
that, like audiences of early film, here both mother and baby were ‘learning how to 
be a cinema audience’ anew (2010: 280). As such, for the mothers it ‘became a 
site for the re-negotiation of identity and, specifically, their new relationship to 
public space’ (2009: 276; 2010: 280), offering ‘an opportunity to reconcile a former 
sense of self with their new identities as mothers’, although this did not always 
work (2010: 284). Situating her discussion within rhetoric around ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
parenting, Boyle suggests this was partly possible due to a certain solidarity 
among the audience, a sense that everyone was ‘in the same boat’, and therefore 
less judgemental (2010: 280). As such, Boyle argues, the pleasure gained from 
Watch With Baby Screenings stemmed from ‘the sense of belonging to a particular 
kind of audience’, emphasising a collective nature of cinema that also emerged in 
my research and which I have come to recognise as vital to the conception being 
developed here (2009: 267).
Boyle’s (2010, 2009) attention to the collective atmosphere at the cinema enables 
her to move beyond the models of social difference engaged by classic audience 
studies that have been subject to charges of determinism (Hermes, 2009; Morley, 
2009). By instead emphasising a social identity forged in the collective space of 
the cinema, Boyle (2010, 2009) implies a more emergent and dynamic 
understanding, an in-the-moment relational understanding of social difference that 
resonates with my own findings.
In conducting research at the cinema with a particular audience, Boyle accesses 
all three of the key elements I want to bring into an understanding of cinema. She 
considers the films seen (2010: 281), emphasises the viewing body’s sensory and 
affective responses (2010: 281; 2009: 271), and indicates the significance of the
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‘colonisation’ of the cinema space for the audience, as well as the cultural status of 
the exhibition site (2010: 279). In doing so, Boyle indicates the different 
understandings generated when the film on the screen, the viewing body, and the 
space of viewing are considered together and her work supports the value of 
generating an understanding of cinema that considers all three together, as I am 
trying to do here. I had already undertaken my own research by the time I read 
Boyle. When I did, the number of crossovers between our findings struck me, 
dealing as they do with very different life stages and differently formulated 
audiences. Where I hope to contribute to her insights is by paying closer attention 
to the co-constitutive relationship between film, body and space at the cinema, as 
well as by considering the significance of methodology in generating such an 
understanding.
The insights offered by Boyle’s work persuasively suggest the value of studying 
lived audiences — including the importance of paying attention to the identities 
and social difference being constituted in the shared space of the cinema as well 
as the impact this may have on representation in practice (Barker, 2009). And like 
Voss (2011), Marks (2000) and Sobchack (2000), Boyle (2010, 2009) also 
suggests that where we watch is important. But what impact do such spaces have 
on cinema in practice? How are the spaces of cinema constituted? It seems clear 
that to explore this question, the material spaces of viewing must be considered. 
While Boyle (2010, 2009) offers a rare example of such a consideration in studying 
contemporary cinema, there is a significant body of work exploring the historical 
practices of exhibition that has long considered the spatialities of cinema (Vijver 
and Biltereyst, 2012; Maltby, 2011; Allen, 2007; Maltby and Stokes, 2007; Hansen, 
1991). These studies offer an approach to cinema that has influenced mine
35
significantly, and this project in many ways began as an attempt to engage some 
of their insights in a contemporary context.
2.5. Engaging the ‘public’: studies of exhibition from film studies and 
geography.
In his exploration of the historical trajectory from animated photography to film 
Doel shows that, despite common assumptions, the arrival of film was not 
celebrated because of its ability to capture movement — this had already been 
achieved through the Kinetoscope. The notable difference offered by this new 
technology was, rather, the ability to project a moving image and release it from 
the small viewing boxes of earlier offerings (2008: 93). Exhibition and the material 
spaces of viewing have been fundamental to cinema from day one, but they 
receive surprisingly little attention in the literature (Maltby and Stokes, 2007).
Writing contemporaneously to the influx of cinemas into 1920s Berlin, the German 
cultural theorist Siegfried Kracauer’s (1987/1926; 1995/1962) analysis of the 
‘palaces of distraction’ was probably one of the first to highlight the significance of 
exhibition space to the both the film on the screen and the bodies of the audience 
(1987/1926: 91-92). While such an approach is rarely applied to contemporary 
cinema, over the last two decades critical film historians have been exploring this 
triad through historical analyses of exhibition practices (Maltby et al, 2011; Maltby 
et al., 2007; Allen, 2007, 2006; Rae Hark, 2002; Friedberg, 1993; Gomery, 1992; 
Hansen, 1991; Gunning, 1987). Their work can help chart one element of the 
approach to the material space of cinema that I adopt in this thesis, emphasising 
as it does the significance of cinema as public, collective, space.
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An early example is Hansen’s (1991) Babel and Babylon in which she explores the 
‘public dimension of [early] cinematic reception’ in America and its intersection with 
‘other formations of public life’. Hansen (1991) suggests that cinema at this time 
offered an ‘alternative public sphere’ in which women and newly urbanised 
working-class immigrants were able to negotiate changing identities, despite the 
increasingly universal address of Hollywood’s outputs (Hansen, 1991:11, 90-91; 
see also Bruno, 1993). However, the cheap price and rowdy atmosphere of these 
early ‘Nickelodeons’ gradually led to associations with the ‘uncivilised mass’, an 
association that exhibitors rejected once they realised the potential in recruiting 
audiences willing and able to pay a higher entrance fee. Significantly, their 
attempts to cultivate such an audience began with a shift in the venue design, 
upgrading from the wooden benches of Nickelodeons to the ornate environs of the 
‘picture palace’ (Hansen, 1991: 63; Gomery, 1992: 30).
The arrival of picture palaces in cities across the world led to a distinction between 
audience types, and an association of certain audiences with particular places of 
viewing (Aveyard and Moran, 2011; Biltereyst et al, 2011; Maltby, 2011; Allen,
2011, 2010, 2006; Meers et al, 2010; Wilinsky, 1996). This led to distinctive 
cultural geographies of exhibition that still exist today, albeit in changed form 
(Jancovich et al., 2003; Hubbard, 2003a, 2003b, 2002). One key study of the 
significance of such geographies of consumption in practice is Stewart’s (2003) 
detailed spatial analysis of the cinema-going experiences of southern black 
migrants to Chicago in the 1910s.
Accessing the ever-complex questions of the nature of cinematic pleasure 
experienced by black audiences from a new angle, Stewart explores not just what 
but where black audiences in 1910s Chicago would have watched. In doing so she
emphasises the effects exhibition sites have on spectatorship, providing an 
important reminder that such ‘public’ spaces of viewing can be exclusionary, and 
that where black spectators watched films had fundamental effects on their ability 
to immerse themselves in the experience. Stewart (2003) argues that while the 
segregated mainstream cinemas provided a demeaning and hostile environment, 
the all-black theatres in the ‘Black Belt’ of Chicago offered a welcome public space 
in which the new audiences could (re)constitute a public identity.
In mainstream theatres, black bodies remained conspicuous -  often squeezed into 
a seating section that kept black audiences separate from their white counterparts 
— and, with the social self ever present, immersion-in-film was disrupted (2003: 
672). Rather than conclude that this represents the complete experience of black 
spectatorship at the time, Stewart highlights that there are multiple modes of 
spectatorship. The black theatres provided an alternative space in which new 
African American audiences reconstituted the racist screen and asserted 
themselves through spectatorship, generating a collective public identity through 
this reconstructive film viewing (2003: 653).
Although concerned by a very different audience, and stemming from engagement 
with a distinct historical and geographical context, the conclusions of Stewart’s 
(2003) study have much in common with those of Boyle (2010, 2009) and Puwar 
(2007) in her oral history of South Asian audiences in Coventry between 1940 and 
1980. Keen to highlight the social role of cinema for this community, Puwar points 
out that ‘the social aspects of the space in which films are played and viewed -  the 
social scenes generated in the spaces of cinema -  have been overlooked by the 
prioritisation of scenes on the screen’, further arguing that:
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‘although audience studies have complicated the multiple ways in which 
films are read, the socialities and intensities produced among the screen, 
seats, steps and foyers [and fundamental to understanding cinema] still 
remain largely unexplored.’ (2007: 255)
In conducting an exploration of two specific cinemas, Puwar (2007) suggests that, 
‘the understudied social spaces of cinema have been sites for the constitution of 
social scenes in the public sphere’ (2007:255). Indeed, much like the newly 
arrived Southern black migrants to Chicago described by Stewart (2003), Puwar 
claims that these cinemas were used by her South Asian participants to develop 
‘public selves’ and carve an identity in a ‘racist British society’ (2007: 258).
For Stewart (2003) and Puwar (2007), then, as for Hansen (1991) and Boyle 
(2010), the public dimension of exhibition is fundamental to understanding cinema. 
The precarious nature of social identity implied by their analysis resonated with my 
own findings. The significance of cinema as a seemingly emancipatory public 
space is also emphasised in Giuliana Bruno’s (2002, 1993) work which section 2.7 
outlines in detail. Emphasising the importance of architecture to practices of 
viewing, Bruno (2002) draws on Kracauer’s (1987/1926; 1995/1962) work to 
suggest that we can be completely different spectators, and have an entirely 
different ‘movie’ experience, depending on where we watch a film. As she 
explains:
‘one can never see the same film twice. The reception is changed by the 
space of the cinema and the type of physical inhabitation the site yearns 
for, craves, projects and fabricates, both inside and outside the theatre. 
Thus we can be utterly different spectators when we watch the same film in
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different places, for different models of cinema are figured in the 
architecture of the theatre itself’ (2002: 45).
In offering an analysis of two exhibition sites -  a palace of distraction and an art 
deco monument to vision — Bruno argues that these designed spaces configure 
spectatorship in particular ways (2002: 44).
In her description, however, Bruno (2002) offers a representational analysis and 
treats the modes of spectatorship encouraged by particular architectures as fixed 
and inherent to the built form. Although she doesn’t draw it out, Stewart’s (2003) 
study suggests a more fluid understanding of the way bodies encounter the built 
form of viewing spaces. The architectural design of black and mainstream theatres 
was not significantly different, but audience practices and the corresponding 
engagement with the design formed the nature of the space: in both a de facto 
segregation was being practised, but in ways that produce quite different 
experiences for black audiences. In mainstream theatres this segregation 
fragmented the audience; in black theatres a collective public was formed -  each 
corresponding to different practices of spectatorship that were not determined by 
the built form but co-constituted with it through practice. The cinemas bought by 
South Asians in Coventry were similarly spatially indistinct but the ‘social cinema 
scenes’ were decidedly different to that found at other cinemas in the city. Perhaps 
it is not, then, just the design of such spaces that we need to acknowledge but 
rather the ways in which they are co-constituted through practice. I explore this 
lived understanding of cinema space in Chapter Seven.
The historical periods studied by Puwar (2007), Stewart (2003) and Bruno (2002) 
are chosen because they represent times of arrival: of South Asians to Coventry;
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of Southern black people to the integrated north of Chicago; and of cinema itself. 
But, while Puwar (2007) emphasises the need to explore cinema’s social scenes 
from the time when cinema-going constituted one of the main public social 
activities in Britain (a period she sees as having ended) my research suggests that 
the social element of cinema-going lives on and is co-constituted by the specific 
spatialities of cinema. This is an idea supported not just by Boyle’s (2010, 2009) 
work but also by Hubbard’s (2003a, 2003b, 2002) exploration of the growth of the 
multiplex, which is to date the most considered study of contemporary exhibition 
sites to be generated by a geographer.
Citing the multiplex as the reason for the resurgence of cinema-going that has 
taken place over the past 20 years, Hubbard (2002) sets out to understand how 
different consumer groups use cinemas. He explores the ‘spatial switching of film 
exhibition’ to out-of-town locations to examine why this might encourage more 
people to attend the cinema (2002:1240). For his research, Hubbard (2003a, 
2003b, 2002) surveyed residents of pre-selected neighbourhoods in Leicester, 
following up by undertaking in-depth interviews with 15 respondents who he asked 
to describe their last trip to the cinema (2002:1250). In doing so, he not only offers 
an in-depth engagement with the cultural geographies of contemporary cinema- 
going practices, he also provides a rare example of geographers working with the 
empirical audience and his work suggests the positive effects of doing so.
For his analysis he adopts the ‘dual city’ model, which some cultural 
commentators have claimed epitomises the postmodern condition -  one of 
fragmentation, insecurity and anxiety in which consumption has replaced 
production as economic force and identity signifier (Hubbard, 2002:1240). The 
‘dual city’ is demographically mixed but culturally separate, as ‘safe’ and
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‘dangerous’, ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ coexist but are increasingly, spatially, kept separate 
(Hubbard, 2002:1243). Having found that the only notable difference between the 
cinema-going habits of different social groups is their preferred site of exhibition, 
Hubbard’s question becomes whether or not the appearance of multiplexes as 
new spaces of consumption on the periphery of the city, and their subsequent 
popularity, are evidence of this fragmentation being written on the landscape 
(2002: 1243).
In a variety of ways, including thinking about the ontological boundaries of the 
body (2003a: 261), the ability to drive to the multiplexes (2002:1254), the 
perceived safety of the out-of-town sites (2003b: 63), and the avoidance of the 
‘Other’ (2002:1253), Hubbard asserts that the draw of the multiplex is the same as 
the draw of the city-centre cinema or any other: it is the ‘riskless risk’ of sociability 
in a predictable leisure space with people ‘like us’ (2002:1257; 2003a: 267). As 
Hubbard shows, these distinctions are mapped onto the landscape to produce 
cultural distinctions between places (see also Jancovich et al, 2003). By extension, 
this means that exhibition sites also offer the possibility of feeling out of place, 
even in less extreme circumstances than those described by Stewart (2003).
By raising issues of the body and spaces of viewing, and relating them to socio­
economic conditions to generate an understanding of contemporary cinema-going, 
Hubbard provides a productive starting point for exploring contemporary exhibition 
practices that maintains the importance of cinema as public social space. While, 
for the most part, he concludes that the distinctions between spaces run along 
lines of social class, he also indicates a difference among age groups significant 
for this study.
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Taken together, all of the literature on exhibition mentioned thus far highlights the 
importance of space in two key ways: the position of exhibition sites across space, 
and the constitution of cinema buildings as space. While both are significant to my 
question ‘how are the spaces of cinema constituted?’, the latter forms a larger part 
of the understanding of cinema as practice developed in this thesis. But while 
Hubbard (2003a, 2003b, 2002) explores such issues through engagement and 
comparison between different social groups, I am here enlisting a particular 
cinema event and audience constituency to explore my questions, and my 
research suggested a co-constitutive relationship between the ageing body and 
cinema space that is significant to my understanding of cinema. In generating such 
an understanding, I draw on insights from geographical gerontology, a literature 
interested by the spatialities of ageing. This work escapes the understanding of 
space as a predetermined entity or container for action, offering instead a co- 
constitutive analysis that has helped me more productively engage and contribute 
to Bruno’s (2002) insights.
2.6 Cinema architecture reconsidered: practising spaces of ageing.
The geographies of ageing have taken many forms over the last two decades. 
While this sub-discipline offers wide-ranging work, including the spatial distribution 
of the global ageing population and the resources available to support them, of 
concern here are studies that critically examine the spaces of ageing and the 
associated marginalisation of these landscapes in wider society (Andrews and 
Phillips, 2005; McHugh, 2000; Laws, 1996, 1995; Harper and Laws, 1995).
A pioneer of this approach, Laws (1996: 92) adopted a spatial analysis of ageing 
to explore how it might allow for a more nuanced understanding of the bodily,
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taking both the corporeal, the social and the relationship between them into 
consideration. In her analysis, Laws (1996) turns to the reciprocal relationship 
between the social and the spatial to understand how aged identities are 
(re)constructed by and reflected in built environments (1996: 91). To take this 
forward, she carried out a genealogy of the spaces of old age, beginning with the 
poor houses of modernity through to the ‘designer retirement landscapes’ of today 
(1996: 96). Her analysis highlights that these new landscapes of ageing require a 
very particular ‘aged’ body, one that remains ‘youthful’ -  much like the older body 
encouraged by the representations described in the first section (1996: 96). In this 
sense, the spaces and the status of ageing exist in a mutually constitutive 
relationship, and the relationship between ageing and place can tell us much 
about later life.
While Laws (1996) is keen to deconstruct the negative associations of spaces of 
care, her work nevertheless maintains the discipline’s focus on medicalised old 
age, despite the vast majority of people over 60 and under 85 living independently 
(Kearns and Andrews, 2005:16; Hugman, 1999:184). In an attempt to escape an 
institutionalised representation of old age, several gerontologists turned to 
analysing the home (Kearns and Andrews, 2005:17; Mowl et al., 2000). Moss 
(1997), for example, undertook research into how women with acute arthritis 
negotiated their home. In doing so, like Laws (1996), she moved beyond imagining 
space as a container used by people toward understanding the two as existing in a 
co-constitutive relationship. Hugman takes this point on and extends it in arguing 
out that older people develop spatial strategies to conceal the problems the ageing 
body causes, arguing that: ‘the ageing body uses space to manage identity’ (1999: 
197).
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This literature indicates the importance of understanding the spatialities of ageing. 
It shows how space and place are implicated both in negative portrayals of later 
life, and in producing a landscape of ageing that has a marginalising effect on 
older people in contemporary Western societies. But it also suggests that the 
changing practices of older age influence the shapes and meanings of those 
spaces. However, while it offers a considered approach to the built environment 
that is complementary to the analyses of cinema spaces above, I could not find an 
example of work from gerontology that explores the social and public spaces of 
ageing. Undertaking such an exploration at the cinema leads to quite different 
‘spaces of ageing’ to those previously explored and to develop my analysis I have 
drawn on work being done in the geography of architecture, exploring the ways in 
which buildings are produced through embodied practice (Jacobs and Merriman, 
2011; Paterson, 2011; Degen et al, 2010; Kraftl, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2008; Saville, 
2008; McCormack, 2008; Jacobs, 2006).
As Lees (2001) explains, ‘architecture is about more than just representation. Both 
as practice and product it...involves on-going social practices through which space 
is continually shaped and inhabited’ (2001: 53). To understand buildings in this 
way, Lees (2001) draws on recent geographies of consumption, which contest the 
linear producer-consumer model such as that suggested by Bruno’s (2002) 
analysis of the two cinemas, to argue consumption as a productive process. She 
argues that such an approach enables us ‘to explore the ways that the built 
environment is shaped and given meaning through active and embodied practices 
by which it is produced, appropriated and inhabited’ (2001: 55). Jacobs and 
Merriman (2011) similarly argue that by embedding understandings of architecture 
in practice, we can productively escape conventional understandings that tend to
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look at the architect’s intentions and the built form as stable and fixed. Engaging 
architecture in this way enables us to move beyond the ‘artefact’ to a more ‘active 
and vital’ understanding of its being in the world (2011: 213).
Through alternative ‘inhabitations’, they argue, we become producers. In the 
course of our everyday lives we continually produce, and are produced by, 
architectural forms -  an approach that offers a productive re-engagement with 
Bruno’s (2002) work and which is representative of the relational production of 
cinema space that I found in my research. Throughout my fieldwork, I was struck 
by the ways in which I repeatedly experienced the familiar interior space of the 
cinema anew through the ways in which participants pre-reflexively engaged its 
materialities to enable increased mobility. This everyday (re)negotiation and co­
constitution of cinema space and embodied practice became fundamental to the 
understanding of cinema developed in this thesis and while it stemmed 
predominantly from my engagement with the everyday practice in situ, I draw 
heavily on the literature discussed here to fully shape the emerging conception of 
cinema space in Chapter Seven.
However, when at the cinema the material space of viewing does not represent the 
sum of the spaces that should be considered in asking how are the spaces of 
cinema constituted? Instead, an engagement with the geography of film and 
Bruno’s (2002) work introduced above suggests strongly that the spatio- 
temporalities on the screen are significant too.
2.7 Spatialising cinema: the geography of film and revisiting haptic visuality.
The geography of film began with a concern for the relationship between the 
representation of place and its real-world counterpart. With the arrival of the crisis
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of representation, however, the distinction between real and reel is no longer 
understood as so clear-cut and film has become a legitimate object of study in its 
own right (Lukinbeal and Zimmerman, 2008; Orueta and Valdes, 2007; Aitken and 
Dixon, 2006; Escher, 2006). With this shift films have come to be understood as 
‘the temporary embodiment of social practices that continuously construct and 
deconstruct the world as we know it’ (Cresswell and Dixon, 2002: 3; see also 
Aitken and Dixon, 2006: 329). Once a marginal concern, Aitken and Dixon (2006: 
326) claim that the geography of film has ‘come of age’ and now engages the 
wider discipline’s understanding of landscape, spatialities, mobilities, scales and 
networks to offer spatialised analyses of film texts, reconsidering these concepts in 
light of this engagement (Aitken and Dixon, 2006).
Recently, drawing on postmodernist theorist Fredric Jameson (1995), geographies 
of film have started to explore these themes by approaching films as a form of 
‘cognitive map’ providing access to ‘meaning creation and identity formation’ in 
society (Lukinbeal, 2004: 247). As Clarke (2008) explains, ‘film permits an 
exemplary understanding of the way that society speaks to itself about its spatial 
constitution’ (2008:102). Films are analysed as a form of social cartography -  a 
map of society’s fears, hopes, desires and anxieties that show the ways in which 
such ‘social and cultural meanings are intertwined with space, place, scale and 
narrative’ (Lukinbeal, 2004: 248).
This is an important insight and relates to one of the most enduring 
interdisciplinary engagement of film studies and geography: that of cinema and the 
city. Or, to be more precise: cinema and urban (post)modernity (Hallam et al,
2008; Farish, 2005, Dimendberg, 2004; Bruno, 2002; Donald, 1999; Clarke, 1997; 
Charney and Schwartz, 1995; Natter, 1994; Friedberg, 1993; Hansen, 1991).
These studies engage with the historical specifities (social, political, economic, 
technological) that gave rise to the modern city and to cinema, arguing that one 
could not have come to exist without the other (cf. Clarke, 1997:10-11; Bruno, 
1993). The contemporaneous development of technologies of speed and travel, 
such as the car and train, as well as the Fordist production lines manufacturing 
them, were bringing about a changed ‘perceptual landscape’ that film, as a spatio- 
temporal medium, could talk to and enhance (Hallam, 2010: 279; Clarke and Doel, 
2005; Schonfeld, 2002).
Doel (2008) points out that the development of editing enabled film to cease being 
purely ‘referential’ and instead ‘manipulate and manufacture space and time’, 
leaving it free to become a ‘simulacral medium’ that could produce a ‘reality-effect’, 
rather than merely a representation, and therefore better talk to the modern 
condition (2008: 96). In this historical context, Clarke (1997:3) explains, ‘the 
spectacle of the cinema both drew upon and contributed to the increased pace of 
modern city life, whilst also helping to normalise and cathect the frantic, 
disadjusted rhythms of the city’. Cinema ‘reflected and helped to mould the novel 
forms of social relations that developed in the crowded yet anonymous city streets; 
and both documented and helped to transform to social and physical space that 
the modern city represented’ (1997:3). But the connection between cinema and 
the city did not fade with the early days of modernity. Instead, it is considered to 
have ‘paved the way for the postmodern condition’ (Clarke, 1997: 6; see also 
Friedberg, 1993: 2), with cultural theorists from Benjamin to Baudrillard observing 
‘the curious and telling correlation between the mobility and visual and aural 
sensations of the city and the mobility and visual and aural sensations of the 
cinema’ (Sheil, 2001:1).
48
This has resulted in many works exploring the co-constitutive relationship between 
film and the city (Hallam, 2010; Roberts, 2010; Webber and Wilson, 2008; 
Brundson, 2007; Dimendberg, 2005; Neumann, 2001; Ford, 1994; Natter, 1994).8 
While all of this literature implies a viewing body, it is rarely given much attention in 
analyses. But Bruno’s (2002) work, introduced above, combines two of my key 
interests because she engages debates on the city and cinema to generate a 
distinctly spatial understanding of embodied spectatorship that develops the 
arguments from Voss (2011), Sobchack (2004, 2000,1992) and Marks (2002, 
2000) above. Along with Friedberg (1993) and Clarke and Doel (2005), Bruno 
argues that: ‘By changing the relationship between spatial perception and bodily 
motion ... [modernity’s] new architectures of transit and travel culture [produced a 
new spatiovisuality and] prepared the ground for the invention of the moving 
image’ (2002:17). Focussing on this spatiovisuality, Bruno emphasises the 
journeys taken at the cinema and conceptualises the female spectator as a 
'voyageuse' who, at the turn of the 20th century, found a new public mobility by 
walking in and through the spaces of film, a journey determined in part by the 
exhibition site (Bruno, 2002: 56). In this way Bruno spatialises film viewing away 
from the screen and explicitly brings the spectatorial body in to play.
In finding a path through cinema history by way of architecture, Bruno ‘partakes in 
a shift away from the long-standing focus of film theory on sight and toward the 
construction of a moving theory of site’ (2002:15). She persuasively insists that 
we need to intersect conventional film theories with the lived history of space, a
8 There have also been a number of studies of cinema-going in this early period that argue this 
focus on the urban is misguided (cf. Allen, 2007; Fish, 2007).
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genealogy that stems back to ‘[t]he historical deployment of mapping, [which] with 
its spatial renderings of affects, is film archaeology’ (2002: 276). As such, we need 
to make room for ‘the sensory spatiality of film’ because our engagement with 
space, including that of all filmic space, ‘occurs through an engagement with touch 
and movement’ (2002:16).
Bruno’s (2002) work, then, is complementary to Marks’ (2002, 2000) but she 
extends it to develop a haptic reading of all cinematic space. Importantly, for 
Bruno, ‘haptic’ is not just a sense of touch, a tactile engagement, it ‘is also related 
to kinesthesis, the ability of our bodies to sense their own movement through 
[emotional and geographic] space’ (2002: 6). As such, at the turn of the 20th 
century, Bruno argues that film’s haptic visuality offered women of all walks of life 
a new form of mobility and a route to public space (2002: 77). This argument of 
course resonates with the historical exhibition studies outlined above but here 
emotion, understood within a psychophysiological framework as a state of the 
body, emerges as key to this mobility — we move through filmic space via 
emotion, entering the cinematic world as it enters our emotional one (2002: 250). 
When we go to the cinema our senses, albeit phantasmagorically, move us -  we 
move through the film as it moves (through) us (2002: 64 -65; 254; 288). Haptic 
visuality for Bruno, as for Marks, is reciprocal, and emotion becomes the mediating 
force between the screen and spectator, capable of taking the voyageuse 
elsewhere (2002: 92).
By combining this embodied and spatial understanding of film with an interest in 
the spaces of viewing, Bruno’s (2002) work speaks to many of the concerns my 
questions raise. By taking her work to the cinema and applying her concepts to
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empirical research with audiences I hope to build on Bruno’s (2002) insights to 
develop an understanding of cinema as spatial and embodied practice.
Conclusion: Proposing an understanding of cinema.
As the above begins to suggest, during my research, and in the process of 
preparing for and writing this thesis, three elements of cinema have recurred that 
are key to my understanding of cinema. These are: the film on the screen, the 
viewing body, and the space of viewing. They represent three core themes that 
run through the literature I have engaged from the key disciplines geography, 
gerontology and film studies -  broadened here to incorporate literature not directly 
related to, but nevertheless useful in, understanding cinema. But they also relate 
to three of my research questions raised in the introduction and, as such, provide 
an indication of the core thematic strands of this thesis. It was this literature, read 
through Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) theoretical framework, which conjured my 
questions that, in turn, directed my attention to the thematic strands this thesis.
Taken together, my hope is that this discussion shows the productive points of 
intersection between work from gerontology, geography and film and audience 
studies. It is very rare to find a study that incorporates all three elements (body, 
film, space) that I found key to understanding of cinema. The detailed film 
analyses offered by gerontology indicate the significance of film representations to 
perception in everyday life, including perceptions of people and place. This work 
highlights the politics of such representations and their ability to co-constitute 
social identity, particularly that of older women. It powerfully evidences the 
existence of ageism in contemporary culture and suggests the complicity of film 
representation in the social marginalisation of older bodies. However, when these
51
overwhelmingly negative perceptions of the relationship between film and ageing -  
drawn from analyses of film texts -  are read in the context of audience data that 
suggest older people enjoy going to the cinema, I was left wondering, how is 
representation experienced in practice? A key question for this thesis, and one 
that helped draw out the significance of the viewing body and cinema space to 
generating the understanding of cinema explored in the following pages.
The interest in embodied spectatorship within film studies provides provocative 
theories on how we might think through the body and film, emphasising the 
significance of the sensing body (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 2004, 2000; Marks,
2002, 2000). Engaging this work alongside gerontology, however, highlights the 
need for social difference to be incorporated more fully into such analyses. 
Audience studies offers detailed analyses of how social identities relate to shifting 
media effects, but the body is present only as an external signifier of difference — 
Boyle’s (2010, 2009) work with the audience at watch with baby screenings 
suggests a more precarious understanding is required. Combined, these 
approaches suggest the need to consider not just the viewing body when 
analysing representation, but also the significance of difference in our cinema- 
going more broadly. As such, it drew me to ask how differentiated bodies might 
practice cinema differently; a question that, as suggested above, raises the 
significance of where we watch.
A growing number of studies exploring historical exhibition practices indicate the 
significant shift in approach when we start to think on these terms. By engaging 
with the material spaces and practices of viewing, the public and social 
dimensions of cinema are emphasised, and film analyses are exposed as 
decontextualised readings of texts that are in fact often given shape through lived
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audiences. Although this begins to suggest a co-constitutive relationship between 
the audience and the space of viewing, the insight often ends at the entrance to 
the cinema itself. In my research I found a distinct embodied relationship to the 
space of the cinema, in which it seemed to be co-constituted with practice. This 
approach has much in common with geographical gerontology and for my own 
analysis I combine insights from this work with learnings from the critical 
geography of architecture concerned with the constitution of buildings through 
practice. How, then, might ageing bodies co-constitute the cinema? How are the 
spaces of cinema constituted?
Cinema is lived. It is embodied and it is spatial. And, while it inevitably involves 
films, it is not reducible to them, just as our understanding of films should not be 
reduced to an academic’s reading of the ‘text’ (Smith, 2002). As this suggests, the 
historical studies of exhibition, such as Hansen’s (1991), Stewart’s (2003) and 
Puwar’s (2007), as well as Boyle’s (2010, 2009), and Bruno’s (2002,1993) work, 
come closest to the approach to cinema these questions lead me to adopt. 
However, by learning from their insights, and engaging a variety of other 
literatures, my work aims to build on rather than reproduce their findings. One of 
the key ways in which I propose to do so is through the engagement with 
Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) theory of practice and the next chapter outlines this 
framework that has so influenced my understanding of the literature discussed 
thus far, and which is fundamental to the understanding of cinema that underpins 
this thesis.
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Chapter Three. Engaging with Bourdieu’s practice theory
The previous chapter set out my desire to develop an understanding of cinema as 
practice. In doing so, I aim to combine the many productive approaches to film and 
exhibition outlined, while drawing together the oft-separated concerns with the 
body, the film and exhibition -  which I predominantly engage spatially. In many 
ways developing such an approach is to learn from the powerful studies produced 
on historical exhibition practices, which emphasise the audience, spatialities of 
exhibition and the film on the screen (Bilteryst, 2012; Puwar, 2007; Stewart, 2003; 
Kuhn, 2002; Hansen, 1991) and bring their approach to bear on contemporary 
cinema-going. Boyle (2010, 2009) has already indicated how productive such an 
application can be, this project seeks to build on her insights through an 
engagement with practice theory.
Practice theory offers a different starting point to the approaches outlined in the 
previous chapter, encouraging different questions (Couldry, 2004:121). However, 
as Schatzki (2001) has shown, there is no singular theory of practice, and 
although widely used the term is not universally understood. He identifies four 
distinct types of practice theory, each an umbrella for a variety of theorists 
(Shatzki, 2001:11). The purpose of the current discussion is not to offer an 
extensive debate on the nature of practice theory or the various different 
approaches to it, but is instead to spend some time outlining the ways in which the 
theory of practice I have adopted can help explore the questions posed by existing 
literatures. Key to this is outlining the framework through which I attempt to 
develop an integrated understanding of cinema as practice — one that considers 
the social body of the audience, with the films screened and spaces of viewing as 
inseparably intertwined.
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I am not the first to suggest that we recognise cinema-going as practice, and I 
begin the chapter with a discussion of Srivinas’s (2010a, 2010b, 2002, 1998) 
instructive research on cinema-going in India. Taking this as a launch point, I 
move on to outline Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, via its many critiques, and 
identify the ways in which it provides a productive theoretical framework through 
which the project started by Srivinas can be further developed. I hope that this 
chapter serves as a persuasive testimony to the value that Bourdieu’s practice 
theory holds for understanding cinema. What his theory does not do, of course, is 
magically provide a definitive answer to the many questions grappled with in work 
on film and cinema for over a century. But this should not be the aim. Instead I 
engage his theory as a tool through which, alongside my empirical work, I 
generate a conversation between important insights in existing literature that are 
generally kept separate. In generating such a conversation, I hope to offer another 
piece to the patchwork of understandings -  those already developed and those 
still developing.
1. Cinema-going in Bangalore: a study of cinema-going as practice.
Despite a continuing tendency for studies to explore either f\\rr\ (as in the 
geography of film, theories of embodied spectatorship and cultural gerontology) or 
exhibition contexts (such as the work in film histories, or Hubbard’s study of 
cinema-going in Leicester) there are, as I have already shown, some exceptions to 
this rule, and I am by no means the first to suggest the value of an understanding 
of cinema-going as practice(d). In recent years, an anthropology of media has 
developed, interested in the practices of media consumption and the relationship 
to, for example, national film cultures, or subversive political movements (cf. Rao, 
2007; Fernandes, 2006). In response to this rich work, and the broader ‘practice
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turn’ to which it belongs, media studies theorist Nick Couldry (2004) published a 
rallying cry for his disciplinary colleagues to adopt practice theory and develop a 
new paradigm of media research.9 The most sustained consideration of cinema- 
going as practice that I could find is Srivinas’s (2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998) 10-year 
study in Bangalore, India.
Taking as her starting point the recognition that even work which acknowledges 
the audience as active consumers neglects the in situ act of watching films, 
Srivinas (2010a; 2010b; 2002; 1998) sets out to explore what people do when they 
go to the cinema, and to consider its broader implications (1998: 323). In doing so, 
she argues that an element of our understanding of film that has thus far been 
overlooked is the ‘way in which it is elaborated in public settings’ (2002:156). 
While she doesn’t engage historical analyses or reception theory, this argument 
has much in common with such work. She differs significantly, however, in her 
methodology. Pointing out that most research with audiences is conducted after 
the viewing event (1998:324), Srivinas instead -  like Boyle (2010, 2009) -  
undertook participant observation at cinemas across the city, as well as 
conducting interviews with audience members, exhibitors and producers alike. Her 
aim is to develop a ‘socially situated’ understanding of ‘actual audiences’ (2010b: 
291). Unlike Boyle (2010, 2009), Srivinas purposefully approaches cinema-going 
as practice, and in doing so she observes that some of the more significant 
elements of cinema-going -  namely embodied practices, and the viewing habits 
they imply -  are also the most ignored in existing work on contemporary cinema- 
going (2010b).
9 It is perhaps important to note that I do not make any claim to being part of such a ‘paradigm’ and 
also that this notion has been criticised even by those who support Couldry’s general argument
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In taking this as her starting point, Srivinas is not just interested in accessing film- 
spectator relationships through practice, she is also keen to highlight that the (still) 
dominant understanding of spectator-as-passive-consumer is based on a 
decidedly western understanding of cinema-going -  more specifically, on 
researchers’ experiences of attending the cinema in the west (1998: 330). Due to 
the predominantly silent practice of cinema-going in western cultures, she argues, 
these theorists were unable to access the active elements of film-viewing practices 
in situ (2002:172). In India, however, members of the audience loudly 
communicate with one another, as well as with the film on the screen, so that an 
understanding of the audience as active is easier to develop (1998:325). She 
concludes that far from being passive consumers, the audience’s practices are 
influential in how they (as individuals and collectively) experience the cinema. It is 
perhaps important at this juncture, then, to explain that I do not present her work 
here in order to later generate a form of cultural comparison between practices of 
cinema in Britain and India. Rather, I outline her work because, despite this 
different cultural context, she offers an approach to cinema similar to that which I 
attempt to develop in the following pages. For this reason I would like to dwell a 
while on her arguments here as they resonate with my own research and, I hope, 
indicate the different knowledges produced when we explore cinema as practice.
Srivinas suggests that Indian audience practices don’t just amend film meaning in 
the moment of viewing; they have amended film form itself. In contrast to 
Hollywood film in which the opening scene is often crucial to the unfolding 
narrative and ‘requires’ a focussed audience, Hindi films often open with a long 
and loud dance sequence containing very little to do with the overall narrative 
(1998:329). This is, she suggests, a creative response to the typical Indian
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audience arriving late and chatting loudly before finally settling down. Such a 
narrative structure also reflects the audience’s approach to attending the cinema, 
whereby the social encounters far outweigh the film as a motivation (2002:159 -  
162). Sociability is also the main draw cited by the new mums in Boyle’s (2010, 
2009) study, and in Bangalore it results in the common practice of moving in and 
out of the auditorium while the film is playing: an activity that, Srivinas claims, 
enables audience members to construct a narrative to suit their interests. They 
might return, for example, for all of the big dance numbers or action sequences. 
While she tends to emphasise this visible practice, Srivinas does concede -  more 
in line with viewing practices described in Boyle’s (2010, 2009) study -  that such 
‘selective viewing’ is not just achieved by actively leaving the auditorium, but also 
by providing varying levels of attention to the film (2002:166; 1998:329).
The sociality in Bangalore cinemas is so forceful that Srivinas (2010b) suggests 
the cinema becomes a public extension of the domestic sphere. Food concession 
stands are absent here as (predominantly female) audience members bring their 
own food, acting as host to family and friends (2010b: 297). Indeed, ‘social and 
interactive viewing’ is a fundamental element of cinema-going in India according to 
Srivinas (1998). Described as when ‘audience members make sense of the film 
through a filter provided by their interactions with others’ (1998: 330), this is a 
valuable insight into the ‘perversity of spectators’ (Staiger, 2000) enacted at the 
cinema and provides a way of acknowledging the fluidity of meaning without 
having to adopt a resistance/submission model. However, Srivinas insists that this 
type of viewing is unique to Indian cinema-going: ‘The emergent collective 
experience [of India cinema-going] is very different from the emotional experience 
which contemporary western audiences of Hollywood films may encounter and
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expect...In the theatre viewers demonstrate a sociability not seen with audiences 
of western cinema’ (1998: 330; see also 2002:164).
This links closely to Srivinas’s evocative concept of ‘participatory viewing’, a mode 
of engagement also understood as fundamental and unique to Indian cinema- 
going. As mentioned, audiences in Bangalore actively, loudly, engage with the film 
on the screen and each other. Some audience members even go so far as to 
watch certain films repeatedly in order to learn songs and dialogue, which then 
enables them to either join in, or to make well timed jokes that subvert the 
intended emotion of a particular scene (2002:168; 1998: 334). When a favourite 
actor or character appears, people cheer loudly or throw coins at the screen. 
Participatory viewing, then, describes the ways in which audience members make 
themselves part of the film-viewing experience. Rather than engaging with the film 
as a finished product, audiences use it as ‘raw material’ with which to construct 
their own meaning (Srivinas, 2002:164). This practice, Srivinas (1998: 337) 
suggests, brings the audience closer to the product and (re)positions them as 
producer rather than consumer, as what the audience does (collectively) 
‘transforms the experience of watching a film’. Importantly, Srivinas argues that 
this does not just alter the film’s meaning in that moment but instead ‘achieves 
permanence as it becomes lodged in the collective experience that other viewers 
have of the film’ (1998: 341).
When audience participation becomes central to the practice of cinema-going so, 
too, do the spatialities of cinema — as the people you sit next to have significant 
impact on viewing experience. The status of cinema as ‘public’ space is also 
important as, much like the women in Boyle’s (2010, 2009) study, as well as the 
audiences in the historical studies offered by Puwar (2007), Hansen (1991), Bruno
(2002,1993) and Stewart (2003), Srivinas argues that ‘[i]n India cinema theatres 
become important venues for the enactment and creation of public life...Part of the 
experience of watching the film is seeing others and being seen.’ (1998: 333; see 
also 2010b: 295-296). It seems striking to me that this diverse range of studies 
have resulted in similar key conclusions that are often argued by the writer to be 
unique in some way to a particular historical period or social or cultural group. With 
more and more work concluding that a fundamental part of cinema-going is the 
generation of a public or a public identity we need to begin to consider that it is not 
a property of a specific period or a group but is instead part of the practising of 
cinema.
Here, due to the spatial politics of the cinema, audience members carefully select 
where they sit as the stratified seating implies positions in society (2010b: 298 -  
299; 2002:163; 1998: 334). Indeed, many of the middle class women interviewed 
said that getting a balcony seat was more important than what film they watched 
(1998: 325). Such spatial segregation also extends to the locations of cinema too, 
as certain venues become associated with particular audiences and films (2010a: 
192). As Srivinas herself notes, her analysis of this geography concurs with 
Hubbard’s (2003a, 2003b, 2002) exploration of cinema-going in Leicester, outlined 
in the previous chapter. Both find that audiences prefer to attend cinemas with 
people perceived to be ‘like them’, and that this de facto segregation is written onto 
the landscape through the different cinema locations (Hubbard, 2002:1243; 
Srivinas 2010b: 294). Further, both Srivinas and Hubbard comment that to cross 
these spatial boundaries does not just imply social transgression but also 
challenges the ontological boundaries of the body -  something evidenced for
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Srivinas in the comments by middle class women that they won’t attend certain 
cinemas for fear of being touched (Srivinas, 2002:161; Hubbard, 2003a: 261).
Srivinas’s work demonstrates the valuable contribution that ethnographic work on 
contemporary cinema-going practices can make. Her long-term project engages 
with the relational nature of differentiated bodies at the cinema, the spatialities they 
co-constitute and the impact that this has on the film, not just in-the-moment of 
viewing but also in the production process. Through her concepts of social and 
participatory viewing, Srivinas highlights the in situ meaning making practices, 
while noting that the audience does not have equal ability to enact all meanings.
By developing a geographical understanding of the spaces of cinema, Srivinas 
develops a complex analysis that has much to offer not just the geography of film 
and film studies, but also this project.
However, Srivinas does not offer a definition of what she means by the term 
practice, nor does she engage with the ontological or epistemological 
repercussions of adopting such a framework. The absence of theory is common 
across the majority of media ethnography (Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee, 2008; 
Couldry, 2004). Indeed Postill (2010), who conducted a textual analysis of 
literature from anthropology looking at media practices, found that almost none of 
it defined the term or specified which theory of practice they engaged — the term 
‘practices’ was used in 93 different ways across 190 books, without ever being 
defined (2010: 4). He concludes that, ‘If we are to begin to understand what people 
do with media we need to engage with practice theory’ (Postill, 2010: 6). It is this 
lack of engagement with theory that I think leads Srivinas to make such stark 
distinctions between Indian and western viewing practices -  occasionally slipping 
into an active/passive dichotomy (2002). For example, in arguing that participatory
viewing practices mean that, ‘Indian audiences are consequently closer to the 
producers and less alienated from the product compared to their western 
counterparts’ (2002:172), she denies such active viewing to a western audience 
just because they are silent at the cinema.
As such, while I agree with Srivinas’s arguments about the importance of 
acknowledging that local practices of cinema-going and culturally habituated ways 
of watching will impact on a film’s meaning, the following discussion suggests that 
if we engage with practice on a theoretical as well as empirical level then the inter­
subjectivity, (embodied) biographies and co-constitution of film meaning described 
by her becomes vital to all practice, not just those in which such elements are 
notable to the casual observer. Indeed, I hope to show in the discussions of my 
findings in chapters Five to Seven that some of the elements described by Srivinas 
also exist in the apparently more subdued cinema auditoria in which I conducted 
my research.
Acknowledging Postill’s (2010) concerns, the next section moves on to introduce 
the central tenets of theories of social practice before moving on to outline key 
elements of Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) work which forms the backbone for my 
analysis of cinema.
2. Theories of practice.
In introducing his joint edited collection exploring the ‘practice turn’, Schatzki 
(2001) explains that there is no one coherent theory of practice, nor any universal 
understanding of the term. Instead, he identifies four disciplines from which 
theories have stemmed: philosophy, social theory, cultural theory, and science and 
technology studies (Schatzki, 2001:10; see also Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 2002).
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While all approaches offer what Schatki (2005, 2003) terms a ‘site ontology’ -  an 
understanding of the social as situated in practice -  they do so on quite different 
terms. Variance exists not just between these four strands but also within them. 
There are, however, a few key commonalities that are regularly pointed to in 
Schatzki’s work (2005, 2003, 2001,1997). Broadly speaking these are: first, 
practice is understood as the location of the social and, as such, constitutes the 
phenomena we should study;10 second, both subjectivist and objectivist theories 
of the social are seen to miss the significance of tacit knowledge; third, the 
majority of practice theorists think predominantly in terms of human practices;11 
fourth, most understand practice as embodied, although the nature of embodiment 
is differently understood and; finally, objects and things are important because 
they mediate practice (Schatzki, 2001:10).
This list of tendencies is generally understood to apply to Giddens’ (1984) 
structuration theory, Bourdieu’s (1977) theory of practice, the later outputs of 
Foucault’s (1990, 1988) discourse theory, Butler’s (1993, 1990) performativity, 
Latour’s (1987) studies of scientific practice, de Certeau’s (1984) work on 
everyday or ‘ordinary’ practices, and many more besides (Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 
2002; Schatzki, 2001). In locating the social in practice, this diverse group of 
theorists share a common aim — to overcome the inadequacies generated by the 
either/or approach inherent to both the objectivist focus on structures and the 
subjectivist emphasis on individual acts (Postill, 2010: 9; Schatzki, 2005: 467, 
2003:175, 1997: 284; Reckwitz, 2002: 245; Bourdieu, 1977: 2).
10 Practice is widely agreed to refer to ‘arrays of activity’, but there is divergence on what 
constitutes ‘activity’ and what the relationship between activities and practices is (Schatzki, 2001: 
10).
11 This is, of course, with the significant exception of those writing in Science and Technology 
Studies, or from an Actor Network Theory perspective.
Perhaps the most widely discussed engagement with ideas of practice in 
contemporary geography is work engaging a non-representational approach. 
Importantly, despite its name, non-representational theory is not in fact ‘a new 
theoretical edifice’ but is instead ‘a means of valuing and working with everyday 
practical activities as they occur’ (Thrift, 2008:112). It is ‘A mode of thinking which 
seeks to immerse itself in everyday practice’ (Cadman, 2009:1). This ‘mode of 
thinking’ is an attempt to challenge what counts as knowledge within contemporary 
geography, and avoid the ‘deadening’ effect of representational thinking. The aim 
is to instead generate an approach that emphasises the play, creativity and ‘push’ 
of the world, which is understood as ‘momentary, as always in the making of now3 
(Thrift, 2000: 556). The interest in practice is not the only element of this thinking 
that resonates with my work — Thrift (2008, 2004, 2000,1996) and others 
engaging his ideas emphasise the importance of the sensing body to 
understanding the ‘event’. The concept of affect is engaged to explore the ways in 
which we are moved to action without cognition.
Pile (2010) has shown the difficulty of working with, and the inconsistencies in, the 
understanding of affect put forward in non-representational theory. Key to this is 
the argument that affect, as a trans- or pre-personal force, is ‘non- or pre- 
cognitive, -reflexive, -conscious and -human’ and therefore can neither be spoken 
about nor captured (2010: 8). Despite this, the main thrust of the approach is that 
we must pay attention to affect because it is being manipulated and this 
manipulation is part of an increasingly mediatised political landscape (Thrift, 2004: 
66). What this results in is an approach that claims to be ‘valuing and working with 
everyday practical activities as they occur’ (2008:112) but which ends up offering 
quite distanced analyses (Thrift, 2008:112, see also 1996; for a criticism of this
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‘distanced’ approach, see Bondi, 2005: 438; Nash, 2000). Indeed, non- 
representational theories have paid attention to film as part of understanding this 
manipulation of affect but despite a shift away from studying representation, the 
focus remains firmly on the screen — not in the everyday practices of viewing 
(Carter and McCormack, 2006; Thrift, 2004). This points to what I consider the 
biggest source criticism: that, in the legitimate rally against the dominance of 
representational thinking, non-representational theory rejects it in entirety and 
ends up unable to engage the lived practices it claims to be so concerned with.
Thrift (2008) himself is not against representational thinking as such; he is instead 
against its dominance in cultural geography. His approach is an attempt to 
‘compensate for this deficit’ (2008:113) by offering a different way of thinking the 
world that emphasises the almost-theres, the non-cognitive, the imperceptible and 
that which cannot be represented. While this is an important venture, it has been 
often pointed out that the difficulty with a focus only on the fluidity and openness of 
affect, and the importance of the ‘creativity’ and ‘potential’ in every ‘event’, is that it 
doesn’t attend to the different access we have to making such creativity stick, to 
making the world otherwise. While Thrift (2008:114) is careful to point out that, 
‘[t]he potential of events is always constrained’, the body engaged in non- 
representational theory is ‘both universal and also prior to its constitution in social 
relations’ (Pile, 2010:11). As Tolia-Kelly (2006: 213) argues, The literature on 
affect is particularly inattentive to issues of power; negated is a focus on 
geometries of power and historical memory that figure and drive affective flows 
and rhythms’. It must be acknowledged, for example, that ‘a body that is signified 
as a source of fear through its markedness cannot be free to affect and be affected 
similarly to one that is not’ (Tolia-Kelly, 2006: 215).
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To this end, in his analysis of the development and ‘codification’ of ballroom 
dancing culture in Britain in the early twentieth century, Cresswell (2006: 73) 
argues that although non-representational ‘thinking has clearly opened up 
important new avenues for human geography’, its insights would prove even more 
fertile ‘by thinking of it in tandem with, rather than in opposition to, ideas about 
representation’. Our understanding of ‘bodily mobility’ must, he suggests, be 
positioned ‘within larger social, cultural and geographical worlds that continue to 
ascribe meaning to mobility and to prescribe practice in particular ways,’ anything 
else risks ignoring the still-powerful impact of representation and ‘inverting the 
age-old hierarchy of mind (representation, consciousness, culture) over body (the 
non-representational, practice, nature)’ (Cresswell, 2006: 59). I hope to show that 
Bourdieu (1977,1990a) enables such an approach by maintaining a sense of the 
world as constantly being produced -  of practice as unstable, determined in the 
moment and precarious -  while also acknowledging the histories and contexts that 
in different ways place limits on our capacity to practice the world otherwise.
3. Bourdieu’s theory of practice.
Writing a summary of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is a decidedly difficult thing to 
do. With a career spanning over 40 years and 25 books, Bourdieu never stopped 
defending, applying, adapting and developing his ideas and, as such, has left the 
opportunity to take a number of different perspectives from his work (Cresswell, 
2002; Wacquant, 1992).12 I nevertheless hope the following (brief) discussion 
shows that Bourdieu’s theory has much to offer an understanding of cinema as a 
spatial and embodied practice.
12 The key texts engaged with for this thesis are his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), 
Distinction (1984), The Logic of Practice (1990a), In other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive 
Sociology (1990b) and Sociology in Question (1993)
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Engaging with debates in French academia, Bourdieu (1977) was -  much like all 
practice theorists -  interested in overcoming the subjective/objective dichotomy 
dominant within the social sciences. He suggests that while structuralism (like 
gerontology’s media analyses) misses out on the essence of practice by valuing 
representation over action, phenomenology (as in Sobchack’s [2004] work on 
embodied spectatorship) devalues the importance of structures on the nature of 
individual practices (1990a: 52). Bourdieu argues that we instead need to 
acknowledge both objectivist structures and subjective engagement and recognise 
that they exist in a dialectical relationship. One of his key aims was to break with 
the notion that the actions of social agents are driven purely by rational conscious 
thought. This understanding of agency, he suggests, stems from the ‘objective’ 
scientific method, which reduces social life to a set of rules, presented in academic 
texts as the perception schemes of social actors. This interpretation, Bourdieu 
argues, generates an understanding of practice as fixed and pre-existing an 
individual’s engagement with the world. Much like Thrift (1996, 2000, 2003, 2004, 
2008) he advocates instead that practice, or action, should be understood to stem 
from an embodied, pre-reflexive, ‘practical’ logic (1977: 3).
While his work is fundamentally humanist, Bourdieu (1977,1990a) was equally 
keen to escape subjectivist understandings of the individual as the creator of all 
meaning (Schatzki, 2001:14). Although he borrowed certain elements from 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Bourdieu rejected his tendency to ignore the 
limiting influence of ‘external’ structures. He argued instead that in a differentiated 
society, social class shapes practical logic — we inculcate implicit expectations 
appropriate to our social position (1977: 81). Along with these expectations, we 
develop congruous bodily dispositions so that, as suggested above, our material
67
body is also inescapably social (1977: 94).13 What is essential to his theory is that 
such structures remain implicit and are reproduced through practice precisely 
because they are not, and cannot be, consciously registered in everyday life, nor 
in interviews with social scientists (1977: 79). He argues, then, that the source of 
action:
[R]esides neither in consciousness [as in subjectivism] nor in things [as in 
objectivism] but in the relation between the two states of the social, that is, 
between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the 
history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring 
dispositions which I call habitus. The body is in the social world but the 
social world is in the body. (1990b: 190)
Habitus, then, is fundamental to Bourdieu’s solution to the object/subject binary. It 
is also a vital concept for the understanding of cinema developed in this thesis.
3.1 Habitus.
As the quote above suggests, dispositions and bodily schemas make up our 
‘habitus’, a concept borrowed from Marcel Mauss, and Bourdieu’s term for the 
subjective incorporation of objective structures through which they are maintained 
but subtly changed.14 Mauss (1973/1934) adopted the term to move away from an 
understanding of bodies as individually determined and explain what he saw as 
culturally and historically specific ‘techniques of the body’. He argued that on
13 As Bourdieu explains, T h e  word disposition seems particularly suited to express what is covered 
by the concept of habitus [outlined below] (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first 
the result of an organising action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also 
designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular a 
predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination' (1977: 214, /?.1).
14 For an outline of the historical development of the concept, see Bourdieu 1990b: 12-13
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viewing shared habits within societies and other groups, ‘we should see the 
techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the 
ordinary way, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties’ (1973/1934: 73). He 
developed the term habitus to umbrella the social, psychological and biological 
elements of ‘man’ that he saw as ‘indissolubly mixed together’ (1973/1934: 73 -  
74). It is this integrated approach that continues in Bourdieu’s work, along with 
Mauss’ notion that these dispositions and habits are developed through pre­
reflexive imitation.
In Bourdieu’s work, habitus is suggested in place of rules as a guiding force for 
practice. The habitus is a ‘system of structured, structuring dispositions’ that is not 
just constitutive of practice, but constituted by it — most profoundly during 
childhood but habitus are continuously shaped across life (1990a: 52). These 
dispositions do not only influence the pre-reflexive ‘feel for the game’, they also 
show themselves in bodily hexis (how we eat, walk, look and so on), which in turn 
act as social signifiers of capital or ‘political mythology realised, em-bodied’
(1990a: 79). Habitus, then, are culturally, socially and historically specific but they 
also work to reproduce social inequalities, particularly those of the class system.
So although ‘[Habitus] is an open system of dispositions that is constantly 
subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that 
reinforces or modifies its structures’, it also exists in relation to social structures 
which are more often than not reproduced and serve to limit modifications 
(Bourdieu, 1992:133). In this way, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus enables a way to 
engage theories of embodied spectatorship while strengthening the consideration 
of difference offered thus far.
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Importantly, the deposited expectations of habitus are incorporated into our way of 
being so that to act in particular ways we don’t always have to think about obeying 
‘cultural norms’. Instead, that obedience is unacknowledged because we are 
simply doing what feels natural: The schemes of the habitus, the primary forms of 
classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they function below the 
level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or 
control by the will’ (1984: 468). Fundamental to this is the incorporation of past 
experiences into the body that influence our sense of the future (outcomes) and 
pre-reflexively guides our practice in the present (1977: 77). This is what Bourdieu 
terms embodied knowledge, and it is his way of thinking through memory. It is this 
sedimentation of the past in our present that, for Bourdieu, means there is 
immanence in practice as there are multiple possible futures, or outcomes (1977: 
76). This again echoes the openness of the world insisted on by non- 
representational theories but here such immanence is limited because although 
the outcome cannot be predicted, Bourdieu argues that by doing what feels natural 
we more often than not reproduce our position in society.
As such, while the notion of domination (in the sense of dominant and dominated 
groups) is key to Bourdieu’s social theory, he avoids there being a rational 
intentionality or hierarchical structure to it:
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of class condition) produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles of the generation and structuring practices and representations 
which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being
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the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating conductor (1977: 
72, original italics).
It is important here to underline Bourdieu’s use of the term durable, and note that it 
does not imply fixity, despite him often being accused of such an argument.
We can see the implicit learning of the habitus may be similar for those born into 
similar environments and histories, and Bourdieu argues that this is the genesis of 
social groupings, especially that of social class, because a ‘homogeneity of the 
mode of production of the habitus (i.e. of the material conditions of life, and of 
pedagogic action) produces a homogenisation of dispositions and interests’ (1977: 
64). These result in naturalised groupings of what us right for ‘us’ and ‘them’ that 
serves to reinforce such homogeneity (1984: 480) -  a tendency reflected in 
Hubbard’s (2002) analysis of cinema-going in Leicester. These homogenous 
habitus, however, do not imply that each person sharing a class habitus will be the 
same, or conduct practices in exactly the same (predictable) way. Instead,
Bourdieu insists that individual experiences influence the habitus. The habitus ‘is 
the product of all biographical experience (so that, just as no two individual 
histories are identical, so no two habitus are identical, although there are classes 
of experiences and therefore classes of habitus — the habitus of classes)’ (1990b: 
191, original italics). Classes, then, are the aggregate of individual agents with 
shared habitus, but their class position should not be understood as determining 
particular behaviours.
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As I hope is becoming clear, habitus can usefully complement understandings of 
embodied spectatorship by emphasising the importance of the sensing, feeling, 
material body while also exploring the important ways in which it is, in part, shaped 
socially. For example, we can begin to see that habitus -  social made body -  will 
pre-reflexively influence how we feel when watching a film. As such, the embodied 
co-constitution of film in the moment of viewing described by Marks (2002, 2000), 
Sobchack (2004, 2000, 1992) and Voss (2011) will in part be determined by our 
(always in process) social position which is, in turn, produced relationally. This 
particularly enables an extension of Marks’ (2002) concept of ‘cultural sensoria’ as 
we can begin to see it working within not, just across, national cultures. Similarly, 
Bourdieu’s argument that social position is never determining, never the full story, 
and that habitus are instead inflected with personal biographies, enables an 
engagement with Voss’s (2011) idea of ‘projective additions’ without necessarily 
requiring recourse to cognition. This relates to perhaps the most important and 
unexpected use of habitus in my understanding of cinema: its temporality.
When memory emerged as a key theme in data analysis I turned to literature on 
film memory (Kuhn, 2011, 2002, 1984; Puwar, 2007; Stubbings, 2003; Stacey, 
1994). This work has been vital in evidencing and emphasising the significance of 
cinema-going as social practice, challenging the focus on film texts common to 
much of film studies (Kuhn, 2011, 2002). Such studies, however, are concerned 
with what memories can tell us about past practices of cinema, not what it can tell 
us about the present. Bourdieu (1977,1990a) understands habitus as a form of 
embodied knowledge, a bodily memory. The corresponding sense he gives of the 
significance of this embodied past on practice, enables a way to think memory not 
as a looking back but as an instrumental part of the present. Because of this
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habitus proved key to my exploration of how film representation might be 
experienced in practice, and the discussions in Chapter Six developed out of a 
conversation between literature on film memory and Bourdieu’s theory, via my 
empirical work.
But habitus cannot be understood in isolation, extracted from practice. Instead it is 
only fully determined, fleetingly, in the moment -  through interaction with capital 
within a field (Edwards and Imrie, 2003: 243). Combining habitus with his concepts 
of ‘capital’ and ‘field’, Bourdieu offers an equation to express the relational nature 
of practice: ‘(Habitus) (Capital) + field = practice’ (1984:101). To him ‘practice is 
the result of various habitual schemas and dispositions (habitus), combined with 
resources (capital), being activated by certain structured social conditions (field) 
which they, in turn, belong to and variously reproduce and modify’ (Crossley, 2001: 
96).
3.2. Capital.
Perhaps his most commonly utilised concept, capital is Bourdieu’s way of 
attempting to escape the economic determinism of work on social class (1977: 
172). He argues that, in addition to this oft-cited economic capital, social class and 
societal positions are indicated and determined by social and cultural capital — 
generally understood as educational capital. In turn this educational capital 
encourages particular cultural practices that serve to reinforce and maintain the 
status of that capital. Social and cultural capitals are incorporated into the body 
through the habitus to form symbolic (ie. intangible, unlike economic) capital. This 
symbolic capital is an embodied expression of our position in society that is pre- 
reflexively understood by social agents within fields. It is perhaps important to note
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that these capitals are not equally or consistently valuable. While economic capital 
is ‘relatively stable’, symbolic capital is ‘relatively precarious’ and its meaning 
changes significantly across fields.
The relational nature of capital is key to Bourdieu’s ability to maintain the 
importance of social difference, or distinction, while emphasising the precarious, 
fluid and unstable nature of practice. While he has, as I discuss further in the final 
section of this chapter, been criticised for offering a deterministic understanding of 
social difference and reproduction, his formulation of capital is a clear attempt to 
avoid such an approach. As such, it became fundamental to my engagement with 
the question ‘how might differentiated bodies practice cinema differently?’ and 
offered a way of interpreting such ‘difference’ as both enduring and emergent, an 
approach outlined in Chapter Five.
Shilling (2004) draws attention to physical capital (that is the body as capital), 
arguing that it is vital, both as an aspect of symbolic capital and in the 
development of economic capital through waged labour and, as such, it is ‘key to 
the reproduction of social inequalities’ (2004: 474; see also Bourdieu, 1984, on the 
hyper physicality of those who rely on manual labour for employment). As 
Edwards and Imrie (2003) highlight in their work on disabled bodies, this 
connection between physical capital and economic, cultural and social implies that 
certain bodily dispositions are viewed as superior, with others judged against 
them. Read through the gerontology work described in the previous chapter it 
seems, then, that as we grow older our physical, and with it economic, social and 
cultural capital become reduced. Ageing bodies become, in the words of Edwards 
and Imrie, ‘bodies without value’ (2003:244).
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My own empirical work, combined with my reading of Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) 
ideas, challenges such a fixed understanding and begins to suggest a move away 
from bodily value as always understood in terms of physical ability, to take in ideas 
of affectual affinity enacted or not between bodies in the moment of practice. 
Bourdieu’s understanding of field proved important in developing such an analysis, 
as the meaning and value of capital -  physical or otherwise -  is only determined 
fleetingly in the moment of practice, in relation to the networks of value 
encouraged by particular fields.
3.3. Field.
As explained, the value of capital is not fixed but is instead constituted within a 
field. Bourdieu’s concept of field is essentially his way of thinking through cultural 
context. Fields are specific structures of social conditions, some of which people 
are born into (such as social class) and others which they join (such as academia), 
although the two types are distinctly interconnected (Crossley, 2004: 6; Bourdieu, 
1990a: 68). If habitus is ‘history made in to the body’ then field is ‘history made into 
a thing’, and Bourdieu’s concern is with ‘the relation created between those two 
modes of the existence of the social’ (1990b: 190-191). Fields are ‘historically 
constituted areas of activity with their own specific institutions and their own laws 
of functioning’ (1990b: 87). As such, ‘Each field is a game with specialised stakes’, 
so they have an enduring exclusionary character in which certain habitus are 
legitimated and others marked as illegitimate (Widick, 2003: 687, his italics). Our 
‘sense of the game’ arises out of the fit between habitus and field — we find our 
‘place’ when our dispositions match the expectations immanent in a field: ‘when 
the history in things and the history in bodies are perfectly attuned to one another’ 
(1993: 46, see also 1990a: 190). Fields are not all powerful, though. To remain
viable, they rely on their ability to produce bodies with durable dispositions that 
enable them to ‘recognise and comply with the demands immanent to the field’ 
(1990a: 58). Every field generates the interest which is the precondition of its 
functioning (1990b: 88).
Bourdieu extends the metaphor of the game to explain how capital relates to the 
field, suggesting that we can imagine the capitals as tokens, or cards, so that even 
if we have the number required to play the game, the proportion of those that 
represent cultural or economic capital, for example, will vary (1990b: 88). 
Understood in this way, capitals become sites of struggle, as different players are 
keen to maintain (or improve) their position in the field. The meanings of our 
habitual dispositions, then, are determined in the moment of practice -  in relation 
to the capital(s) they imply, and their connotations within the (pre-reflexive) value 
judgements of a given field (Edwards and Imrie, 2003: 243).
I began through my research to think of both the screen and exhibition site as 
fields and this concept helped me think through a particular set of social relations I 
felt being enacted in the collective space of the cinema as I attended matinees for 
the over-60s. The significance of this collectivity was drawn out in studies from 
Srivinas (2010a, 2010b, 2002, 1998), Boyle (2010, 2009), Stewart (2003), Hansen 
(1991) and the concept of field enables a development of these individual 
arguments which pose such collectivity as specific to the audience being 
researched towards an understanding of cinema as a field which relies on such 
collectivity for its durability. This discussion forms part of my understanding of how 
differentiated bodies might practice cinema differently and is outlined in Chapter 
Five.
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Importantly, the three elements (field, capital and habitus) seen by Bourdieu to 
determine practice are, in turn, determined by it (and each other). A co-constitutive 
understanding that emphasises embodiment and asserts that social differentiation 
is reciprocally produced between bodies and fields. In doing so, it offers a 
theoretical framework that can enable an understanding of cinema as practice that 
views film, body and space as co-constituted. Key to this formulation is Bourdieu’s 
understanding of practical logic.
3.4. Practical logic.
Functioning in a practical state means ‘below the level of explicit statement and 
therefore outside the control of logic, and in relation to practical purposes which 
require of them and give them a necessity which is not that of logic’ (1990a: 94). 
Rather than rational action based on a set of known rules or an essential subject 
capable of generation of such rules, then, Bourdieu argues that we are pre- 
reflexively driven by practical logic, ‘performed directly in bodily gymnastics without 
passing through explicit apprehension of the aspects ‘chosen’ or rejected’ (1990a: 
89). These bodily gymnastics represent our practical sense, which adjusts 
strategically in different fields depending on distribution of capital. Practical sense 
is what enables our knowing body to respond appropriately (as our position 
requires) without ever having to think it through. This sense is relational and it 
implicitly “selects’ certain objects or actions... in relation to ‘the matter in hand” 
(1990a: 89 -  90). However, it also induces ‘an identity’, so that while practical 
sense contains infinite potential practices, the ones that take place stem from the 
relation between habitus and field, a relation that cannot be predicted (1990a: 90), 
an idea which proved not just influential on my understanding of social difference 
but also the overarching understanding of cinema proposed in this thesis.
As I have shown, each field or ‘game’ has its own immanent demands and, as 
such, its own immanent logic. But just as a field relies on agents with habitus 
appropriate to that logic, so engagement with them ceases to make logical sense 
once the related practices are no longer of practical ‘use’. Bourdieu chooses the 
seemingly contradictory term ‘strategy’ to explain this process. Key to 
understanding this is the acknowledgement of practical time -  the fact that, in 
practice, we don’t often remove ourselves from a situation to reflect on it and make 
a rational decision about ‘what do next’. Instead, we act spontaneously through our 
practical sense. This generates a distinct temporality to practice. As Bourdieu 
explains, ‘because it is entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is 
inseparable from temporality, not only because it is played out in time, but also 
because it plays strategically with time and especially with tempo’ (1990a: 81). In 
arguing this last point, Bourdieu’s work offers a way to pay attention to the moment 
of practice while avoiding the perceived negation of history that non- 
representational theories have been criticised for (Tolia-Kelly, 2006):
‘The idea of practical logic, ‘a logic in itself’, without conscious reflexion or 
logical control, is a contradiction in terms, which defies logical logic. This 
paradoxical logic is that of all practice, or rather of all practical sense. 
Caught up in the ‘matter in hand’, totally present in the present and in the 
practical functions that it finds there in the form of objective potentialities, 
practice excludes attention to itself (that is, to the past). It is unaware of the 
principles that govern it and the possibilities they contain; it can only 
discover them by enacting them, unfolding them in time’ (1990a: 92).
This, I hope to show, has much to offer understandings of lived audiences at the 
cinema. It seems that it is ‘practical time’ that Sobchack (2004, 2000) captures in
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her description of her instant, bodily, responses to the opening scenes of The 
Piano. Moreover, it suggests that these senses and perceptions are the result of 
habitus (see Bourdieu, 1984: 21) as much as they are the result of meaning 
inherent to the film, a notion that also chimes with Voss’s (2011) argument that the 
film and the spectator should not be considered as separate elements of the 
viewing moment. Instead the two are inseparably intertwined in the creation of 
cinema. As suggested above, this influenced my understanding of the function of 
memory at the cinema and relates to my questioning of how representation might 
be experienced in practice, discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
Bourdieu leaves room for -  indeed, at times emphasises -  the fragility of habitus, 
field and capital. It must be said, however, that for him our habitus will in general 
be in tune with the fields with which we engage, because our habitus drives us to 
those with which we ‘fit’. However, Bourdieu acknowledges that there are 
instances in which this is disrupted, for example as a result of an individual moving 
from one type of society to another, or entering a field not congruous with habitus 
(as Bourdieu feels he did when entering academia from a working class 
background). Such disruption generates a ‘crisis of habitus’, exposing the taken for 
granted history that positions us (1990a: 62). Bourdieu rarely discusses crises of 
habitus but when he does so, it is often in terms of age. It is because of this that 
he offers the concepts of age-class and modes of generation -  both of which have 
much relevance for this project and to understanding the practical logic of cinema- 
going for my participants (and me).
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3.5. Age-class and modes of generation.15
Bourdieu’s interest in age-class stems from the shifting value of cultural capital 
across generations, disrupting the automatic inheritance of equal social standing 
and displacing expected positions within fields. One of the key ways in which 
Bourdieu understands the differentiation between the age-classes to manifest 
iteself, and be produced, is in the relative value of educational capital. He points 
out that as more people gain a particular qualification, such as a university degree, 
it is ‘ipso facto devalued’ and it ‘loses still more of its value because it becomes 
accessible to people ‘without social value” (1993: 98). Education is just one area, 
but Bourdieu argues that we can also see this differentiation between modes of 
generation in fashion, music tastes, food, economies and so on. Such shifts in 
cultural and symbolic capital can mean that certain dispositions are more in tune 
across the usually dividing parameters of social class, than they are across 
generations. In fact, after occupation, age was the next most significant common 
factor in cinema-going practices of participants in Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984), an 
in-depth study of cultural practices and the judgements of taste.
As Bourdieu explains:
‘[Practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the 
environment in which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to 
which they are objectively fitted. This is why generation conflicts oppose not 
age-classes, separated by natural properties, but habitus which have been 
produced by different modes of generation, that is, by conditions of
15 Bourdieu sometimes uses age-class and generation interchangeably and at other times he uses 
age-class to refer to chronological age and generation to refer to a symbolic grouping along the 
lines of generational cohort. Here, I have tried to be consistent with his usage.
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existence which, in imposing different definitions of the impossible, the 
possible, and the probable, cause one group to experience as natural or 
reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable 
or scandalous, or vice versa.’ (1977: 78)
These socially defined temporalities produce ‘boundaries that define age-groups’ 
but also ‘the limitations imposed at different ages’ (1977:165). The differentiation 
of bodies along age lines moves beyond a simple process of decline, to instead 
understanding older bodies as materially different because their bodies speak of 
habitus generated decades ago, they relate to past ‘norms’. What this means is 
that, although ‘old’ is considered a fixed category, in fact the various forms that 
‘old’ takes will be significantly different across generations as the embodied 
habitus that is carried and developed across life will be different for somebody
A
born in 1920 to 1940, and a different material ageing body is produced.
When it comes to modes of generation, Bourdieu’s concern is with the 
disadvantages faced by younger rather than older people. Despite this difference, I 
think that his understanding of age-class, or modes of generation, provides a 
useful framework for thinking through the cultural construction of the category ‘old’, 
and all its associated negative connotations in contemporary western society, 
without losing sight of the corporealities of ageing. Through his concept we can 
recognise that the material body does not just age biologically but also 
symbolically, as those dispositions inculcated across life produce a body that 
speaks of a particular (out-dated) generation. Cultural gerontology has shown us 
that in contemporary British society symbolic (bodily) capital reduces as we age, 
shifting our sense of the game and position within fields. I am interested in how 
this plays out in those places associated with particular fields and bodies.
Accordingly, the next section engages an element of Bourdieu’s work on practice 
that is not frequently discussed -  his understanding of inhabited place. I hope to 
show that this can usefully complement, and be complemented by, ideas arising 
out of the critical geography of architecture.
3.6. Space through the body: spatialities of practice and the Kabyle House.
Bourdieu has faced significant criticism for failing to be sensitive to spatial 
differences or the effect of space and place on symbolic capital (Holt, 2008: 234 -  
236; Kelly and Lusis, 2006). He has also been accused of offering a literal 
understanding of space (Haimes, 2003). However, some geographers have 
highlighted the relevance of his concepts to discussions of spatiality in everyday 
life (Hillier and Rooksby, 2005; Casey, 2001a, 2001b; Painter, 2000). This work 
highlights that Bourdieu’s emphasis on the corporeal, material element of the body 
incorporates the phenomenological emphasis on being-in-the-world and implicitly 
suggests that space must be understood as embodied (Low, 2003). What is more, 
his argument that habitus (as a system of bodily dispositions) and practice exist in 
a co-constitutive relationship intersected by field and capital generates a 
permeable understanding of the social body that implicitly problematises notions of 
space as a pre-existing fixed entity (King, 2000). Indeed, Holt (2008) argues that 
Bourdieu’s embodied understanding of social capital makes it into a distinctly 
spatial entity and salvages the concept for productive use within geography (see 
also Casey, 2001a).
In his preface to The Logic of Practice (1990a), Bourdieu himself lists a concern 
with the spatial dimension of practice as one of his key contributions (1990a: 9). 
Bourdieu’s (1977: 89) understanding of the relationship between the built
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environment and the learning body is perhaps most useful for my attempts at 
exploring how the spaces of cinema are constituted. In a characteristic treatment, 
Bourdieu draws on our practical relationship to space in order to evidence the 
failure of theoreticians to recognise the embodied nature of practice. He argues:
The gulf between this potential, abstract space, devoid of landmarks or any 
privileged centre... and the practical space of journeys actually made, or 
rather journeys actually being made, can be seen from the difficulty we 
have of recognising familiar routes on a map or town-plan until we are able 
to bring together the axes of the field of potentialities and the “system of 
axes linked unalterably to our bodies, and carried about with us wherever 
we go”, as Poincare puts it, which structures practical space into right and 
left, up and down, in front and behind’ (1977:2).
Space to Bourdieu is both material and symbolic and is inseparably related to the 
generation of a body appropriate to habitus. By arguing against abstracted or 
representational treatments of space and trying to instead consider the ways in 
which it is lived through practice he shares an aim with many contributing to the 
geography of architecture discussed in the previous chapter. But his work enables 
a combination of the fluidity of space outlined in that literature and implied in 
Stewart’s (2003) study, while paying attention to the spatial politics highlighted in 
her work and explored by Hubbard (2003a, 2003b, 2002). This approach proved 
fundamental to the understanding of space that emerged out of my research and 
which became key to my formulation of cinema as practice. His most considered 
application of this understanding is in an analysis of the logic of the Kabyle house 
(1977,1990a).
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While, as Bourdieu himself concedes, his analysis of the layout of the house is still 
‘within the limits of structuralism’, it is this approach that enabled him to explore 
the symbolic reinforcement offered by the structure of the house to the gendered 
divisions of Kabyle society (1990a: 316, n. 1). This structuralist description is only 
a starting point, as the subsequent mentions of the house scattered throughout his 
Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and Logic of Practice (1990a) offer a more 
complex understanding in line with his engagement of practice. The built structure 
-  and its structured symbolism of ‘society in miniature’ -  becomes an ‘implicit 
pedagogy’ for young bodies as they move through the house and, in so doing, 
‘learn’ their place in society and develop a body appropriate to it (1977: 94). But 
Bourdieu is keen to emphasise that, while these representational analyses of 
spaces can tell us much about the structure of society, the structures extracted in 
such analyses are not determining, nor are they the full story:
The house, an opus operatum, lends itself as such to a deciphering, but 
only to a deciphering which does not forget that the “book” from which the 
children learn their vision of the world is read with the body, in and through 
the movements and displacements which make the space within which they 
are enacted as much as they are made by it’ (1977: 90, my italics)
Our (gendered) embodied relation to inhabited space across life generates 
differentiated embodied perception which is both produced by and (re)productive 
of the habitus (1990a: 280). As such, the meaning of the Kabyle house is not fixed. 
Instead it is relational, and ‘may, in different universes of practice, have different 
things as its complementary term and may therefore receive different, even 
opposed, properties’ (1990a: 87). While this in part is still reliant on a structural 
analysis, what I found important is that the material body becomes fundamental to
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the lived constitution of space, implying that we cannot understand one without the 
other. While we can learn about structures through a representational analysis of 
built forms, the meaning and function of such structures do not pre-exist the 
encounter with practising bodies. We must understand space through the 
embodied practice with which it is constituted. In this way, while he might not quite 
take the step himself, Bourdieu enables a move beyond a structuralist 
understanding to one which understands the built environment as co-constituted 
by practising bodies and talks to the approach adopted by the critical geography of 
architecture (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Lees, 2001).16
While these geographies already engage practice theory, analyses tend to be 
undertaken in the framework of actor-network or non-representational theories 
(Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Degen, 2011; Rose et al, 2010; Jacobs et al, 2008; 
Saville, 2006; Lees, 2001). As such, they are particularly interested in the ways in 
which the collision of bodies and things enact fleeting (affective) ‘building events’ 
through different practices. The significance of embodied difference to the types of 
‘building events’ available to us, however, is of less concern. Bourdieu can, I think, 
help with thinking through the impact of social difference without disrupting the 
insights offered by existing literature. His co-constitutive understanding of the 
Kabyle house and practising bodies emphasises that, through such collisions, it is 
not just space that is constituted. Its materiality also implicitly teaches the 
practising body its place, further generating the habitus -  the site of social 
difference. In this way it becomes clear that while possibilities of enactment may 
be infinite, bodies do not have equal capacity to enact.
16 While Bourdieu (1977: 89) sees the spatial form of implicit learning as particularly significant to 
non-literate societies, the geography of architecture shows such an analysis can be applied more 
broadly.
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As this discussion suggests, I find Bourdieu’s framework a productive one. But it is 
not beyond substantial criticism and it is important to acknowledge the challenges 
made to his theory in order to fully explore the implications of adopting it in this 
thesis. I would like to take a bit of time here to outline the key criticisms aimed at 
Bourdieu (1977,1990a) as well as some of the defences mounted on his behalf.
My aim is not to claim no such issues exist in his theory but rather to suggest how 
I try to overcome them in my work, and why I think his ideas are nevertheless 
productive for thinking through cinema as practice.
3.7. Where did all the agency go? Criticisms and defenses of Bourdieu.
There are many criticisms levelled at Bourdieu’s theory of practice. He is accused 
of prioritising reproduction over transformation and, as such, leaving no room for 
social change or social movements and his theory is often taken to be a badly 
disguised economic determinism in which all capitals and therefore social 
positions are, in the final analysis, reduced to their economic element (cf. Holt, 
2008; Nash, 2003; Bridge, 2001). Of more relevance to this project is that, in his 
emphasis on the un-thought logic of practice, he is accused of denying the power 
of consciousness and reflexivity in human action. Bourdieu’s insistence that 
objective structures are embodied through the habitus in the form of practical logic 
but not conscious rules is seen to place the emphasis on pre-reflexive action at the 
cost of consciousness, reproducing the very mind/body dualism he attempts to 
overcome, albeit in an inverted form (Noble and Watkins, 2003: 521). Bourdieu’s 
understanding of habitus is seen to be key in generating a passive subject as it 
emphasises the unconscious reproduction of structures and generates an on­
going cycle of passive reproduction through the body (Nash, 2003; Butler 1999). 
This lack of attention to consciousness also prevents him from accounting for the 
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adoption of habitus or entry to a field and, as such, does not account for the 
genesis of habitus or aspiration (Bridge, 2003; Noble and Watkins, 2003; Lovell, 
2000). This is a criticism with significant repercussions for the aim of this project as 
it highlights the potential for Bourdieu’s theory to reproduce the passive spectator 
that work on film has struggled to escape.
Both Schatzki (1997) and Butler (1999) offer critiques that suggest this passivity 
stems from what they perceive to be a rigid understanding of field. Butler (1999) 
argues that fields are presented in Bourdieu’s theory as though they offer pre­
determined limiting structures, thus undoing the more unstable, fluid immanent 
understanding of practice through the habitus (1999:114). In confronting the same 
issue, Schatzki (1997) proposes that this makes Bourdieu’s understanding of the 
organisation of practices problematic because, in his theoretical work at least, he 
insists that ‘it is not with practices but with the objective conditions established by 
them that dispositions are homologously structured’ (1997: 289). Schatzki does not 
see this problem as insurmountable, instead suggesting that this (unintentionally) 
rigid formulation can be improved by instead linking the structure of the habitus 
with the multiple potential actions -  to Schatzki, ‘action manifolds’ -  it produces 
(1997:290).
I hope to have shown in the previous discussion, however, that while much of what 
drives practice might be pre-reflexive this does not mean we are passive bodies. 
Instead, embodied practice in Bourdieu’s understanding is active. Decisions are 
made in practice, but they do not necessarily enter into cognition and nor are they 
necessarily based on choice. Instead, they are made in practical time, by the 
intelligent body. While for Bourdieu habitus more often than not reproduce the
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social order, it is this active understanding of practical logic that means he is also 
careful to insist that the outcome of practice is never a forgone conclusion.
What is important to me here, though, are not the ins-and-outs of different 
readings of Bourdieu. Instead, it is that almost all criticisms point out that their 
reading goes against Bourdieu’s intention, and offer ways in which that initial 
intention might be in the end fulfilled. As such, while I think that this interrogation of 
Bourdieu’s theory is valuable, it also highlights to me the opportunities that his 
framework offers. If, in his attempt to develop a total theory of the social, Bourdieu 
failed to fully carry through the benefits of his practice theory into his conceptual 
framework, then it becomes a productive task to carry them through ourselves 
through empirical analyses of practices. Indeed, as Noble and Watkins point out, 
just because ‘Bourdieu had specific uses for the term [habitus] and specific 
theoretical enemies in mind... does not mean we can’t rehabilitate the concept for 
other uses’ (2003: 526; see also Postill, 2010:16). However, as Holt (2008: 234) 
warns, we should not integrate reflexive action at the cost of once again valuing it 
over the ‘pre-reflexive level at which much social reproduction occurs’. Instead, we 
need to maintain the importance of the social body that is so insisted upon in 
Bourdieu’s understanding of practice.
By taking the essence and intention of Bourdieu’s theory -  which, as I hope to 
have shown here, leaves space for active human agency (Bourdieu, 1990a: 57; 
see also Wacquant, 1992) -  into an analysis of practice we can attempt to extend 
his valuable insights. Particularly since, as Warde (2009) points out, although 
Bourdieu’s concepts are often used as though they present a total theory of 
practice, Bourdieu himself, ‘at least in his early career, intentionally invented 
concepts for use, and almost in use, to deal with particular substantive analyses,
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rather than constructing an architecture of concepts in the manner of a pure 
theorist’ (2009: 242, see also Moi, 1991:1017).
Feminism’s engagement with Bourdieu has largely been along these lines, 
embracing (although not uncritically) those concepts useful to the concerns of 
contemporary feminism, despite Bourdieu’s own masculinist assumptions and 
marginalisation of gender as an issue within practice (Adkins, 2004; Lovell, 2000; 
McNay, 1999; Moi, 1991).17 In a powerful argument for the productiveness of his 
theory, Adkins (2004) points out that feminism now engages gender differently, so 
it matters less that Bourdieu’s theory does not attend to it. Instead, she suggests, 
we should focus on those elements of his work that do speak to the concerns of 
contemporary feminism -  an interest in embodiment, temporality, spatiality and 
place (Adkins, 2004: 5). Moi (1991) suggests, and Adkins concurs, one of the 
ways a fixed understanding of gender can be usefully disrupted and thought 
through Bourdieu is to align it with his thoughts on class, or capital -  as something 
that is a structuring element of all social fields and is relationally produced with 
those fields as they generate practice (Adkins, 2004: 6; Moi, 1991:1035).
As feminism moves more towards an intersectional analysis, Bourdieu’s theory 
also offers a way to pursue studies of class inequalities between women and 
disrupts the notion of a homogenous womanhood (Lovell, 2000: 21; Adkins, 2004: 
7; Moi, 1991:1035), an approach that became key in my own research. Further, 
the integrated understanding of the body offered by his interpretation of habitus 
breaks not just with the structuralism that feminists are keen to escape but also 
‘the Cartesian traditions of social theorising (which of course have been named by
17 He did address issues of gender directly in Masculine Domination (2001), offering a scathing 
critique of feminist scholarship (Lovell, 2000: 27, fn 1) but acknowledging that gender is key to 
social inequality.
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feminists as both exclusionary and normative)’ (Adkins, 2004:11). In this way, for 
Lovell (2000) and McNay (1999), Bourdieu’s work enables an escape from the 
limitations of both structural analyses and the voluntarism that often appears as an 
alternative. He enables, they suggest, ‘tightness of the constraints which bind 
women into the social circumstances in which they find themselves’ (Lovell, 2000: 
18), without seeing such circumstances as determining and pre-determining the 
outcome of practice (see also McNay, 1999:104).
While, then, feminist writers emphasise the potential of Bourdieu’s theory they do 
not do so uncritically. One of the key additions to the above criticisms is that 
Bourdieu fails to attend to emotion -  a significant concern for contemporary 
feminism (Adkins, 2004). Skeggs (2004) argues that Bourdieu’s habitus cannot do 
so because the on-going accumulation of capital is fundamental to his 
understanding, and emotion has no clear value. In the same volume, however, 
Reay (2004) argues that, through empirical work, we can amend Bourdieu’s 
understanding of symbolic capital to include the emotional capital he ignores, and 
position it alongside social and cultural capitals. Probyn (2004) meanwhile 
proposes that we understand emotion as part of embodied knowledge and 
practical logic -  it is generated by, and generative of, practice in relation to the 
sedimented embodied pasts of the habitus. For her, this dimension of the habitus 
is more accurately described in terms of affect and she re-engages Mauss to 
develop a notion of affective habitus. In my research, the affective dimension of 
habitus became significant for understanding cinema. I understand this as the 
accumulation across life of capacities for affect that position us in particular ways. 
Bourdieu (1977,1990a) himself, I think, accounts for this in his emphasis on the
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bodily sense of practical logic, one that is relationally produced with capital, field 
and habitus.
These amendments offer a strengthening of ideas implicit within Bourdieu’s own 
theorising and once again indicate the potential of his wide-ranging work. The 
ability to read different approaches into his writing seems to result from the 
syncretist nature of his theory. And, for all of the critics, Bourdieu has an equal 
number of writers who defend his work (see, for example, Holt, 2008; Adkins,
2004; Hunter, 2004; McNay, 1999). In trying to combine the opposing philosophies 
of objectivism and subjectivism, Bourdieu sometimes fails to be consistent in his 
approach, leading to contradictions within his theory. Despite this, I hope that the 
above discussion indicates that if we engage the essence of his intention, and 
main thrust of his theory of practice, Bourdieu’s work can be a useful tool in my 
attempt at developing an understanding of cinema as practice. It is an 
understanding that moves beyond solely representational thinking to emphasise 
the significance of lived embodiment while nevertheless maintaining an interest in 
history, in context and in social difference (Lorimer, 2008: 554; Cresswell, 2006: 
59).
4. Conclusion: what Bourdieu’s theory offers to my questions, and how it 
poses another.
Srivinas’s (2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998) long-term study of cinema-going in 
Bangalore discussed in the first section of this chapter serves as a provocative 
example of the different perspective gained when we access cinema as practice. 
However, she does not define her understanding of practice and nor does she 
explain the approach to practice that she has adopted in her research. This is
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problematic because, as I have shown, ‘practice’ is by no means a universally 
understood term. The theory of practice one adopts for a study will have significant 
implications for the understandings generated. My hope is that this chapter serves 
as a persuasive argument for the adoption of Bourdieu’s theory for developing an 
understanding of cinema as practice, and exploring the questions asked in this 
thesis.
Through habitus, and the related concepts of capital, field and practical logic I 
developed an approach to the question of how differentiated bodies might practice 
cinema-going differently that suggests such difference is, in part, enacted through 
practice and that the two are co-constituted. Bourdieu’s (1977,1984) discussion of 
modes of generation reinforces the sense I had of a precariousness to ‘difference’ 
when at the cinema, and to the sense that different dimensions of habitus will 
come to the fore depending on practical logics in a particular field. Such a 
relational understanding enabled me to engage older participants and explore the 
ways in which cinema became significant to the constitution of a -  fleeting -  
collective identity. This argument is outlined in Chapter Five. Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus and its associated practical logic -  a form of embodied memory or 
knowledge, which pre-reflexively drives practice in the present -  enables a cultural 
analysis of the materially ageing body and has much to offer ideas of embodied 
spectatorship and its ability to incorporate the concerns for social difference 
exemplified in gerontology’s film analyses.
In this way, as memory emerged as a key theme in my data, habitus provided a 
way of connecting it to the sensing body and its differentiation. This conception of 
the body proved key to my exploration of representation in practice and resulting 
formulation of cinematic habitus, outlined in Chapter Six. Finally, Bourdieu’s
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incipient understandings of space through the Kabyle house, and the inherent 
spatiality of his theory more broadly, enables an understanding of the spaces of 
cinema that honours the structures of difference highlighted in representational 
analyses while insisting that space must be understood through the body. 
Bourdieu’s work suggests that the meaning and shape of space cannot be 
understood in isolation of practice, as it is not pre-determined or fixed but is 
instead enacted in the present through a body shaped by its past and working 
towards a future. Space should not be understood as a pre-determined container 
for action. Important though representational analyses are, the meaning of space 
literally takes shape through the lived body, and in my research this seems to be 
the case for both the material space of the exhibition site, and the spatialities of 
the screen. This approach, then, provided a way of exploring the constitution of the 
spaces of cinema that became significant to the conception of cinema offered in 
this thesis, and it is explored fully in Chapter Seven.
Despite the criticisms outlined above, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework has been 
widely used within the social sciences. Like Srivinas, who herself points out that 
audiences in India ‘provide an extreme example of active viewing, their routine 
practices in theatres being overt and explicit’ (1998: 325), most researchers 
engaging with Bourdieu’s theory through empirical work explore practices that are 
explicitly physical, or involve an element of learning distinctly bodily skills across 
time (such as boxing and tennis, rather than reading or learning maths). The 
literature includes explorations of glass-blowing (O’Connor, 2006), disability (Allen, 
2004; Edwards and Imrie, 2003), boxing (Wacquant, 2005), circuit training 
(Crossley, 2004) and ballet (Wainwright and Turner, 2006). These studies offer 
valuable insight into the genesis of habitus through practice, and the incorporation
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of the social into the body, as well as those ‘moments of crisis’ in which the habitus 
needs to be realigned to changes in or between fields. They do, however, leave an 
important part of Bourdieu’s practical theory unexplored. As Holt notes in her 
discussion of embodied capital, the focus on explicitly bodily practices has meant 
that ‘the host of embodied inequalities reproduced, and potentially transformed, 
through everyday practice, have not been fully illuminated’ (2008: 235).
Indeed, one of the powerful nuances of Bourdieu’s theory is that his bodily 
understanding of practice is not limited to those practices that have a visibly 
evident and oft-acknowledged bodily element. Instead, all practice is embodied 
and everything we do is produced by and produces bodily affects. What is more, 
Bourdieu’s (1977) theory also enables us to recognise this co-constitution even 
when it is not directly observable, as in Srivinas’s (1998) study. Bourdieu’s (1977: 
6; 1990a: 55) suggestion that embodied memories influence our expectations of 
the future, implicitly determining the decisions we make in the present and, as 
such, practice offers a way of developing an embodied understanding of the 
‘perversity of spectators’ (Staiger, 2000), without reverting to a conscious rejection 
of representation on the part of the audience (1990a: 56; 1977: 83). However, 
these theoretical claims carry significant methodological implications and 
considerations. With so many social science methodologies based around 
interviews or observation, how can we pick up on the pre-reflexive embodied 
nature of practice when we are interested by a practice that is not overtly physical? 
How can we empirically explore practice? This is the fourth and final question 
being asked in this thesis and one that I try to address in my methodology. It is to 
this that I turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four. Methodology: Bourdieu’s problem with methods, 
and choosing to study cinema at the cinema
In the previous chapter, I outlined some of the key concepts in Bourdieu’s 
(1977,1990a) theory of practice and argued that they can be useful in generating 
an understanding of cinema as practice that attends to the film on the screen, the 
body in the audience and the space of viewing — all key to this project. Taken as 
a guiding force rather than a rulebook, Bourdieu’s framework can offer ways of 
exploring most of my research questions. But while his work offers opportunities 
for the study of cinema, his emphasis on a pre-reflexive sense of the game 
presents significant challenges to empirical work keen to explore it. Attempts to 
access such embodied knowledge have long been a consideration for researchers 
from a variety of perspectives but quite how we attend to this through empirical 
work is still not entirely clear (Simpson, 2011; Hopwood, 2010; Thrift, 2008).
Useful though it is for exploring my research questions, then, Bourdieu’s theory 
also prompts another -  how might we empirically study practice? It is in part this 
question to which this chapter speaks by exploring my methodology in theory and 
in practice.
Because Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) theory is so embedded in a critique of 
conventional methods, I begin with an overview of the particular methodological 
problems posed, and the commitments implied for researchers engaging with his 
understanding of practice. The final section of this first part outlines my primary 
method, the go-along (Kusenbach, 2003), and the reasons it seemed appropriate 
for considering the research questions being explored in this thesis. Having thus 
used existing literature to explore the ‘why’ of my chosen methodology, the second
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section is given over to the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of my fieldwork. I 
conducted research with women who attended matinees for the over-60s.
Adopting the go-along method led me to join participants on their trips to the 
cinema, and I also conducted separate informal interviews. After providing a more 
detailed outline of the methodology adopted, including a description of these 
research events, the sites of research, recruitment and participants, as well as my 
data analysis procedure, I use my experience to reflect on the go-along and 
assess the method’s usefulness in empirically studying practice, particularly that of 
cinema.
1. Methodology in theory: the go-along and Bourdieu’s methodological 
concerns.
It is impossible to extract the research questions I pose in this thesis from the 
theoretical framework I adopt. My interaction with arguments on method stems 
from an engagement with Bourdieu’s critique of conventional social science 
methods, which he perceives as unable to capture the most essential elements of 
practice. As such, in exploring the methodology developed to answer my 
questions, it is first important to outline those concerns it attempts to overcome.
1.2 Bourdieu on method
‘What is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying’ - 
Bourdieu, 1977:18
In the first section of his Outline of a theory of practice (1977), Bourdieu offers a 
critique of the ‘objective’ techniques dominant in the social sciences. Arguing that 
‘the “impartial spectator” [is]... condemned to see all practice as spectacle’ (1977:
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1), Bourdieu criticises the tendency for researchers to reduce social life to a set of 
rules. These rules, he claims, are presented in academic texts as the perception 
schemes of social actors, generating an understanding of practice as fixed and 
pre-existing an individual’s engagement with the world (1977: 3).
To Bourdieu, traditional research techniques leave ‘unsaid all that goes without 
saying’ as social agents do not recognise those implicit structures that govern their 
practice, and we do not have the tools with which to access them (1977:18). As 
Bourdieu explains, ‘simply because he [sic] is questioned, and questions himself, 
about the reasons and the raison d ’etre of his practice, he [sic] cannot 
communicate the essential point, which is that the very nature of practice is that it 
excludes this question’ (1990a: 91). He argues that we need to escape the 
assumption that practice can be told and turn to a consideration of bodily 
communication -  that which is unsaid (1977:15). As explained, the bodily 
dispositions of the habitus show themselves in bodily hexis -  how we look, walk, 
eat, talk and so on, and their connotations provide insight into lived practice, 
beyond the reification of reflexive talk (1990a: 79).
Bourdieu’s theory, then, poses two connected problems for empirical researchers. 
First, we must avoid the tendency, particularly common in participant observation, 
to allow the rigid logic of theory to eclipse the ambiguous logic of practice and 
cease ‘substituting the observer’s relation to practice for the practical relationship 
to practice’ (1990a: 34). Second, and relatedly, we must not lose sight of the 
embodied knowledge that pre-reflexively co-constitutes practice.18 The first of
18 It is perhaps important to say that Bourdieu’s own empirical research is criticised for reproducing 
the very positivism he tries to overcome (Hamel, 1997; Griller, 1996). While he adopted 
ethnographic methods for his early work -  such as his study of the Kabyle that fed into his theory of
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these is now widely recognised as in the time since Bourdieu (1977) published his 
theory of practice, anthropology and the wider social sciences has undergone a 
‘crisis of representation’. Feminist literature has been fundamental to these critical 
discussions of the politics surrounding what counts as ‘valid’ knowledge. Drawing 
on and generating anti-foundationalist and postmodern philosophies feminists 
have -  much like Bourdieu (1990a: 36) albeit through a different framework -  
disrupted the notion that methods can access essential objective truths by 
emphasising that all knowledge is situated (in particular bodies and social space) 
and partial (Moss, 2002; Rose, 1997; Haraway, 1988). In response to this, there 
have been attempts to incorporate the researching body into findings as a way of 
writing reflexively (Longhurst et al, 2008; Sharp, 2005; Bondi, 2003; Nast, 1998).
In geography, the question of how we capture embodied knowledge has come 
increasingly into focus as the influence of non-representational theory gains 
momentum (Simpson, 2011: 343; Latham, 2003; Thrift, 2000). As I have 
explained, this approach emphasises affect and the significance of the sensuous 
body in everyday practice, and claims such dimensions of social life have been 
inadequately explored by ‘dead, dead, dead geographies’ incapable of engaging 
the lived-ness of life (Thrift, 2008:138). Thrift (2008) advocates the use of 
performative methodologies, most famously advocating engagement with dance, 
arguing that performance has long engaged the pre-cognitive capacity of bodies to 
affect and be affected. Although by no means all led by engagement with non­
practice (1977,1990a) -  his prominent studies, such as Distinction (1984), were based on large- 
scale survey research, a quantitative method which some argue is out of synch with his practical 
ontology. Later, however, he announced himself free of his positivist shackles when he returned to 
an understanding of research as ‘provoked and accompanied self analysis,’ reinforcing the central 
role of reflexivity in research (Wacquant, 2004; Hamel, 1997; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 227).
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representational theory, embodied knowledge is now a well-established concern of 
geographers and social scientists more broadly, and the challenge of broadening 
our methodological toolbox has been the focus of a fair few ‘innovations’ aimed at 
overcoming the difficulty of capturing such information. These include (sensory) 
video methodologies (Simpson, 2011; Lorimer, 2010; Pink, 2009); embodied auto­
ethnography (Wacquant, 2004a), participant observation (Longhurst et al., 2008; 
Bain and Nash, 2006) and interviewing (Turner, 2000); mobile methodologies 
(Buscher et al., 2011; Fincham et al., 2010; Hein et al., 2008); performance-based 
methods including music (Morton, 2005) theatre (Kaptani and Yuval-Davis, 2008), 
and dance (McCormack, 2003); as well as the extension of interview prompts 
beyond the verbal to the visual (Mason and Davies, 2009; Murray, 2009) and 
musical (Anderson, 2004b).
It is in this context that the go-along, as a newly formulated set of research 
techniques, took a formalised shape in methodology literature. As I hope to show, 
the research sensibility offered by this literature talks to many of the problematics 
raised by Bourdieu’s ontology and, as such, I am keen to use my experience of 
adopting the method to consider its contribution to the challenge of how we might 
empirically study practice. Literature on the go-along attends directly to two of the 
key themes explored in this thesis: embodiment and spatialities, predominantly 
engaged through discussions of place. It does not directly attend to film but a 
spatial understanding of embodiment is key to the understanding of representation 
generated in this thesis. Further, the third core thematic strand drawn out in go- 
along literature -  that of mobility -  offers a way of thinking through what Bruno 
(2002) and Friedberg (1993) term the Virtual mobility’ of film, to explore the
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medium’s sensual spatiality in situ. Doing so can also extend uses for the method 
beyond existing discussions.
1.3. The go-along as a hybrid of qualitative interviewing and in situ 
observation.
At the simplest level, despite his own reservations about observation, Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on lived experience -  and the corresponding ambiguity provided by 
practical time -  implies a commitment to being present in the moment of practice. 
This suggestion is reinforced by the insights of research undertaken by Boyle 
(2010; 2009) and Srivinas (2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998) at the cinema. While both 
describe their key method as ‘participant research’, this is a broad label and such 
a method can take many forms. It could, for example, constitute a period of 
observation. But this did not seem appropriate to me. I felt that in just observing 
unknown audiences at the cinema I would more easily fall foul of the tendency for 
researchers to project our own framework onto the practice of others (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 34). While I hoped that interviews would reduce the risk of this colonising 
tendency, conducting them out of context offered the downfall of potentially 
producing an abstract, disembodied understanding of practice (Bourdieu, 1990a: 
91). Keen to combine the benefits of both methods I turned to the go-along, a 
relatively new form of participant observation that attempts to do just that.
The go-along belongs to a growing number of ‘mobile methods’, developed as 
explicit, valued methodologies (Buscher and Urry, 2009; Pink, 2007a; Sheller and 
Urry, 2006; Kusenbach, 2003). There have been various such methods adopted in 
geography, including strapping head-mounted cameras onto participants (Brown 
et al, 2008), setting up cameras in participants’ cars (Laurier, 2010) or observing
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train travellers (Bissell, 2009; Watts, 2008). The majority of the literature, however, 
offers an account of the go-along. The term umbrellas both ‘walk alongs’, in which 
the researcher walks with participants, and which dominate the existing literature; 
and ‘ride-alongs’, in which they join them on a car or bike journey (Spinney, 2006; 
Kusenbach, 2003). What you do in a go-along is quite self-explanatory: you 
accompany, or ‘go-along’ with, a participant as they engage in the (mobile) 
practice in which you are interested. As you do so, you conduct a conversational 
interview while simultaneously observing -  and responding to -  participants’ 
embodied behaviour.
The ‘interview’ element should be informal and seems to be most productive when 
it takes a more conversational form. According to Kusenbach (2003) and Pink 
(2007a, 2007b) this element should involve the participant(s) talking you through 
their thoughts about, and reasons for, actions, using ‘spatial cues’ to prompt 
comments. As with semi-structured interviews, the focus is on encouraging the 
participant to speak freely, prompting only where necessary. As you engage in 
conversation, however, you are not only paying close attention to what participants 
are saying but also what they are doing. By interviewing in situ, you are able to 
observe participants’ bodily interaction with spaces as they talk, and use this 
observation to guide questions and/or interpret what the participant is saying.
My go-alongs involved attending the cinema with participants, watching what they 
(and I) did there (comprising the observation element), and asking them to talk to 
me about their experience, including of the film and anything else of interest during 
the trip (forming the interview element). While, clearly, an element of observation is 
involved in all interviews (and, for that matter, conversations) in the go-along we 
are not just observing the participant and their reaction or relationship to an
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interview situation. Instead, we are able to observe their interaction with others 
and, as Kusenbach (2003) points out, are therefore more attentive to informal 
networks of social relationships than we might be in an interview where, Pink 
(2007a) argues, a participant is less likely to talk about such apparently 
meaningless, everyday, exchanges. This points to an opportunity to access the 
‘social cinema scenes’ described by Puwar (2007) in a contemporary setting, as 
well as gaining in situ awareness of the relational nature of habitus.
Despite not engaging with Bourdieu’s work, in her description of the go-along 
Kusenbach (2003) answers many of his concerns about research methods. She, 
too, points out that in observing we cannot pick up on or learn the ‘layers and 
contexts of meaning that subjectively transform a mundane routine into something 
entirely different’ (Kusenbach, 2003: 470), echoing his argument that such routines 
can be so implicit the researcher does not ask about them in an interview situation 
and the participant does not think to talk about them. Instead, Kusenbach argues, 
by conducting a go-along, observation is undertaken in a context where you can 
ask about anything of interest. Interviews, meanwhile, become prompted 
circumstantially and contextually and are therefore more likely to incorporate the 
elements of practice not usually drawn out in interviews because they ‘go without 
saying’.
Furthermore, Kusenbach (2003: 469) argues, being able to engage with a 
participant’s practice in situ ‘de-emphasises the researchers’ own perceptual 
presuppositions and biases’, a key issue for Bourdieu. Additionally, Pink (2007a: 
244) explains that by ‘walking with’ we become more aware of embodied 
experience, and the layered sensorial experience of everyday life: we smell the 
smells, taste the food, experience (dis)comfort and hear the sounds, all of which 
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are fundamental to practice but most of which are left out in a conventional 
interview context and many difficult to pick up on when observing. A final 
suggestion of the go-along’s suitability to Bourdieu’s framework and exploring my 
questions is that Kusenbach emphasises the method’s effectiveness at picking up 
on the ways in which biographies, histories and memories influence the spatialities 
of experience — a consideration fundamental to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, 
which holds embodied histories as vital to practice (Kusenbach, 2003: 472-474).
As is beginning to become clear, literature on the go-along emphasises the 
method’s ability to pay attention to the significance of corporeality in the social 
world. This raises one of three key themes in the literature: embodiment. 
Kusenbach also argues that this hybrid method is particularly suited to an analysis 
of spatial practices as, by joining the participant in their everyday activities we are 
offered the opportunity for a more in-depth understanding of the personal 
experiences of space and the construction of place (2003: 466 -  472). And indeed 
place is another key theme across writing on the go-along. Unsurprisingly, the 
methodologically generative nature of mobility is also much discussed, and the 
connection between the three place-embodiment-mobility is key to arguments 
made about the validity of the method. As such, it seems important to explore 
them further to fully outline the potential of the method to speak to Bourdieu’s 
concerns and my research questions. Although they are fundamentally co­
implicated, in discussing place-embodiment-mobility one or other is often brought 
to the fore, with place perhaps the most frequently discussed.
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1.3.1 The significance of place in literature on the go-along.
Engaged with as both a prompt in walking interviews (De Leon and Cohen, 2005; 
Jones et al, 2008a, 2008b; Anderson, 2004 Kusenbach, 2003; Carpiano, 2009; 
Moles, 2008; Hein et al, 2008; Hall, 2009; Hall et al, 2006) and as constituted 
through the research event (Murray, 2009; Ross et al, 2009; Moles, 2008; Pink, 
2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b; Lund 2006; Spinney, 2006; Anderson, 2004), place 
is a protagonist in all of the literature I could find on the go-along.
Pink uses discussions of walks with her participants through a community garden 
in Ludlow (2007a) and on a tour of Mold (2008a) to argue that by ‘walking with 
video’ researchers can adapt to participants’ rhythms, embodiments, sensations 
and, as such, get closer to their imaginings of place. To Pink this means that the 
researcher can become attuned to a participant’s conception of a place as it is 
phenomenologically enacted and is more able to recognise that ‘the co-presence 
of researcher and research subject is itself inscribed on place-as-event as it is 
simultaneously experienced and constituted’ (2008a: 179) -  a claim that talks to 
the approach to space adopted in this thesis. Furthermore, drawing on Casey’s 
(1996) philosophy of the co-ingredient nature of place, and De Certeau’s (1984) 
analysis of walking through the city, Pink argues that walking with video enables 
the researcher to acknowledge ethnography itself as place-making practice 
(2008a: 176-77).
Similarly, anthropologists Lee and Ingold (2006) argue that walking with 
participants can be particularly useful in exploring how places are ‘made’ by our 
routes through them. Anderson (2004:255), again drawing on Casey (1996), 
suggests that because walking with, or ‘bimbling’, enables us to be aware that
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places ‘are not only a medium but also an outcome of action, producing and being 
produced through practice’, it is a useful tool for developing socio-spatial 
understandings. Ross et al (2009) echo this sentiment in arguing that, by walking 
with young people in care, they were able to reflect on the ‘interrelatedness of self 
and place’ (2009: 620). In this vein, go-alongs are seen to emphasise the ways in 
which personal narratives, or biographies, impact on the co-constitution of place 
and embodiment. Kusenbach (2003) identifies this as one of the key uses of the 
go-along -  to explore the relationship between biography and ‘perception of place’ 
(2003: 474). Moles (2008) and Lund (2006) further emphasise that walking with 
encourages reflection on the role personal narratives and memories play in the 
constitution of place. The idea here is that as researchers and researched walk 
together, the built environment acts a prompt for these alternative, often pre­
reflexive, embodied knowledges (cf. De Leon and Cohen, 2005; Anderson, 2004; 
Kusenbach, 2003).
As I hope is becoming clear, the understanding of place encouraged by this 
literature is inseparably related not just to mobility but to embodiment. This 
interrelation of body and place brings the methodology in line with arguments 
made in the geography of architecture (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Paterson,
2011; Saville, 2006; Lees, 2001). Indeed Rose et al. (2010) and Degen et al.
(2010) productively engage the method for research in that framework. The go- 
along, then, provides the tools for studying the relationship between spatialities 
and practice. But while this clearly offers a way of thinking through the material 
spaces of viewing, Bruno’s (2002) understanding of the film itself as a spatial entity 
suggests that the go-along can also offer an important methodological contribution 
to studies of cinema. In so doing, it suggests that the go-along is an appropriate
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method through which to access the sensual geographies of cinema spaces and 
to explore my question ‘how are the spaces of cinema are constituted?’ -  those on 
and off the screen.
The ability to capture the pre-reflexive and embodied elements of practice must 
also be addressed, though. Bourdieu himself emphasises the break academic 
study makes ‘with the imminent ends of collective action’ and argues that such a 
break ‘is presupposed in the very intention of talking about practice and especially 
of understanding it and seeking to make it understood other than by producing and 
reproducing it practically’ (1990a: 34). Indeed, the difficulty of reflecting the pre­
reflexive and embodied nature of others’ practice is reflected in the tendency of 
studies emphasising embodied knowledge to engage auto-ethnographic methods 
rather than engage other participants (Hastie, 2007; Wacquant, 2004a; Sobchack, 
2000; del Rio, 1996). The challenge is to extend this evocative engagement to 
include not just our own bodies but to attempt to think those of others and maintain 
some of the imminence of practice. The go-along is seen to overcome precisely 
this issue.
1.3.2 The body: rhythm, empathy and the senses in the go-along.
There are two connected ways in which embodiment is explicitly discussed in the 
literature. First, it is drawn out in Pink’s (2007a, 2008a) claims to an embodied 
empathy with participants, an effect of the method that she argues brings the 
researcher closer to their participants’ embodiment and place enactment. This is 
closely linked to a broader discussion about the distinct knowledges offered by 
tuning into a body-on-the-move, and the ways in which being on-the-move 
together can bring us closer to an understanding of others’ place-perception,
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further entwining understandings of embodiment-place-mobility (Degen et al.,
2008; Hall et al., 2006; Anderson, 2004; Kusenbach, 2003).
Claiming that walking with video produces ‘empathetic and sensory embodied 
(emplaced) understandings of another’s experience’ (2007a: 250), Pink 
emphasises the bodily empathy that stems from shared kinaesthetic experiences. 
Throughout her research Pink mobilises her senses to access other people’s 
imaginings of place (2007a: 240). Directly linking place-embodiment-mobility, she 
argues that it was by eating, drinking, photographing and journeying with her 
participants that she was able to focus in on similarities in sensations, and become 
attuned to the making of Mold as a ‘Slow City’ (2008a: 176 -  185).19 While we can 
never directly access imaginings of place, Pink argues, we can get closer to other 
people’s embodied perceptions and, ‘begin to make places that are similar to 
theirs, and thus feel we are similarly emplaced’ (2008a: 193).
Situating her work in a research tradition of connecting walking with vision and 
place making (2007a: 244), Pink (2007a) argues that ‘walking with can bring us 
closer to understanding how other people perceive their multisensory 
environments, constitute place through everyday practice and live in their bodies’ 
(2007a: 246). Through this focus, the body becomes integrated into 
understandings of perception, and vision becomes a more complex process — an 
argument also made forcefully by Degen et al (2008) who conducted go-alongs as 
part of a mixed methodology exploring people’s experiences of designed spaces, 
such as shopping centres (see also Lund, 2006). To indicate how intense this
19 Slow cities ‘are characterised by a way of life that supports people to live slow. Traditions and 
traditional ways of doing things are valued. These cities stand up against the fast-lane, 
homogenised world so often seen in other cities throughout the world. Slow cities have less traffic, 
less noise, fewer crowds.’ (Slowmovement.com/slowcities)
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attunement can be, Pink describes a shift in her corporeal experience on parting 
with her tour guides in Mold: ‘Once walking hurriedly to my car I felt more deeply 
how my way of both being in and knowing the town shifted as I was disengaged 
from my hosts’ (2008a: 192). The idea that we have particular ways of being-in- 
the-world is familiar from phenomenology and here the aim is to use shared 
physical experiences to become attuned to other people’s lived practice, including 
their practising of place, overcoming representational difficulties associated with 
pre-reflexive, embodied knowledges (Pink, 2007a: 240).
This links closely to the second way in which the body is engaged with in this 
literature. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the body with which researchers are attempting 
to become attuned is a body-on-the-move. As such, it isn’t just about eating the 
same things, experiencing the same weather, being in the same place, but also 
about using the bodily rhythm of being-on-the-move to open up a different kind of 
embodied communication. Through Solnit (2001), Anderson (2004) claims that his 
‘aimless’ wandering (bimbling) with participants mirrors the rhythm of thought so 
that the bodily movements-in-place give rise to a more relaxed, free-flowing 
conversation. This leads us closer to understanding participants’ embodied place 
perception by eliciting embodied knowledges, pre-reflexively drawn on in the 
moment of practice (Moles, 2008: 4.8). Ross et al (2009: 612), who undertook 
research with children in care, similarly describe an ‘opening up’ of their 
participants once interviews were undertaken while walking, as the conversations 
began to flow freely with the movement of the body through place (see also 
Lorimer and Lund, 2003:132).
This has much in common with those methodologies aimed at drawing forth pre­
reflexive knowledges or embedded memories by engaging prompts such as 
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photographs (Mason and Davies, 2009; Harper, 2002); music (Anderson, 2004b); 
food (Brady, 2011) and (personal) objects (Wade, 2004; Hoskins, 1998). The 
difference here is that the body is engaged not just as responding to a prompt, but 
also functioning as a prompt in itself (De Leon and Cohen, 2005). Anderson 
directly combines the two and argues that ‘by harnessing the practice of bimbling 
in this co-ingredient environment I was able to...use both the practice and the 
place to prompt the recall of activist knowledges’ (2004: 257, my italics). With the 
emphasis on walking together, it is important to note that this engages not just the 
researcher’s body or the participants’, but both, pulling them into a motion that 
elicits particular kinds of conversations and shared knowing.
The sensuous, walking, riding, place-making, mobile researching body is a key 
feature of the majority of methodological literature discussing the go-along, and the 
ability of the method to access embodied knowledge is referenced throughout. By 
enabling me to observe bodily practices and think through pre-reflexive knowledge 
in situ it offered ways of thinking through my question ‘how might differentiated 
bodies practice cinema-going differently?’ and ‘how might film representation be 
experienced in practice?’ As this discussion suggests, mobility is fundamental to 
the methodological literature’s engagement with the body and the irony of adopting 
a mobile method to study an ostensibly sedentary practice (at least the film- 
viewing component) was not lost on me. But doing so in fact served to engage 
literature on the virtual mobility of film (Bruno, 2002; Friedberg, 1993), and thus 
highlight an alternative form of mobility to which the method could usefully be 
applied.
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1.3.3. The go-along, mobility, and extending it to the virtual mobility of film.
Mobility is, as the above discussions show, integrated into all discussions of place 
and embodiment in literature on the go-along. Much of this work claims that being 
mobile is empirically generative, that it enables researchers to access ‘different’ 
knowledges and different ways of being in the world from those offered by more 
‘conventional’, ‘sedentary’ methods (Pink, 2007a; Moles, 2008; Kusenbach, 2003). 
Hall et al suggest that adopting a mobile methodology generates an ‘animate 
geography’ as ‘living things do not stand still, they move’ (2006: 2). Although not 
all of this work engages directly with the mobilities turn, it is nevertheless keen to 
emphasise ‘the different engagement with spaces that being mobile produces’ 
(Moles, 2008:1.1).
Hein et al argue that although research subjects are always mobile, they are often 
studied in ‘sedentary interviews and surveys. In contrast, mobile methodologies 
seek to use movement as part of the research approach itself.’ (2008:1268). Hall 
et al (2006) similarly suggest that the affinity between biography and place, 
‘movement as narrative -  is neglected when the interview takes place only here, or 
there; but when conversation and movement combine, when the interview takes 
place on the way from here to there, all sorts of synergies -  reverberations -  are 
set in motion’ (2006: 3). The overall sense generated by a review of the literature 
is that being mobile engenders a different embodied way of being-in-the-world that 
emphasises and embraces our different ways of engaging with space and place 
(cf. Moles, 2008:1.1). Despite growing arguments elsewhere that ‘mobility is an 
ontological absolute’ (Adey, 2006: 76), in literature on the go-along what counts as 
being mobile seems to amount to a physical traversal through space.
no
With the emphasis on the advantage of a body-on-the-move for accessing 
embodied knowledge and embedded memories one could assume that I would not 
benefit from such elicitation for a large part of my research event — as we sit and 
watch a film in relative stillness. However, as Hein et al (2008) point out, while they 
are yet to be discussed at length in the literature, ‘it is easy to think of other forms 
of mobility that could be used to open up alternative ways of being and knowing’ 
(2008:1279). In my research there was of course actual walking around the 
cinema -  as we picked up tickets, bought or collected hot drinks, walked upstairs, 
found our seats and so on. But there was also another dimension of mobility on 
my go-alongs: the virtual mobility of the film, and the sense of going elsewhere it 
provides (Bruno, 2002; Friedberg, 1993). And, while they do not equate to walking 
or the traversal of physical space, these journeys too proved to be 
methodologically generative, a finding through which I hope to contribute to 
literature on the go-along and which I return to in my later chapters, particularly 
Chapter Seven.
This was, of course, in many ways a ‘foreshadowed problem’ (Malinowski, 1922: 
8-9, in Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) as I had already developed an interest in 
the mobility offered by film as a way of thinking through the embodied nature of 
spectatorship (Bruno, 2002; Cresswell and Dixon, 2002; Friedberg, 1993). As 
Chapter Two explained, Bruno (2002) understands spectatorship as a peripatetic 
engagement, and film as a medium homologous with technologies of travel and 
tourism. To Bruno (2002), meaning is made not just as we move through the film 
but also as it moves (through) us. In tracing the genesis of film and its exhibition 
culture to cultures of shopping and tourism, Friedberg (1993) similarly concludes 
that the film’s (female) spectator is a flaneuse, engaging film’s ‘mobile and virtual
gaze’. It is mobile, Friedberg (1993) argues, because of its extension of the 
architecture of tourism such as world fairs and panoramas and it is virtual because 
of its reliance on the virtual gaze of photography (1993: 37). But foreshadowed 
problem or not, throughout my go-alongs this virtual mobility seemed very much in 
place and I found it proved to be methodologically productive in similar ways to the 
‘real’ journeys described in the literature.
By offering the opportunity to interview in situ, while observing the practice in 
which one is interested, the go-along talks to many of the drawbacks of social 
science research raised by Bourdieu (1990a; 1977). Specifically, literature on the 
go-along emphasises the method’s ability to access pre-reflexive embodied 
knowledges, both by engaging the built environment as a prompt and by observing 
bodily movement in practice. Because of this, it seemed appropriate not just for 
exploring the question of how differentiated bodies might practise cinema-going 
differently. But also for considering the question ‘how might we empirically study 
practice?’ -  especially because the literature also suggests that the method 
evokes a reflexive stance to research that helps overcome perceptual bias, 
another key concern for Bourdieu. Further, by claiming to offer access to the in- 
the-moment co-constitution of place through embodied mobility, it offered a way of 
considering how the spaces of cinema are constituted. And, finally, by situating the 
researcher in the moment of practice it seemed to offer a way in to my question — 
how is film representation experienced in practice?
At the moment, however, all of this is just in theory. Before making claims about 
the method’s ability to address my questions and Bourdieu’s concerns, it is 
important to explain my own research practice, including my addition of a 
preparatory informal interview -  a technique suggested by Kusenbach (2003) and 
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undertaken by most of the studies referenced above. In the following section I 
explain the purpose of these interviews, outline the sites of my research, explain 
my recruitment process, data analysis, and offer reflexions on the go-along as 
practised.
2. Methodology in practice: the what, where, when and who of my research.
As explained in the introductory chapter, people aged over 45, predominantly the 
over-60s, represent the fastest growing cinema audience in the UK (Cox, 2012; 
UK Film Council, 2009; FAME, 2007; Macnab, 2007). Perhaps because of this, 
many cinemas now provide mid-week matinees for the over -50s or -60s, offering 
tickets at a reduced rate or free, often accompanied by a free tea or coffee. While 
these offer a very particular type of cinema-going that could be considered outside 
of the mainstream, I was interested in the audience being constituted at such 
events and decided to undertake my research at two such matinees. For this I 
adopted the go-along as my key method and supplemented it with informal 
interviews, intended to ‘break the ice’ before the main research event.
Despite high hopes, in undertaking the go-along I found that the merging of the 
two dominant qualitative methods in a best-of-both-worlds hybrid was not so 
seamless in practice. Like most qualitative methods, the go-along requires a 
relentless process of negotiation, renegotiation and adaptation as well as some 
thoroughly disheartening moments. I hope to show that it offered a productive 
research environment through which to consider my questions as it enabled me to 
work with particular bodies in specific spaces of viewing while watching films that 
participants at least claimed they would have been watching regardless of my 
research. To explain this further, in this section I outline my final methodology and
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describe the data collection period -  what I did in practice, where, and who with. I 
move on to data analysis and -  using all of this -  end with a reflexion on my 
research practice, in particular my engagement with the go-along.
2.1 What I did. Part one: go-alongs at the cinema.
Between July 2009 and November 2010 I carried out 30 go-alongs at two sites: the 
Rio Cinema in Dalston, East London and the Clapham Picturehouse in South 
London. Across the course of this research I watched 29 different films with 
participants, conducting on-the-spot film analyses and observations as we did so 
(for details of what I watched, where and with whom, see Appendix One). On 
these trips I met the women at the cinema, at a time determined by them, and we 
parted after our post-film conversation. I purposefully got to the cinema 10 minutes 
before the arranged time so that I could observe the moment the women arrived, 
and pay attention to any ‘informal sociability’ that might greet them (Kusenbach, 
2003). On arrival, I allowed the participant to lead our route around the cinema and 
determine what we did, all the time paying attention to what my participant was 
doing and how we both moved. Before the film we tended to chat freely, and I 
offered no structured questions. I audio-recorded our conversations and attempted 
to commit to memory my observations to note down at a later stage.
Once inside the auditorium I would hang back so that the women went to their 
preferred seat, and I observed the way they negotiated the layout of the 
auditorium, as well as the other bodies encountered. In doing all of this, I was 
watching interactions between practising bodies and spaces of the cinema, as well 
as tuning into my own sensations, drawing on the method to explore the practical 
relationship between body and space. Once the cinema lights dimmed, I jotted
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down the observations thus far and continued to observe the behaviour of the 
woman I was at the cinema with, as well as my own. As the film started, I 
attempted to tune into my own sensations and thoughts and continued to do so as 
I watched, as well as observe any notable changes in the woman’s comportment 
and note down anything she or the wider audience said. In this way, I generated a 
form of on-the-spot film analysis. I continued to jot down observations of my 
responses and those of participants once the film finished, until we either got up to 
leave or the lights came on.
After the film, I asked participants what they thought of it, using my own responses 
to form questions, and participants often did the same. These conversations took 
place in a variety of locations: at the Rio we often stayed in the auditorium or 
moved to the small cafe area in the foyer. At the Clapham Picturehouse they 
almost always took place in the cinema’s cafe/bar, apart from one for which we 
went to the cafe across the road. These conversations ended when the participant 
wished them to, taking anywhere from ten minutes to four hours. This mirrored the 
type of post-film conversation that I would have when attending outside of a 
research context, and in relation to my on-going observations it enabled me to 
interrogate the differences and similarities not just between our observable 
practices but also some of the pre-reflexive processes that occur as the film 
becomes cinema. These conversations could do this, I suggest, because the 
traces of the often pre-reflexive biographical details and memories that had been 
brought forward throughout viewing -  through the journey provided by film’s virtual 
mobility -  were still tangible.
It is perhaps important to note that three of the go-alongs were in groups of two, 
with one woman joining only for the trip to the cinema. Of those listed in Appendix
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One, three participants -  Diane, Sheila and Mavis -  were not interviewed, other 
than on our trip to the cinema. This did not seem to impact upon our ‘field 
relations’, as the familiarity between the two women appeared to override the 
distance felt when meeting someone for the first time. There was however one 
significant difference between group and individual go-alongs. While the interview 
component of all go-alongs was conversational, I would make a conscious effort to 
not interrupt a participant while they were talking. With two participants such a 
consideration became ineffective as they consistently interrupted each other. This 
did not render the go-alongs void, however, as while it certainly blocked certain 
information, the two participants also served to draw out different knowledges, not 
just in conversation but also through what they did at the cinema — both of which 
further encouraged me to reflect on my own practice.
I hope that the discussion in the previous section serves as justification for my 
adoption of the go-along as the principal method for this research. By going to the 
cinema I was able to observe and partake in the practice of cinema-going as it 
happened and, as such, pay attention to the temporalities of practice so important 
to Bourdieu’s framework. In situ research enabled me across time to note 
differences between the women as well as the similarities in their practice, 
enabling an attempt (at least) at accessing the embodied history of the habitus 
described by Bourdieu. Because I, too, was engaging in cinema-going I also tuned 
into my own practices and embodiment, drawing on my own sensations to think 
through theirs, an in-the-moment comparative approach that enabled me to 
access some of my own taken-for-granted ways of practising cinema, and 
corresponding practical logic.
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The public nature of the events meant that I could observe the ways in which the 
women I attended with interacted with fellow audience members and I was careful 
to watch for both verbal and bodily communication. If we understand cinema as a 
field then I was able, through the go-along, to witness the game being played and, 
through our conversations attempt to get a sense of the embodied capitals at play 
(Bourdieu, 1990a, 1984,1977). By experiencing the atmosphere at each event 
and the significance of the wider audience to our relational positioning, I was able 
explore how differentiated bodies might practise cinema differently -  a key 
question for this thesis. Being at the cinema together also enabled me, like 
Sobchack (2004, 2000), to draw on my own bodily sensations and think through 
their relationship to the meaning made in the moment of viewing. But my position 
next to participants meant that I could also observe any of their own visible (if 
subtle) physical response to the film. In doing so I was able to capitalise on the 
methodological sensibility of the go-along to think through not just my own 
embodied co-constitution of film, but also that of the woman beside me. As such it 
offered a way of engaging Voss’s (2011) notion of the ‘surrogate body’ through 
habitus to consider the question ‘how might representation be experienced in 
practice?’, while avoiding the universalising transference of my particular 
relationship to film onto participants (Morley, 2009; Gillespie, 1995; Bourdieu, 
1977).
Finally, as the literature suggests, by moving around the building with participants I 
was able to think through how this cinema space was co-constituted by differently 
practising bodies including my own — an insight that encouraged my engagement 
with literature from the geography of architecture (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; 
Jacobs et al., 2006; Saville, 2006; Lees, 2001). In this way, the method allowed an
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in situ engagement with the practical constitution of space and offered a way of 
exploring the question ‘how are the spaces of cinema constituted?’ Through our 
simultaneous viewing of the film and the conversations it generated I was further 
able to attempt to access the sensual geographies of film, and explore how our 
‘surrogate body’ and the habitus it implies are fundamental to the constitution of 
film’s space (Voss, 2011). An unexpected value of the go-along was that it further 
enabled me to witness the ways in which these two spatialities of cinema are co­
constituted through the body, in the moment of practice.
As such, I benefited from many of the values claimed on behalf of the go-along in 
the literature. I did not find the process seamless, though, and reflect on my 
research experience in the final section of this chapter. Before doing so, I would 
like to outline my methodology in full. While verbal data is not generally considered 
sufficiently able to represent practice (Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Thrift, 2008), 
most go-alongs were supplemented by introductory conversational interviews. 
Despite the oft-cited drawbacks, I unexpectedly found these interviews boosted 
the go-along’s ability to access pre-reflexive embodied knowledges. And it is this 
process that I discuss next.
2. 2. What I did. Part two: informal interviews.
With all of my emphasis on pre-reflexive and embodied understandings, it might 
seem inappropriate to include qualitative interviewing as part of this methodology. 
My decision to do so, however, is in line with the majority of research referenced 
above (Degen et al, 2008; Ross et al., 2009; Moles, 2008; Pink, 2008a, 2008b, 
2007a, 2007b; Hall et al., 2006). In my case it was for two reasons: I wanted to 
ensure that our encounter at the cinema was not the first time we had met, so that
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there was a level of familiarity between us on that trip; and I wanted to generate an 
understanding of participants’ biographical trajectory. The latter was an attempt to 
discover at least some elements of the history participants embodied, and which 
fed into their practical logic. I intended these conversations to be very casual 
encounters but I developed a prompt sheet and, while this was not always used, it 
does serve to represent the themes of our conversations (see Appendix Two).
While the ‘natural’ go-along is intended as a way to access a certain level of 
naturally occurring practice, in adopting the method for my MRes research I found 
that the ‘unnatural’ pairing of me with my participant on their trip to the cinema was 
disruptive to this. It has been shown that embodied emotions have an impact on 
the research encounter, and my experience indicated that I might find the go-along 
more successful if a connection had already been established with participants 
(Ezzy, 2010; Inkle 2010; Kim, 2006; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Longhurst et al., 
2008; Anderson and Smith, 2001). I do not mean to suggest that I aspired to a 
deep emotional attachment, nor that meeting participants once before the go-along 
miraculously offered access to a ‘natural’ practice. I merely suggest that it enabled 
the instigation of an emotional dynamic prior to our trip to the cinema, so that the 
encounter there was not dominated by a ‘weighing up’ on both our parts. My hope 
was that the interviews would enable a more relaxed conversation at the cinema, 
offering better access to the taken for granted elements of habitus that sit behind 
the reflexive engagement offered by much research (Bourdieu, 1990a: 91).
Part of the appeal of the go-along is the claimed ability of the method to be able to 
access the pre-reflexive relationship between biography and place. Embodied 
history is so fundamental to Bourdieu’s understanding of practical sense, however, 
that I wanted to first generate an understanding of participants’ biographical
trajectory beyond those fragments drawn out by engagement with particular 
material spaces. As suggested, although reflexive, the biographical details and 
memories offered in these interviews provided me with a way to contextualise the 
women’s practice at the cinema, not just within personal histories but also within 
broader histories of institutions and social change. My hope was that this enabled 
an informed engagement with embodiments at the cinema, and their subjective 
expression of objective structures.
The interviews varied in time and location. The shortest lasted just half an hour; 
the longest went on for over five. Most took place in the women’s homes (12) or in 
the cafe/bar at the Clapham Picturehouse (11). Three were held in a cafe across 
the road from the Clapham Picturehouse, a couple at cafes near the Rio, one in a 
cafe near the participant’s home, and one in my kitchen. Despite the relatively 
standardised (although fluid) framework for the conversation, then, there was 
some diversity in the nature of the interview. When conducting interviews in the 
women’s homes, for example, they would often engage props to talk through 
biographical details, including family photographs and DVD collections, generating 
quite different data to interviews conducted in a cafe. I produced ‘head notes’ after 
the interviews to maintain the tacit knowledge gained beyond the talk recorded and 
these, too, fed in to my understanding of the data (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007:147). In writing the empirical chapters I was surprised to find myself drawing 
on this data quite extensively. This does not need to suggest a reversion to purely 
discursive, disembodied analysis. Instead, these quotes only became significant in 
light of my observations at the cinema, and the two worked together to produce my 
analysis of cinema as a spatial and embodied practice.
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In the context of the go-along these pre-interviews provide a potentially productive 
way of assessing the method’s ability to access the taken for granted embodied 
knowledge of practice, by thinking through the different histories divulged in the 
different scenarios. In this sense, in addition to assisting in a consideration of the 
question ‘how might differentiated bodies practise the cinema differently?’, it also 
offers a way in to the question ‘how might we study practice empirically?’. As I 
discuss in Chapter Six, the films we watched together did draw out biographical 
details previously undisclosed, as well as memories of films seen.
2.3 Where I did it: matinees for the over-60s at the Rio Cinema and Clapham 
Picturehouse.
As explained, my research took place at two cinemas that held matinees for the 
over-60s: the Rio Cinema in Dalston, East London and the Clapham Picturehouse 
in South London. During the period of research there were a number of similar 
matinees held across the UK. The Picturehouse Cinema group has 19 cinemas 
nationwide, with five in London, all of which host Silver Screen matinees. In 
addition to the programme run by Picturehouse Cinemas, just under half of the 
venues in the Odeon cinema chain offer Senior Screens for the over-50s, with 
seven of their 25 London cinemas offering the service. In addition, like the Rio, a 
large number of independent cinemas host such events across the country. As 
such, the events held at the two research sites are representative of a wider 
pattern of exhibition across the UK. My reason for choosing these two sites was 
practical — they were the first two to allow me to conduct research. Despite this, 
they ended up shaping my findings by offering distinct ‘social cinema scenes’ 
(Puwar, 2007).
The Rio Cinema Classic Matinee takes place on the first or second Wednesday of 
the month. The matinee has external funding and is offered to the over-60s free, 
on production of a ‘freedom pass’.20 One free cup of tea or coffee and a slice of 
cake are available from the cafe on production of a ticket. The audience is made 
up of those attending with care homes or community groups and those attending 
independently. The films screened are programmed specifically for the matinee, 
and there is a 20 minute interval about two thirds of the way through. The 
programme is a mixture of ‘classic’ films -  generally those recently re-mastered 
and re-released -  and more contemporary titles, often a month or two after 
showing in the mainstream programme (see Appendix One). The cinema has one 
screen, so the matinee audience is the only audience found in the cinema for the 
duration of the event. The maximum audience is 360. It usually fills to capacity and 
rarely falls below half of that.
In contrast, the Clapham Picturehouse Silver Screen is a twice-weekly event. On 
Tuesdays and Thursdays before 5pm tickets for the over-60s are offered at the 
reduced price of £4 (this is half the price of the standard concessionary rate of £8), 
and free tea and biscuits are provided. The audience is made up of those 
attending individually or as part of a social group; there are no community groups 
or care homes at these screenings. The cinema has four screens, and offers a 
choice of five films on any given day, all of which are also showing as part of the 
mainstream programme. More often than not these are contemporary releases. All 
screenings are also open to people under-60 at the standard ticket price. On 
Thursdays, the cinema hosts its ‘Big Scream’ cinema club for parents and babies
up to 12-months-old. While they often dominate, then, the Silver Screen audience
20 The Freedom Pass is the free travel pass for public transport available to people over-60 and 
disabled people living in London.
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is not the only one found at the cinema. There is the potential to seat 472, but the 
Silver Screen audience rarely rises above 50, and there tend to be no more than 
30 people in any one screening.
Across both, the majority of the audience is female, reflecting UK-wide statistics 
that show a female skew in cinema attendance (UK Film Council, 2009:118).
While similar in sentiment, the matinees offered by the two research sites vary 
considerably. The different temporalities of the two types of matinee, and the 
distribution of the audience between one or four screens, generate quite distinct 
‘social cinema scenes’ (Puwar, 2007). A sense of these can, I think, be garnered 
from the different ways in which the two are advertised:
The Rio’s monthly Classic Matinees take place on the first or second 
Wednesday of the month. There is an interval for every film, and extra 
seating is provided in the foyer. We are delighted that thanks to funding 
from the Big Lottery's Reaching Communities Programme we are able to 
offer free admission for the Over 60's! Please come along and enjoy a film 
and a chat!’
The Rio also produces a flyer for each film that is distributed widely in the local 
area, and handed out at the end of the preceding matinee.
The Clapham Picture house meanwhile offers this description:
‘On Tuesday and Thursday afternoons (before 5.00) anyone over 60 can 
see any film for just £4, and receive complementary tea, coffee and biscuits 
in the relaxed atmosphere of our cafe-bar.’
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Importantly, while different in tone, these blurbs both emphasise the sociability 
offered by the event: the Rio literally offering an invitation to a ‘chat’, and the 
Clapham Picturehouse suggesting the ‘relaxed’ conviviality of a cafe.
In their comprehensive study of film consumption in Nottingham, Jancovich et al 
(2003) highlight the need to understand ‘that the meanings of different modes of 
film consumption are tied to their location within the cultural geography of the city’ 
(2003: 31). This concurs with Hubbard’s (2002) argument that the distinctions 
between cinemas and audiences are mapped onto the landscape to produce 
cultural distinctions between places (2002:1243). He argues that this implicit 
labelling in turn helps us to determine whether or not they are for people ‘like us’, 
thus reinforcing such associations and maintaining a pre-reflexive distinction of 
cinemas along cultural lines (2002:1257; 2003a: 267). Both the Rio and Clapham 
Picturehouse are independent cinemas. The Rio is a non-profit registered charity 
while the Clapham Picturehouse is part of the independent Picturehouse/City 
Screen chain. While not unique, these cinemas offer an experience different to that 
found at the multiplex, and both seem keen to offer an alternative to the clinical 
environments of the contemporary cinema-going experience.
The distinctiveness of the Rio is very much shaped by its history. Its art deco 
design (see figs. 1 and 2) is maintained from a 1937 refurbishment and unlike 
many of the older cinemas that are still running, it retains a single screen. As such, 
the shape of the Rio reflects the independent, non-commercial, nature of the 
cinema and connotes a particular -  classed -  type of cinema-going. While there 
are no period features of the original 1909 building clearly evident at the Clapham 
Picturehouse, its stripped floorboards and chalkboard signs similarly connote its 
status as an independently run venue, while also clearly marking it as part of the
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‘quality’ Picturehouse/City Screen chain (see figs. 3 and 4). While their 
independent status means that both cinemas offer films other than major 
Hollywood releases, rarely these days would they draw from art house cinema. 
Rather, they tend to programme the more popular end of foreign-language and 
British films as well as American ‘independent’ cinema. Such programming would 
tend to connote audiences with relatively high levels of cultural capital, a classed 
connotation mirrored by the interiors (Bourdieu, 1984).
Figure. 1. The exterior of the Rio Cinema, Dalston
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Figure 2. Usherettes upstairs at the Rio, approx. 1940s. Image courtesy of Rio Cinema
Figure. 3. The exterior of the Clapham Picturehouse
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Figure. 4. The handwritten signs of the Clapham Picturehouse
Despite the cinemas being of similar type (ie. independent), the audiences were 
demographically diverse, complicating arguments from Hubbard (2003a, 2003b, 
2002) and Jancovich et al. (2003) and I found the ‘riskless risk’ Hubbard describes 
being, in part, constituted in the moment of practice. This is discussed further in 
the following chapter, here it seems important to explain why I chose to limit my 
sample to women.
2.5. Who with. Part one: why I chose to only recruit women.
There are two key and connected reasons for me choosing to limit my sample to 
women that attend matinees for the over-60s. First, there is a strong tradition of 
feminist film studies and I was keen to engage this through an alternative lens -  
that of practice theory. My second reason links to this: an element of female 
spectatorship that is overlooked by much of this work is the ‘double bind’ of ageing 
experienced by women, a double bind that is considered in cultural gerontology to
127
be exacerbated by film representations (Woodward, 1999). Working with such a 
group for this project is a modest attempt to disrupt the marginalisation of older 
women being mirrored in academic work by collaborating with them outside of 
gerontology.
Since the early 1970s cinema has provided a critical tool, a ‘crucial terrain’, for 
feminist thinking about the relationship between culture, representation and 
identity (Mulvey, 1989: 77, in Thornham, 1999). In the mid-1970s feminist theorists 
began to engage with ideas from psychoanalytical and semiotic frameworks being 
put to use more widely in film studies -  an engagement epitomised by Laura 
Mulvey’s (1975) seminal essay Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema -  to 
consider issues of pleasure and identification for the female spectator. In very 
broad terms, this work argued that the dominant (and naturalised) ‘male gaze’ of 
film meant that women were present on screen only as fetishised object of desire, 
as objects of the gaze (Thornham, 1999: 2, 54). Thus, in order to ‘get the joke’ or 
otherwise identify with and gain pleasure from film, it was argued that female 
spectators undertook a form of masquerade in which they became complicit in 
their own oppression (Doane, 1982: 87; although see Modleski [1988: 25-29] for a 
critique that attempts to reclaim pleasure for the female spectator without her 
having to enter into such masochism).
While the feminist thrust of this psycho-semiotic framework is well attended to, 
feminists have offered other interventions in film studies. Drawing on the 
psychoanalytical insights of feminist film studies and combining them with social 
analyses offered by audience studies, Kuhn’s (1984) early work on female 
spectatorship of ‘women’s genres’ was pioneering in its call for recognition of 
social context as well as text in framing the female spectator, to explore the 
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struggles over meaning that occurred when women watched. This began the slow 
push back against what was widely argued to be a characterisation of the female 
spectator as passive, a push back that still continues today and was the starting 
point for Bruno’s (2002) introduction of the voyageuse, Staiger’s (2000) 
engagement with broader contexts of film reception, and Kuhn’s (2002) own later 
work with audiences. Early notions of a simplistic binary between male/female 
gaze have also been problematised by work on black female spectatorship that 
exposes an assumed whiteness in this formulation and proposes the notion of an 
oppositional or critical gaze offered by those excluded from the equation (hooks, 
1992; Gaines, 1988).
Despite its diversity, all of this work is concerned by the ‘problem’ of female 
spectatorship — the enjoyment by women of those images understood to 
contribute to the naturalisation of their marginalisation. While the formative work 
does not feature heavily in this thesis, it is to this heritage that it speaks. It was 
through engagement with these arguments that I wanted to work with female 
audiences, and contribute another piece of the mosaic to this cultural-political 
project. This links to my interest in studying older women particularly, as the 
‘double marginality’ of ageing experienced by women as they reach late mid-life -  
noted in the same year by Sontag (1972) and de Beauvoir (1972) -  has not been 
much considered by feminists working in film studies (Woodward, 1999, Beugnet, 
2006, is a rare exception). Surprisingly, this is true even of those that engage older 
women for their histories of earlier periods of cinema (Stubbings, 2003; Kuhn, 
2002; Stacey, 1994).
As Woodward (1999) observes, outside of gerontology the invisibility of older 
women in contemporary society is echoed by feminist scholarship. Along with
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cultural gerontologists, Woodward asserts that ageing is a cultural process — one 
that is experienced more by women than men. It is this cultural process that she 
thinks feminism, in its implicit abjection of older women, helps to maintain as 
‘ageism is entrenched within feminism itself (Woodward, 1999: xi). As such, it is 
the aim of her project to make the invisible visible, and interrupt this 
marginalisation. By bringing older women into a study of cinema that did not just 
focus on their memories of youth, but interrogated their practices in the present, I 
was keen in my work to contribute to this project. It seemed particularly 
appropriate for a study of cinema audiences to offer such a contribution because 
the majority of the older audience is female (UK Film Council, 2009).
The umbrella categories of ‘over-60’ and ‘women’ of course offer a great diversity 
of other social identities and positions and my participants represented a range of 
socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. During my research, the importance of 
these other categories -  specifically, in this case, those of ethnicity and class -  
became clear. Much like hooks’ (1992) disruption of ideas that cinema’s gaze 
could be understood through a male/female binary, the ‘double marginality’ 
experienced by older women is complicated when accompanied by a 
consideration of other social identities and positionings. As Thornham (1999:1) 
explains, ‘[t]he assumption that the feminist theorist/critic speaks on behalf of all 
women can no longer be made...as 'sisterhood' reveals itself to be fractured by 
power differences along lines of class, race and sexual orientation’.
I must confess that I had not factored in the impact of such multiplicities before 
setting out on my research. This streamlining of participants to the identity (or two) 
by which you are interested is common in work on audiences. As Staiger (2005: 
143) points out in her review of work on ‘minorities and the media’, a truly
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‘intersectional’ understanding of these social relations within the context of media 
consumption has not sufficiently been carried out. I cannot claim to offer one fully 
here, as the terms on which a study is undertaken can’t help but inflect the data 
gathered and, in retrospect, I don’t feel I focussed adequately during fieldwork on 
the difference -  or not -  that such layered identities (and the multi-dimensional 
habitus they suggest) made to cinema as practice. One element deserving of 
particular note in this context is that I do not fully interrogate social class as an axis 
of identity and habitus for participants, and nor do I offer an in-depth analysis of its 
influence on cinema as practice. I dwell on this here because social class is 
probably the dimension of identity most associated with Bourdieu’s (1984) work, 
and many who engage his theories do so to offer detailed class analyses of the 
phenomena under study -  particularly cultural consumption (cf. Warde, 2008; 
Lizardo, 2006; Holt, 1998; Morley, 1992). That this thesis lacks such a focus is 
largely a methodological issue.
While I do not think that class can be understood as a solely self-defined identity, I 
failed to incorporate questions relating to it in my research design and this 
absence left me feeling uneasy about making any claims about the relationship 
between this dimension of identity and cinema going as practice for participants.
Its absence is accounted for by my methodology. Had I strategically incorporated 
an interest in this dimension of social identity to my research design, I would have 
developed a research design through which I could offer such an analysis, which 
would have included an attempt to recruit interviewees whose experiences could 
speak to class matters in a systematic way. As it stands, and as the following 
section outlines, my recruitment process left no room for such sampling 
procedures and I did not recruit a sample that was representative on any class
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terms (Blaxter et al., 2006). Moreover, as I did the interviews, the clearly shifting 
nature of this identity became clear as I listened to complex accounts of the 
changing material economic circumstances across the women’s lives. As such, 
while the previous section offered a brief outline of the class associations of the 
two research sites and the next chapter incorporates a discussion of class 
differences among participants, I am not able to offer an in-depth class-based 
analysis of the kind commonly associated with Bourdieu (1984) and, indeed, 
classic audience studies (Hall, 1980; Morley, 1980). I hope, however, that the 
understanding of social difference and identity that arose in my research -  which 
suggests it is emergent and co-constituted in the moment -  serves to capture the 
way the multiplicity inherent to social identity, including that of class, plays out in 
cinema as practice.
Looking back at the end of this project, I can see similarly that my interest in older 
women did not need to limit me to engaging only with them. I could have explored 
my questions through a mixed gender sample of cinemagoers and a comparative 
analysis. Right or wrong, the decision to focus on women both limited and 
simplified the process of recruitment, and enabled me to engage with a variety of 
other social categories. Notwithstanding the gender bias, the women that I 
attended each cinema with offered a broadly representative sample of the 
audience populations from which they were recruited. This was despite a 
somewhat ad hoc and difficult recruitment process, which, as we shall see, did not 
leave me the privilege of carefully selecting those women that I attended the 
cinema with, and certainly left no room for formal sampling procedures.
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2.6. Who with. Part two: accessing cinemas and recruiting participants.
As suggested above, I gained access to the research sites relatively easily. I had 
previously conducted research at the Rio for my MRes research, and had 
developed a good relationship with the Audience Development Officer, Jemma, 
who organised the Classic Matinees there. As such, negotiating permission to 
carry out a longer period of research only took a phone call. Gaining access to the 
Clapham Picturehouse was similarly smooth. Years ago I had worked on a film 
festival that hosted some screenings at the cinema so, to request access, I fished 
out the email address of my contact there, the manager Mike. He quickly agreed to 
me conducting the research. Once I had permission, I set about recruiting 
participants at each cinema. I could just as easily, perhaps more easily, have 
recruited participants through local community groups for older people or day 
centres for people over-60 and then accompanied those women to the cinema of 
their choice. But I wanted to ensure that I was finding people who were carrying 
out the practice that I was interested in, and recruiting at the cinema seemed the 
best way to do this.
My main method of getting people involved was to hand out flyers and approach 
women at the cinemas. As the description of the events above might suggest, it 
was quite a different process at the two sites. My hope that I might see some 
friendly faces from my previous research at the Rio were initially dashed when 
Jemma explained that the most regular attendee had not been in for over eight 
months. I did eventually bump into all three of the other participants but only once I 
was some months into my research. As such, I was ‘on my own’ at both cinemas 
and although the staff were very keen to help by pointing out friendly regulars, my 
recruitment sessions coincided with their busiest period so most of the time they
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were far too busy. At the Rio I approached audience members once they were 
seated, either before the film or -  if they didn’t look too busy -  during the interval. 
At the Clapham Picturehouse I approached potential participants in the Cafe bar, 
catching them before or after the film.
Because of the frequency of the events at the Picturehouse I felt I could manage to 
successfully recruit and undertake research with 15 women within the 12 months 
officially allotted to ‘fieldwork’. The Rio, however, posed more problems -  with only 
one screening a month and none in August, time was very tight as I was hoping to 
recruit 15 women and attend a matinee with each of them. I had scheduled 17 
months as a result (ie. two matinees for recruitment and 15 for go-alongs), but this 
required a very successful initial recruitment. When I didn’t get the numbers I 
needed I changed my tactic, handing out flyers as the women entered the cinema 
and collecting them back from those who were interested as they left. I handed out 
just under 230 flyers and 27 were returned to me. Over half of these (15) had to be 
discarded because the contact information had not been filled in. Although on 
these occasions I handed out flyers to all of the women attending the matinee, it is 
important to note that all apart from one chose to sit upstairs during our trip to the 
cinema. As such, they represented the more able-bodied proportion of the 
audience.
I followed up with those women who provided their contact details either by phone 
or by post -  depending on their preference -  and suffered a drop off of four, three 
who didn’t respond to my letters and one woman who was very keen but ended up 
getting too busy with her own studies to be able to help with mine. The 
involvement of the last woman was a victim of an issue with conducting research 
of this type at a monthly event: someone who signs up in September would not
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expect me to then arrange our go-along for the following March or even later in the 
year. I was concerned about timings and decided to make up some of the numbers 
by conducting more go-alongs at the Clapham Picturehouse.
Despite fewer audience members to choose from, recruitment at the Picturehouse 
had been a little easier than at the Rio. Here I also benefited from my consistent 
attendance as, in a few cases, it led regulars who had initially declined my 
invitation to take part in the research to change their mind. This was the case with 
four participants - Mrs Haider, Barbara, Shelagh and Dr Anlaw. I think their initial 
declination was because they treasured their cinema trips (hence the weekly 
attendance) and were therefore reluctant to share them with me. But their regular 
attendance also ensured that they saw me every week, and a casual sociability 
developed which began with a nod or smile before developing into short 
conversations about my progress. Eventually, after they saw me on go-alongs and 
understood the casual nature of the encounter, they offered to take part. At the 
other end of the spectrum, I recruited two people when they responded to a flyer 
they’d picked up at the box office. This meant I met the participants for the first 
time in our interview, generating a slightly different research event to those 
conducted with the regulars.
Although the recruitment process was not always without struggle, I did recruit 
samples that were representative of the audience populations as a whole, 
although as discussed, at the Rio, this sampling was from a smaller pool of the 
audience than it could have been. In the end I worked with 33 women in total, 
aged between 60 and 89 (see Appendix One). I managed to recruit 13 at the Rio 
and 17 at the Picturehouse, with three other women joining in on trips to the 
cinema, one at the Rio and two at the Picturehouse. In undertaking go-alongs with
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these women, I found that the method enabled me to access elements of the 
embodied, pre-reflexive nature of practice, offering a productive, lived, way of 
thinking through my research questions. Maintaining such a sensuous, alive, 
understanding during the process of data analysis is however notoriously difficult 
(Latham, 2010; Pink, 2007a). Since it is suggested that videoing research offers a 
way of avoiding the flattening of data during analysis, and this is so important to 
my research, it seems important to outline why I chose not to engage such a 
method for recording my data before moving on to explain how I analysed it.
2.7. A note on audio and video recording in data collection.
While Kusenbach says that audio-recording is productive during go-alongs; to Pink 
(2007a), video-recording the research event is fundamental. Pink (2008a, 2008b, 
2007a) argues that it not only makes the researcher more attuned to the 
movements of those they film, it also offers a rich data set that provokes a more 
embodied memory of the event itself (2008b: 2). As such, the videoing in Pink’s 
research is not just a recording device — it is key to the value of the method’s 
benefits (2007a: 250). With this in mind it seems important to explain why I audio 
recorded my go-alongs as although Pink is, as far as I can find, the only author 
that emphasises videoing as a key component of the go-along,21 she is certainly 
not alone in arguing that videoing research provides heretofore unavailable access 
to bodily communication during data analysis (Laurier, 2010; Lorimer, 2010; 
Jacobs et al, 2008; Dant, 2004).
21 Although Murray (2009) does conduct a once-removed form of ‘walking with video’ by giving her 
young participants videos with which to film their walk to school, which she then explores with 
them.
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Notwithstanding the logistical problems of conducting a video ethnography of 
cinema-going -  the (il)legality of filming during the film and the limited visibility in 
the darkened auditorium — I was reluctant to add such a dimension to my 
research. Ironic though it may be for a method of recording that is understood to 
capture the embodied elements of practice (Lorimer, 2010), videoing seems to 
lead to an attenuation of the researchers own bodily sensations in the moment of 
practice (Simpson, 2011). In the case of the go-along, it results in the researcher 
drawing on their body most significantly after the research event (Pink, 2008b: 2). 
This is, of course, not a problem in itself, but I was keen to think through the 
relational nature of embodiment in practice and engage my body as a tool in 
research to reflect on my own practice as well as that of participants (Longhurst, et 
al., 2008; Bain and Nash, 2006; Wacquant, 2004a). Simpson (2011) argues that if 
researchers make such engagement a key feature of video research practice then 
it is possible to do this. However, my lack of filming experience -  an issue 
surprisingly absent from the literature -  meant that for me the camera presented a 
distancing mechanism.
I am not, of course, claiming that my research was more, or less, authentic as a 
result of not videoing it. Instead, it meant -  for me -  that I was more capable of 
reflecting not just on my research practice (as Pink persuasively advocates we 
do), but also my cinema practice in the moment. I found writing notes on my own 
embodied sensations and observations of the participants’ dispositions, 
comportments and movements in situ, alongside audio recording conversations 
offered the best way of recording data for my research aims. While video data is 
useful during analysis, my notes offered what I found to be a similarly fruitful, if 
different, access to the embodied nature of practice. As such, despite limitations in
representation that all researchers confront -  including those engaging video data 
(Thrift, 2008:139; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:148) -  the talk and 
observations quoted in the following three chapters has been interpreted through 
the body. It is my hope that they evoke knowledge that moves beyond the text, 
escaping the often scornful way in which ‘talk’ is considered by those attempting to 
access embodied knowledges (Latham, 2010:1999).
Not generating video data does not mean that my research fails to benefit from 
many of the properties claimed on behalf of the go-along by Pink (2008a, 2008b, 
2007a, 2007b) and outlined above. Indeed, as the review above shows, the 
majority of the literature describes similar benefits from research conducted 
without picking up a camera (Carpiano, 2009; Anderson, 2004; Kusenbach, 2003). 
However, as discussed in the final section of this chapter, my experience of the 
go-along in practice differed to that described by the literature, suggesting that the 
method of data collection does encourage a different engagement with embodied 
knowledges and the senses, but not that either is more or less methodologically 
generative. Before moving on to this discussion, to explore the ways in which I 
attempted to maintain the embodied dimension of my data, I first describe my data 
analysis process.
2.4. Analysing the data: transcription, coding and trying to put the body 
back in.
Data analysis for me began while still in the ‘field’, as I began to transcribe those 
go-alongs I had undertaken, and type up observations. For any researcher 
interested in embodied practice, transcribing is a disheartening process. Typing up 
my recordings I had a distinct feeling that the lived understandings generated at
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the cinema were disappearing with every keystroke. While this may seem like a 
reason to have adopted a video dimension to my research, visual data does not 
solve this problem. Indeed, Jacobs et al. (2008:175), who videoed their research 
on Red Road Estate; and Dant (2004: 56) who videoed working practices at a 
garage, bemoan a similar deadening when presenting moving image data in a 
research journal and transcribing it respectively. This is also not a sensation that is 
unique to those working on embodied practice, and the politics of transcription has 
been discussed in a range of disciplines (cf. Bird, 2005; Tilley, 2003; Bucholtz, 
2000).
My experience of transcribing offered a significant problem: its disembodying 
nature meant I was unable to produce transcripts that supported my philosophical 
influences and the intentions of my project. As such, I developed a form of 
transcribing that included notes from the memories conjured up as I typed, 
embodied memories brought to the fore by listening to my tapes and hearing more 
than just talk. Sometimes this was as simple as noting that Joan had brought her 
own sugar to the cafe because of her on-going stomach problems. At other times, 
it was a memory of something I felt, or something subtle that one of the women I 
was with did. For example, the way that Ann fiddled with her wedding ring every 
time her speech drifted off, or the dramatic gesticulating of Joyce that was a 
fundamental part of her communicating but which was lost in a straight transcript 
of talk.
Although my added stage directions do not, of course, solve the problem of 
disembodied transcriptions, I found that during the analysis process they gave me 
pointers and sparked memories that helped me realise that certain spoken themes 
also shared particular bodily acts and embodied sensations. The process of
adding these stage directions in my transcriptions almost happened without me 
thinking as, while I listened and typed, the memories flooded forward. In this way I 
found transcribing a fundamental part of analysing my data, acting as it did like the 
prompts engaged in research (see also Bird, 2005). This meant that, in line with 
recommendations from Maxwell (2005: 96) and Crang (2005b: 222), I began my 
data analysis before engaging in any formal coding.
Armed with these annotated transcriptions and notes from my observations on the 
go-alongs, including those of bodily sensations felt during the film, I began the 
process of data analysis proper. As opposed to quantitative research in which the 
codes are set before the research is carried out, in qualitative analysis the 
researcher’s task is to look through it, grouping together points repetition and 
singling out exceptional elements to generate codes (Cope, 2005: 225; Crang, 
2005b: 224). In my case, this was achieved through a laborious process of reading 
and re-reading the transcripts and field notes, highlighting areas of convergence 
and discordance between them. So much data is generated by qualitative 
research that it is well known to be unwieldy and hard to work with systematically 
(Brewer, 2000). For me, managing hundreds of pages of data involved a lot of 
photocopying, cutting and pasting, and even more post-it notes, as I attempted to 
convert the mess of research into something coherent while also maintaining its 
ambiguity (Law, 2004; Parr, 2001). This (literal) mess is of course now avoidable 
through the use of a digital tool such as NVivo, but having undertaken training in 
this process I decided against it because I wasn’t able to get an over-arching 
sense of the data. This is not a criticism of the software — it is just that, for me, the 
materiality of the data is key to its analysis.
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The codes produced through this process are not, of course, an end in 
themselves. What begin as ‘descriptive codes’ are then used to explore more 
abstract or ‘analytic’ codes (Cope, 2005: 224). Qualitative data analysis, then, is 
an on-going and iterative process (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Maxwell, 
2005). It was after iteration four of analysing the go-along data that I realised my 
interviews could contribute quite a lot to the analysis and interpretation process. 
This stemmed from an engagement between them and my observation during 
analysis, and the developing theme of cinematic habitus that is discussed in 
Chapter Six. I was interested in how the two forms of data related, and the 
different themes arising from both. I did not include the interview data in the same 
analysis as that of the go-alongs, instead I submitted it to the same process and 
compared the developing codes and themes to offer a point of comparison. I did 
this partly because I wanted to explore the ways in which being at the cinema 
together might encourage different forms of talk and knowledge (ie. did it bring 
forth pre-reflexive, or taken for granted knowledges?), but also because I wanted 
to see the continuities between the two and make note of those points referenced 
in both.
Although much of practice is not just ‘unsayable’ but unspoken, speech -  and 
conversation -  is nevertheless an important part of practice. As such, rather than 
discount interview data, I draw on it frequently across the next three chapters as I 
present my analysis. Although I supplement it with observations, I do not discount 
participants’ (our) capacity to be cognisant of, and capable of reflecting on, much 
of practice (Rose et al., 2010). However, there is also -  as Bourdieu notes -  much 
of practice that goes without saying and rarely makes it into our explanations of 
what we do. As such, despite drawing on this data in the following chapters it is
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important to note that I would not have come to understand it in such a way had I 
not conducted go-alongs. Doing so enabled me to also observe the practice in the 
moment and access those pre-reflexive knowledges that constitute habitus, to 
think through the ways in which they relate to more reflexive biographical 
information.
In sum, for me, because of the different knowledges it encourages, the go-along 
affected not just the data collection but also the process of analysis. In this way, 
and as I have suggested, I found it a very productive method with which to work 
and think through my key questions. However, I also found that there was a key 
element of the method as practised that proved fundamental to its effectiveness in 
my research but which has not, thus far, been drawn out in the literature: 
disruption of embodied knowledge, or in Bourdieu’s terms, practical logic.
2.4. Reflexion on the go-along: disruption as methodologically generative.
In order to ensure that my research met ethical requirements I sought and gained 
approval from the Open University’s Human Participants and Materials Ethics 
Committee (HPMEC). While such approval is important, the formalisation of 
research ethics that it represents runs the risk of withdrawing all responsibility from 
the researcher ‘in the field,’ once they have received clearance (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 225-6; Thrift, 2003a: 120). Indeed, it seems clear that because the 
majority of ethical dilemmas arise in the doing of research and cannot be predicted 
beforehand, our ethical framework must be more fluid than that of ethics 
committees. As such, the far more important influence on my own research 
practice was the ethical stance provide by Bourdieu (1977,1990a). While Bourdieu 
engages most explicitly with the issues of ethics in works not yet discussed in this
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thesis -  particularly The Weight of the World (1999) and An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology (with Loic Wacquant, 1992) -  a sense of ethical responsibility runs 
through all of his writing (Kauppi, 2000). Indeed, he seems to argue that 
embracing the ambiguous nature of practice rather than reverting to ostensibly 
definitive explanations of practice is itself a moral responsibility that all social 
scientists should accept if their research is to be considered ‘valid’ (1977:140).
Not only does Bourdieu offer a critique of existing ‘scientific’ practice, outlined 
above, he also shifts the understanding of rigour in research. Instead of aiming for 
an absolute -  and unrealistic -  objectivity, we should instead take the demand for 
rigour to be a call for reflexivity, in which the researcher considers the impact they 
may have had on the outcome of their research, and the structures they may have 
applied, or not, to the practice under study (1977:105). This should not, however, 
be taken to such a degree that the distance between researchers and researched 
is reinforced by reverting to a sense of the all-seeing, all-knowing author 
(Wacquant, 2004b; on the same issue, see Rose, 1997:310). Further, this 
reflexivity is not limited to individual researchers, but is also about stepping outside 
of disciplinary conventions to acknowledge where the academic habitus may be 
skewing what is understood. It is about challenging our epistemic assumptions 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 35). Importantly, this reflexion is distinct from reflection. It is not 
about looking back on research practice and writing yourself in, it is instead an on­
going and active process that must be engaged throughout — a process that 
Bourdieu calls ‘participant objectification,’ in which researchers continually 
question and ‘objectify their own relation to the object’ of research (1990a: 34; see 
also Turner, 2000).
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It is perhaps because of this that I found go-alongs in practice far more conflicted 
than the events described in the literature. However, partly in line with the different 
approach that Bourdieu suggests stems from such challenges, I found these 
moments of conflict the most productive when I came to analysing data. I hope 
that by including reflexions on my own practice throughout the three chapters that 
follow I come close to the ethical requirements inherent to Bourdieu’s theory and 
vital to feminist research (Katz, 1994; Nast, 1994; Stanley and Wise, 1993; 
Haraway, 1988). But here I would like to dwell for a moment on what researching 
reflexively can tell us about the go-along as practised.
I have already explained that many of the claims made about the go-along in the 
existing literature rang true in my research, and I found it a productive tool through 
which to consider my questions. As I hope the following three chapters will testify, 
the method offered a significant contribution to the ways in which we might 
empirically study practice. Undertaking informal pre-interviews proved surprisingly 
productive too, in enabling me to use participants’ statements to frame practical 
logic, which then helped get closer to the pre-reflexive knowledges that guided 
practice in the moment of my research. Combining the two offered a way of 
studying cinema as practice without -  I hope -  reverting to a sense of rules or 
structural analysis, while also avoiding the voluntarism associated with subjectivist 
understandings. Key to this was not just those seemingly embedded memories 
and knowledges that emerged in our conversations, but also the ways in which our 
bodies moved about the cinema. Being able to interview in situ and watch what 
participants did at the cinema enabled me to tune into the difference in habitus and 
immanence in practice that, Bourdieu (1977,1990a) claims, is often lost in 
research.
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This leads me to an element of the go-along that I found fundamental to the 
method as practised: the confrontation of difference between researcher and 
researched. Because my go-alongs required me to accompany participants as 
they undertook what for most of them was a treasured practice, I was struck 
throughout my research by the sense that I was in some way invading. I felt in the 
way. I was familiar with this sensation from go-alongs undertaken as part of my 
MRes research and, although difficult in the moment, it was precisely this 
uncomfortable physical closeness that I found methodologically productive. It 
ended up producing a research context in which it was very difficult to not objectify 
my relationship to the object of research as the more I tried to ‘fit in’ the more it 
emphasised the incongruity between my own practical understanding of cinema 
and that of participants. It meant that I couldn’t avoid confronting not just their 
embodied relationship to the space and the constitution of cinema, but also my 
own and the ways in which we co-constituted each other’s practice and the film on 
the screen. This emergent sense of difference between me and participants, and 
the awkwardness of my body in ‘their’ practice was for me very productive and led 
to many of the findings discussed in the following chapters. It is, however, not 
referred to in any of the existing literature on the go-along.
In fact, there seems to be the opposite assertion. As discussed earlier, in thinking 
through the engagement with place on a go-along Pink (2008a: 193) suggests that 
by getting closer to other people’s embodied perceptions through shared 
experiences we can ‘begin to make places similar to theirs and thus feel we are 
similarly emplaced’. I had quite a different experience -  in my research the 
accessing of others’ perceptions of cinema space stemmed from a disruption of 
my own pre-reflexive practical perception, a disruption that threw it into relief.
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Referencing the physical invasion involved in research, Coffey points out that, ‘As 
cultural boundaries are negotiated, so too are boundaries of the body. At a very 
simple level, the ethnographer has to sit or stand or lie somewhere... fieldwork 
often invokes the physical awkwardness of the body’ (1999: 73). As suggested, in 
my experience, this awkwardness was caused by an embodied assertion of 
difference -  as opposed to the affinity Pink (2008a) implies -  when confronted with 
what might be considered ‘shared’ sensorial stimulants. Rather than these 
differences disrupting empathy, however, I felt that by engaging them I was able to 
get closer to understanding the embodied practice of the women I was with, and 
simultaneously become more aware of my own practical logic.
In addition to the reflexivity in practice encouraged by Bourdieu, there are two 
other possible reasons for this sense of difference and disruption having arisen 
particularly strongly in my research and not that described in the literature outlined 
above. The first is two-pronged. The age gap between me and participants -  
which at times extended to nearly 60 years -  meant that we not only had different 
levels of physical mobility, but that we also belonged to different ‘modes of 
generation’ (Bourdieu, 1977, an issue discussed at length in the following chapter 
and Chapter Seven). The second is perhaps more banal. I was researching a 
practice that I regularly undertook outside of a research context and had attended 
both cinemas that became sites of my research. Therefore, I had my own pre­
reflexive, taken for granted ways of practising cinema that were brought to the fore 
by doing so in a different context and engaging another’s ways of doing the same. 
In this way, while my experience of go-alongs left me explicitly aware of the 
importance of bodily communication in research events, it also served to
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highlighted the different, and shifting, politics of embodiment and affect (cf. Tolia- 
Kelly, 2006).
While arguments for empathetic embodiments are persuasive and highlight an 
important potential of the go-along, Bondi (2003) warns that the balancing act 
required for genuine empathy is in fact very complex and difficult to achieve. It is 
important not to assume it has been, she argues, because doing so can 
inadvertently reproduce oppressive power relations (Bondi, 2003: 66). In this way, 
it seems worth broadening Pink’s (2007) argument out to include the empathy that 
comes from a point of difference, not affinity. This embodied difference produced 
similar insights into spatial perceptions as those Pink (2007a) describes, but from 
quite a different starting point. In this way, our methods of recording data may 
have divided us on some issues, but we eventually arrived at similar 
understandings of the benefits of go-alongs.
2.5. Conclusion: The value of studying cinema at the cinema.
I started this chapter with a key question for this thesis. With all the emphasis on 
pre-reflexive and embodied knowledge that drives it, how might we empirically 
study practice? The first half of my discussion outlined arguments made in 
literature on my chosen method -  the go-along. My hope is that the description of 
the method in the first half of this chapter provides a persuasive argument for why 
I chose to adopt it as my primary method. The discussions in section two are 
intended to provide a sense of the context of research that can be drawn on 
throughout the following three chapters as I discuss the findings from my empirical 
research. Each chapter is organised around an overarching theme that arose in 
data analysis. These do not represent an exhaustive account of the data or the
147
themes it provoked and I could have woven many alternative narratives in this 
thesis. However, I have focused on those that spoke most clearly to my research 
questions and the concerns outlined in the preceding chapters.
The next chapter moves on to explore the overarching theme of an emergent 
mode of generation at the cinema. It is in this chapter that I attempt to provide a 
sense of the bodily affinities across participants, as well as suggestions of shared 
practical logic of cinema that emerged through data analysis. In doing so, I explore 
the question ‘how might differentiated bodies practise cinema-going differently?’ 
while also laying some of the groundwork for the discussions in the following two 
chapters. Chapter Six moves on to discuss the theme of cinematic habitus by 
exploring cinema-going practices across life as well as the memories and pre­
reflexive knowledges that the films we watched together appeared to evoke. 
Exploring these themes through work on embodied spectatorship, I confront the 
question ‘how is film representation experienced in practice?’ and attempt to 
integrate notions of difference from the previous chapter into my analysis. Finally, 
in Chapter Seven I discuss the theme of the sensual geographies of cinema space 
by exploring not just the recurring theme of different productions of the building 
through differently embodied practice, but also the constitution of the space on the 
screen in the moment of viewing. In this way, this chapter attends to both my 
question ‘how are the spaces of cinema constituted?’, as well as, to a lesser extent 
‘how is film representation experienced in practice?’ and ‘how might differentiated 
bodies practise cinema-going differently?’
Having thus discussed my key findings from empirical research, I move on in the 
conclusion to this thesis to finally consider the questions asked, and further
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discuss the effectiveness of the go-along in answering the question ‘how might 
study practice empirically?’
Chapter Five. Somatic norms, modes of generation and the 
practical logic of cinema
This thesis began with the paradox raised by gerontology’s analyses of films: that 
despite the majority of films being distinctly ageist the fastest-growing cinema 
audience in the UK aged 45 and over. In the first chapter, I explored existing 
literature on film, cinema-going and audiences to show (some of) the insights 
offered by gerontology, film and cinema studies, and geography. Out of this 
literature arose three key elements that appeared fundamental to any 
understanding of cinema as practice: the film on the screen, the lived body of the 
audience and the viewing space. As it stands, there are very many studies that 
productively explore one or two of these themes, but only a couple that offer a 
consideration of all three in a contemporary context (Boyle 2010, 2009; Srivinas, 
2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998). This thesis is an attempt to address this gap by 
exploring cinema as a spatial and embodied practice. My engagement with the 
literature, read through Bourdieu’s theory of practice, led to me asking three key 
questions about cinema. In this, the first of three empirical chapters, I will use my 
data to productively engage the existing literature and Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice to explore the question ‘how might differentiated bodies practise cinema 
differently?’
Concerned as he was with understanding the enduring stratifications in society 
without reverting to either a subjective or objective model, an understanding of 
difference is fundamental to Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) theory of practice. He 
suggests that such distinction between social groups is generated by and through 
practice co-constituted by habituated dispositions integrated in the body. While
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class is the social difference of key concern to Bourdieu (1984, 1977), feminists 
have found his theory a productive framework through which to think the gendered 
habitus (Adkins, 2004; Lovell, 2000; McNay, 1999; Moi, 1991), and researchers 
have similarly employed his ideas to overcome problematic theoretical divisions in 
work on ethnicity (Cederberg, 2012; Erel, 2010; Connolly et al., 2009; Bentley, 
1987). Combined with my interest in the politics of ageing, it is perhaps not 
surprising that my research suggested a form of embodied difference as a strong 
theme. However, studying practice in the moment gives a lived and somewhat fluid 
understanding of distinction and I was surprised throughout my research by the 
apparent similarity across the embodiments of participants, despite significant 
‘objective’ markers of difference.
In section one, I outline these ‘objective’ differences between participants and the 
demographic diversity between cinemas. In relation to my question, and certain 
readings of Bourdieu’s theory, it could easily be assumed that the marked 
disparities outlined, for example in economic capital among audience members, 
result in differentiated audience practices appropriate to social group. In practice, 
however, while the ‘social scenes’ (Puwar, 2007) were distinct, at each cinema I 
found a bodily affinity across audiences. As such, the demographic diversity 
becomes significant here, not as a determining force in practice, but instead 
precisely because it did not seem to produce significant difference in cinema as 
practice at the matinees under study. Interrogating this, I came to see it as an in- 
the-moment enactment of a distinct ‘mode of generation’ (Bourdieu, 1997) through 
which these women shared a social identity despite the ‘objective’ differences 
between them. While, of course, this does not mean that the other markers of 
difference are irrelevant, it is this emergent mode of generation that I think has
most to offer my question and which I am keen to draw out and explore in this 
chapter. I begin my discussion of this apparent affinity between participants in 
section two, with descriptions of research events from each cinema in an attempt 
to provide a sense of the events -  both go-alongs and matinees -  in practice.
In section three I draw on these vignettes, and observation notes, to explore the 
sense of embodied difference I experienced on go-alongs. In doing so I suggest 
that such difference is in part produced in practice through pre-reflexive adherence 
to a different (generational) ‘somatic norm’ (Puwar, 2001) of femininity. This could, 
of course, be felt in all practices so in section four I build on my argument by taking 
it back to the specifics of cinema and discussing the public (as in extra-domestic) 
nature of the practice, as compared to domestic viewing. All participants made a 
clear hierarchical distinction between the two, one that to me suggested a 
generational habitus -  a practising of cinema-going distinct to the shared history of 
this age-class (Bourdieu, 1977). Important here is that, with Bourdieu (1984,
1977), my data suggests that in this instance ‘age’ is not so much determined by 
chronology but a social age that is being practically (re)constituted in part through 
cinema-going. One of the ways in which the generation of a collective identity was 
particularly tangible was through expressions of film taste. The final section offers 
an analysis of participants’ assertions of those tastes and associated bodily 
responses as we watched films, arguing that taste is co-constituted by the 
affective dimension of habitus, one built up through historically, generationally, 
specific inculcation of appropriate and inappropriate images at the cinema.
In sum, I suggest here that differentiated bodies do not practise cinema differently 
in a way that can be mapped and predicted. Instead, such differentiation is 
emergent through practice. The differentiation practised, of course, depends on
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the relationship between habitus and field but for these women in this specific 
practice I would like to suggest that while other elements of habitus remain 
important, the key distinction being enacted is not one relating to class, ethnicity or 
race but is instead focused on modes of generation.
As average life expectancy continues to increase in the UK, and with it the ‘Fourth 
Age’, older people are encouraged to ‘stay active to stay young’ with consumer 
culture providing an seemingly endless array of tools for ‘ageing successfully’ and 
maintaining a youthful look. All of this creates an enduring pressure among 
retirees to remain active and avoid physical signs of ageing for as long as 
possible, to maintain social value and stave off becoming a burden on the state or 
family (Clarke and Warren, 2007; Calasanti and Slevin, 2006; Katz, 2000;
Hugman, 1999). In this context the themes discussed below suggest the practical 
logic of cinema for participants is in part the fulfilment of this inculcated 
responsibility. For this audience, the collective identity co-constituted with cinema 
as practice (pre-reflexively) provides distinction from the (marginalised and 
burdensome) ‘fourth-age’ (Townsend et al, 2006; Hugman, 1999). Importantly, 
such a distinction is produced not just by arrival at ‘old age’ and a need to identify 
oneself against the infirm other — instead, it relates to life-long practices and the 
different habitus developed by this generation compared to the one that came 
before it. As such, this chapter is not just about the ‘function’ of such distinction, it 
is about its genesis across life (Lizardo, 2011).
This is perhaps a strong claim, and it no doubt requires explanation. I begin, then, 
with an outline of the demographic diversity between and within audiences at each 
cinema.
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1. Demographic diversity: markers of social difference at the Rio and 
Clapham Picturehouse.
While much of this thesis may appear to put all participants into one social group 
(women over-60) this is not my intention. There are some broad differences in the 
class, race and ethnicities of participants that serve to indicate their diversity and 
avoid presenting them as homogenous. The embodied affinity across participants 
that emerged in my research -  and which is the focus of this chapter -  arose 
despite these differences but I do not wish to suggest that such differences didn’t 
exist and are irrelevant to cinema as practice. As such, in this section, I outline the 
key areas of diversity along ‘objective’ markers of difference across and within the 
two cinemas in order to more fully explore the ways in which the effect of such 
positions was attenuated as a shared mode of generation and collective identity 
appeared to be co-constituted with cinema as practice.
As the employment histories outlined in Appendix One might suggest, participants 
who attended the Clapham Picturehouse on the whole had higher levels of 
economic capital than those recruited at the Rio. The majority of the women I went 
to the Clapham Picturehouse with had access to private- or public-sector final 
salary pensions in addition to their state provisions. Indeed, most of these women 
had retired from a career in the civil service during which all, bar one, had been 
promoted from junior secretary or typist to senior positions. Others were not quite 
as economically privileged but nevertheless had undertaken stable careers in the 
public sector, while Joyce was a senior academic administrator and Lauretta a 
production coordinator. By contrast, participants at the Rio overwhelmingly relied 
on state benefits and financial support from their children, several of whom were in 
well-paid employment. The majority of participants had been employed in the care
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or catering profession. Others had been housewives, supported financially by 
husbands who more often than not had been employed in low-paid manual labour 
(or in Janet R’s case as a Pastor). While Lynda, Joanne and Rama had slightly 
higher incomes, few participants were economically independent, and all were 
openly concerned by the financial implications of retirement.
Understood through Bourdieu (1984), this does not mean that we can make 
assumptions about participants’ positions -  as I have shown, economic capital is 
not the sum of class. Cultural capital, gained among other things through 
education, is also, if not more, important. While I would have described the 
majority of participants at the Clapham Picturehouse as middle class, understood 
through Bourdieu (1984) their position is not so clear as many ‘worked their way 
up’, beginning careers in junior positions, with limited education, and retiring in 
senior positions with substantial cultural capital. Their capital shifted significantly 
across life. Indeed, while I would describe most participants at the Rio as working 
class there was no ‘perfect’ class division that could be identified between cinemas 
because while there might be shared levels of economic capital, cultural capital 
varied across participants. In addition to class differences and differences in 
economic capital across and within cinema audiences, there was a profound 
difference along racial and ethnic lines.
While all participants at the Clapham Picturehouse were white, mainly white 
British, the women recruited at the Rio were more racially and ethnically diverse: 
four participants were black, one south Asian and two Italian. This broadly 
reflected the level of diversity found in the audience at each cinema — across 
seven months of conducting research at the Clapham Picturehouse I saw one non­
white person attend, and he was a young black man; at the Rio, meanwhile,
approximately a third of the audience was non-white, and there was greater 
diversity among the white ethnicities too (see Appendix One). In their exploration 
of quality of life among older people, Moriarty and Butt (2004) highlight that 
embodied norms generate exclusionary structures for non-white races and non- 
‘native’ ethnicities. In later life, being a member of an ethnic minority can constitute 
being ‘a minority within a minority’ (Blakemore, 1997: 35). Add gender in to the mix 
and you are triple marginalised, creating an ‘ethnic-gender hierarchy’ in later life 
(Moriarty and Butt, 2004: 732). It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that all non-white 
participants were found at the cinema within a population that is predominantly 
working class and/or with limited economic capital.
All non-white participants arrived to the UK during the 1950s and 1960s, the peak 
years of mass immigration from former colonies. In their study of race and ethnicity 
in later life, Blakemore and Boneham (1994) point out that, due to post-war mass 
immigration (a system brought to an abrupt end with the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act and the 1972 Immigrants Act), this is the first generation in the UK 
with a substantial population of non-white older people. Unlike future generations, 
the majority of this population migrated to, rather than being born in, the UK. 
Laurice, Mavis, Ethel and Susan came to Britain as economic migrants from the 
Caribbean — Laurice, Mavis and Susan from Jamaica, and Ethel from Dominica. 
Rama meanwhile arrived as a refugee from India after years spent in a refugee 
camp following partition in 1947. Arriving when they did, these women faced a 
hostile reception from a majority white society that, following centuries of 
colonialist discourse characterising black people as wild and uncivilised and/or 
exotic had inculcated a racist attitude towards this hyper-visible Other -  a 
characterisation in which film played a central role (Cederberg, 2012; Puwar, 2001;
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on film see Stam, 2000; Pines, 1997; Shohat, 1991). The history, politics, effects 
and affects of race relations in Britain are topics beyond the scope of this thesis. I 
mention this very basic information here because if habitus is our past and 
relationship to objective structures made body, then being Black or Asian in a 
white majority racist society will have significant impact on embodiment and 
practice.
How, though, might this affect our understanding of cinema as practice? Different 
(ethnic and class) habitus may have significant impact. As Bourdieu explains in 
relation to sport and class habitus:
‘Because agents apprehend objects through the schemes of perception and 
appreciation of their habitus, it would be naive to suppose that all 
practitioners of the same sport (or any other practice) confer the same 
meaning on their practice or even, strictly speaking, that they are practising 
the same practice’ (1984: 208).
Conflict, however, does not tell the full (hi)story of migration to the UK and, as I 
argue below, a certain solidarity appeared to exist among the audience at the Rio 
that suggests a life shared in an ethnically mixed local community -  hinting at a 
layered habitus. Indeed, these matinees seem to offer an example of the 
‘conviviality’ thought by Paul Gilroy (2004) to be fundamental to multiculturalism.
As Nayak explains, such cohesion can depend on ‘the feelings and affective 
capacities that might build up through these performances [of social interactions] 
over time’ (2011: 555) -  an inculcated cohesion that may, in part, have been 
generated in the practising of cinema and come to form at least part of habitus.
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While I do not wish to deny the significance of the ‘social conditions of existence’ 
so fundamental to habitus, then, I would like to emphasise that habitus is multi­
dimensional and that different dimensions will be drawn out in relation to particular 
fields (Bourdieu, 1977). In their study of the ethnic habitus, Blakemore and 
Boneham (1994: 8) also suggest that dimensions of habitus will shift in 
significance, as certain elements are pre-reflexively brought to the fore through 
practice. Nayak (2011) similarly argues that once we see racism and race as 
emerging through affect and emotion -  of a feeling in the body -  then race 
becomes a ‘floating signified and the task becomes to ask ‘under what conditions it 
is summoned-to-life and allowed to materialise within time and place’ (2011: 554). 
Although important, then, race, class and ethnic habitus are not determining, and 
do not exist in essential, unchanging form.
I have dwelled on these instances of demographic diversity here because as 
Srivinas (2010) points out so well, such difference is not just at the level of 
individuals. Instead, because the cinema is a public, communal activity, who is in 
the audience and what they are doing sets the tone of the event and, to borrow a 
term from Puwar (2007), generates distinct ‘social cinema scenes’. This is 
important because, as Hubbard (2003a; 2002) shows, the ‘social cinema scenes’ 
practised serve to maintain a pre-reflexive distinction of cinemas and their 
audiences along cultural lines (Puwar, 2007; Hubbard, 2002:1257; 2003a: 267). 
However, we should not make assumptions about the lines along which such 
distinctions may be drawn. With this diversity of race, class and ethnicity, it might 
be assumed that the focus of this chapter would be the ways in which such 
differences influenced cinema as practice. Instead, I found that such ‘scenes’ were 
constituted in particular ways through cinema and did not necessarily pre-exist this
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practice. Indeed, as suggested, far more significant in my findings was a sense of 
affinity between the embodied practices of cinema — a similitude all the more 
pertinent because it seemed to exist in spite of such ‘objective’ markers of 
difference, and the significant disparity in material conditions they imply.
In other practices of cinema, ethnic or class differences might be clearly asserted, 
either to align with a group and/or to define habitus against it, and issues of race 
more profoundly felt. In this field though, in this context, and with this audience, 
ethnic and class dimensions of habitus appeared to lessen in significance. I will 
argue that despite overarching differentiated habitus, it is the shared generational 
dimension that is fundamental to the social identity emergent in the public space 
and practice of cinema. My research suggests that this practical production of a 
unity between diverse audiences, drawn out in the collective space of the cinema, 
offers the enactment and pre-reflexive assertion of a distinct mode of generation. 
To begin to evidence this claim, I offer two vignettes from my research. I provide 
them partly to give a sense of the research and cinema events, but also so that I 
can engage the lived nature of cinema in the discussion that follows, during which 
I outline my argument by offering analysis of the embodied difference I found 
emergent across my time researching at the cinema.
2. Writing practice -  two accounts of going to the cinema.
While I have discussed the methodological commitments attached to working with 
Bourdieu, this is the first moment in which I have to confront the issues raised by 
how we might then write practice. Bourdieu’s theory offers a distinctly integrated 
understanding of the body-mind, and requires that we decrease the focus on oral 
accounts usually associated with ethnographic writing, maintaining an equal (or
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greater) attention to what people do. Chapter Four described his insistence that 
this must be a reflexive process, avoiding where possible -  or at least 
acknowledging -  our desire to render social phenomena as logical or coherent and
i
instead embracing the ambiguity of practice. This is one thing during the conduct 
of research -  ensuring, as I hope to have done through the go-along, that you 
watch what people do as much as you listen to what they say about what they do, 
and question your research practice as you go -  but it also requires a careful 
writing practice that avoids leaning entirely on oral accounts, which he argues can 
deaden the active nature of practice and the ‘immanent ends of collective action’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 33). Instead, to support analysis, we must attempt to somehow 
maintain the lived (embodied) nature of practice and avoid representing it as a pre­
existing ‘fait accompli’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 3).
Here, as I attempt to write cinema as practice(d), I have tried to tie oral accounts 
with an embodied analysis of what was done. While much of the following does 
draw on quotations, I don’t think that this needs to suggest a flattening effect -  talk 
is very much an active part of practice and I hope my use of quotes from 
participants maintains at least some of the vibrancy with which they were originally 
spoken. However, to ensure I avoid privileging what the women I went to the 
cinema with said over what they did, I begin with two vignettes -  one of my go- 
along to the Rio with Edith, the other of my trip to Clapham Picturehouse with 
Janet. As explained in the introduction, these are intended to evoke a sense of 
being at the cinema that I can draw on not just in the following discussion but also 
throughout the following chapters.
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2.1 Going to the cinema with Edith.22
Edith and I went to the Rio Cinema for their monthly matinee. A fixture in her 
calendar, Edith has been coming to these events every month since they began 
five years ago. On the day of our go-along, Edith had just returned from a week 
away with her son and this cinema trip represented the beginning of a return to her 
usual schedule. Afterwards Edith was off to ‘keep fit’, and she was looking forward 
to a dance class tomorrow. One of Edith’s favourite things about the matinees is 
the free tea and cake that they provide and, as she joined the extensive queue to 
collect her allocation, she spoke freely about the trip, as well as her son’s marital 
prospects.
After collecting her tea and cake we walked upstairs to the balcony, Edith 
cautiously taking time to navigate each step. Once upstairs, she located her usual 
seat (an aisle seat, three rows back from the balcony edge), held onto the seat 
backs and manoeuvred through the crowded rows of chairs until reaching it. I 
followed Edith’s expert route and sat down beside her. Although the balcony was 
already buzzing, it was a good 45 minutes before the film was due to start so I 
took the opportunity to speak to Edith about the cinema. She was wonderfully 
chatty, and despite my continual nerves, put me at ease with her memories of 
sneaking into her favourite cinema with her best friend when she was a teenager. 
All the while, I tried to watch what Edith was doing -  her careful balancing of the 
tea on the floor by her feet, her sporadic picking at the cake that she announced 
she was saving until the film starts, and her casual glancing around, I assume for
22 Both vignettes raise many issues about practice above and beyond those discussed in this 
chapter and I return to them in later chapters.
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the friends and acquaintances she often attends with, but who in fact did not show 
on this occasion.
When the film started, Edith squared up to the screen, sat back in her seat as 
though to let the film wash over her, and set to the cake. She watched intently and 
with little expression for the most part, methodically eating her cake and blowing 
on her tea as though trying to cool it down. Occasionally we would exchange a 
glance or comment but for the most part we were focused on the film. The more I 
watched Edith, the more I noticed subtle movements made in response to scenes 
in the film. Perhaps most clearly, I noticed that Edith slowly picked at her paper 
cup of tea whenever there was a sex scene on screen. Her facial expression did 
not appear to change, but she was (consciously or unconsciously) evidently 
affected in some way by the somewhat explicit (and unexpected) nudity on 
screen.
When the film finished, and the lights came up, Edith moved as though she had 
just been woken up. I noticed my own arms stretch out and felt as though my body 
was involuntary responding to hers. Edith started immediately to talk about the film 
and we stayed in our seats discussing it and her favourite films for the next half an 
hour. Edith had not enjoyed Closing the Ring. Set in a war she had lived through, 
she thought it was a completely unrealistic depiction, and entered into some 
stories of her own experience. She complained about what she felt were 
unnecessary levels of nudity and suggested that the previous month’s film 
Gentlemen Prefer Blondes had been more enjoyable. She used the screen a lot to 
indicate her points and the space of the Rio became part of my imagining of her
23 Interestingly, I had watched this film with a participant during my MRes research and 
experienced a similar response.
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memories. After a while the ushers came upstairs to clear the seats so we began 
to leave the cinema. As she stood up I noticed Edith, visibly stiff, expertly used the 
seats around her and, as we walked, to either side, in order to navigate the space 
with her slightly weakened body. Watching her as she once more elegantly tackled 
the stairs -  one at a time -  I became aware of the ways in which she transformed 
a space familiar to me into something else. The walls became supports not just for 
the building but for her, the seats became banisters. Through this I became aware 
of the mobilities that I take for granted, as well as the very different ways 
apparently functional spaces are transformed not just through different practices, 
but different practising bodies.
As we reached the foyer, Edith turned to me, once again authoritative and 
forthright. I thanked her for taking part, and she set off in the direction of home, 
waving goodbye to Jemma, the event organiser, as she left.
2.2 Going to the cinema with Janet.
Janet and I went to Clapham Picturehouse for one of their twice-weekly ‘Silver 
Screens’ days. We met in a French-themed cafe across the road from the cinema 
and, as we had a coffee at one of their pavement tables, Janet seemed very 
relaxed, waving at waitresses serving other tables, and having casual 
conversations with ours. She explained that going to this cafe was very much part 
of what for her is a monthly ritual. As we walked slowly across to the Picturehouse, 
I was surprised by the disruption of the fluidity of Janet’s social self by the stiffness 
of her body. As I pondered this Janet continued to talk and explained that one of 
the things she loves about Silver Screens was that it gave her an excuse to go to 
the cinema in the middle of the day, but that she avoids it entirely during school
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holidays. As we entered the cinema Janet opened the door for me, as though she 
was inviting me in, and strode confidently, if slowly, over to the bar/box office. As 
the staff made her regular cappuccino, Janet chatted easily about her upcoming 
trip to Italy while choosing her biscuits from the selection provided free to all 
attendees of Silver Screens. She put these in a napkin and wrapped them up, 
explaining that she liked to eat them during the film.
All set with her biscuits and coffee, and me with my tea, Janet guided me almost 
without looking over to the correct cinema screen and once again opened the door 
to let me in. She walked directly over to a middle seat in a row equidistant to the 
screen, at the back of the almost empty cinema, and patted the chair next to her. 
Janet doesn’t enjoy watching trailers so she timed our entrance to hit the last two 
before the film started. During these, Janet smiled at me in the half-darkness and 
lay out her biscuits on the armrest between our seats, insisting that I help myself. 
As she settled into her chair, Janet’s breathing was quite wheezy and loud, and 
her body rigid, seemingly uncomfortable. She leaned stiffly back into the chair at 
what seemed like almost a 45 degree angle. As the film started, this position was 
essentially unchanged but it somehow seemed to shift from stiff and 
uncomfortable to relaxed and open, as though it is the optimum pose from which to 
receive the full scale of the film on the screen.
Janet stayed in this position as Letters to Juliet continued, changing only to sip her 
coffee and delicately pick up a biscuit from the armrest. As she did these things, 
her eyes and body remained focussed on the screen. Once she finished her 
coffee, Janet replaced it with a tissue, which she clung to for the rest of the film. As 
the narrative came to its conclusion, involving the successful reunion of long-lost 
lovers, Janet had a big smile on her face and began to move the tissue around in
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her hand, using her fingers to roll it into a circle. The rest of her body remained 
perfectly still and I only realised that she was crying because she moved her hand 
to her face and used the tissue to expertly wipe away tears. Much like Edith, then, 
what Janet was doing with her hands was indicative of being moved by what was 
on the screen, albeit for different reasons.
When the film finished and the lights came on, Janet shook herself and stretched 
her face, opening her eyes and mouth wide. It once again had the feeling of 
waking up, and again my body responded with a similar stretching of limbs and 
shaking of the head. Janet watched all of the credits and only began to get up 
once the lights came fully on. She eased herself up, expertly using the arms rests 
to support her weight, and then we began to walk slowly towards the door. As 
Janet used the seats to pull her up the slightly slanted floor, I felt as though I was 
towering above her, acutely aware of our different bodies and the way in which 
they were navigating the space. While my description of Janet’s use of the space 
might imply struggle and work, it was instead fluid and ‘natural’, a skilled body 
working with the material space to improve its mobility. Indeed, as she walked, 
Janet chatted freely about the landscapes she had enjoyed in the film, which had 
reminded her of her recent holiday to Italy, and got her excited about one coming 
up.
We strolled over to the cafe area together, Janet indicating her usual seat -  the 
booth on the left closest to the bar -  and strolling off to the bathroom while I 
ordered some more hot drinks (a post-film coffee was another ritual of Janet’s). As 
we sat in the cafe drinking, we spoke about the film. Janet thought it was a bit 
schmaltzy, and found the developing relationship between two young characters 
completely unbelievable. She had become fixated on the size of the male actor’s
feet and felt they disrupted the suspension of disbelief somehow. She had been 
moved by the older characters’ reunion, however, and she now thought that this 
was because it made her think of her own sense of lost love since her partner’s 
death 10 years ago. Speaking about this film led to conversations about her 
partner, but also about the trips to visit her friend in Italy which had helped her 
cope. As we left Janet once again opened the door for me, and nodded goodbye 
to the bar staff who waved warmly. She walked me to the tube -  hosting me until 
the last -  and then set off on her walk home.
3. Enacting differentiation: modes of generation, somatic norms and film 
taste.
In his discussion of ageing and ethnicity in Britain, Blakemore (1997: 31) suggests 
that ‘there is a possibility that older people as a growing minority in an increasingly 
age-categorised society, will form their own subculture’, although he adds that this 
is unlikely to ‘develop very far beyond the sharing of certain cultural products or 
styles’. While I am reluctant to reproduce the tendency in work on ageing to treat 
older people as a homogenous group, from my research it seems that shared 
‘cultural products’ are all that is needed at the cinema to co-constitute a collective 
audience identity (Moriarty and Butt, 2004: 730). Following our trips together, I was 
consistently left with a sense of difference — but rather than it being between the 
different audience members differently positioned in social space, it was between 
‘them’ and me. It seemed to me that despite the difference described above, there 
was an overriding similarity -  a mode of generation -  that constitutes and is 
constituted by significantly different practices and embodiments to my own. 
Drawing on the vignettes above, in this section I first discuss this sense of 
embodied difference between me and participants, before moving on to 
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explorations of practical examples involving film taste and the significance of 
cinema-going as compared to domestic viewing practices.
3.1. Modes of generation and somatic norms of femininity.
On meeting Edith at the cinema, I became very aware of my physical form. Edith 
was dressed in a fitted black trouser suit, a plain white shirt worn with a black and 
white silk scarf draped over it and black court shoes with a gold buckle. Her hair 
was died white and was neatly set close to her head. Dangling delicately from her 
elbow was an elegant handbag with a clasp that matched her shoes. Having felt 
nervous but prepared on meeting her I was suddenly thrown into an awareness of 
my body and appearance as an oscillating presence. In some ways, I felt 
physically protective of this little, frail-seeming person; my far larger frame, 
physically strong and solid, gave me a certain corporeal superiority. But in many 
other ways I immediately felt inferior in comparison to such an elegant and self- 
assured woman. My carefully planned outfit suddenly seemed disastrous.
Standing next to Edith the shoes I had selected for their smartness appeared 
battered and scruffy; the full skirt I had chosen accentuated my largeness and 
seemed invasive of Edith’s apparently carefully constructed compactness. My 
embodiment as a (relatively) mobile, large, generally clumsy and inelegant 
(relatively) ‘young’ person was thrown into relief, a sensation that became more 
extreme once in the auditorium.
The seats at the Rio were designed in the 1930s and are far smaller than those 
you would find in a contemporary cinema. They are also much closer together.
And, while Edith fit perfectly into her allotted space, I felt as though I did not. Not 
because I am physically too big, but because, symbolically, I took up more space.
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On a material level, I had more ‘stuff’ with me, an unnecessarily large bag, a big 
coat, a billowing skirt and so on, but, less concretely, there was also a ‘noise’ 
about me that came to occupy the space in a disruptive and awkward manner. My 
body, my gestures, my posture, way of sitting, walking etc. was somehow louder 
and I felt it left a bigger imprint in the space. As mentioned, I had been to the Rio 
many times to watch films with friends, but these chairs have never before made 
me feel this. It was a relational sensation, one that emphasised difference rather 
than empathy. To me, it spoke of different generations, to differently practised 
feminities -  not just of differently aged bodies, but also of different embodiments. It 
is this sensation of difference, which recurred across go-alongs, that I found so 
fundamental to the insights provided by the method. It is also key to considering 
how differentiated bodies might practise cinema-going differently -  the question 
that drives this chapter.
In discussing this, I would like to borrow Puwar’s (2001) use of the term ‘somatic 
norm’. Engaging the concept to explore the experience of black senior civil 
servants, Puwar (2001: 652) describes it as the ‘corporeal imagination of power as 
naturalised in the body of white, male, upper/middle class bodies’, and suggests 
the ways in which such a norm has been pre-reflexively assimilated by her 
participants, particularly through speech acts. Relating the concept to Bourdieu’s 
theory, she insists that such assimilation should not be understood as a form of 
voluntarism. Instead, ‘we need to think of it as acquired slowly through time by 
[black civil servants] moving through white ‘civilised’ spaces [of Whitehall]. 
Eventually and gradually it becomes part of a habitus’ (2001: 663, 667). While 
Puwar (2001) suggests that this norm -  of white, male, upper/middle class bodies 
-  is one that we are all positioned in relation to, it is not difficult to imagine that
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there is a layering of somatic norms among different habitus.24 Broadening 
Puwar’s (2001) concept through Bourdieu, I would like to suggest that the 
differences I sensed at the cinema related to differing somatic norms of femininity 
across modes of generation.
Before discussing this further it is perhaps important to note that in doing so I do 
not wish to suggest that modes of generation eradicate the diversity described 
above. Rather, as argued, it seems that they serve to attenuate it in a practice 
defined along age lines. The perceived similarity between women may have 
involved what Puwar (2001: 663) calls ‘the centrifugal force of whiteness’, resulting 
in a process of adaptation for minority bodies to achieve the somatic norm, playing 
down embodied cultural distinctions through practice — something exacerbated by 
my presence as a white middle-class woman and implicitly encouraged by the 
representations on the screen which, Stuart Hall has argued, can inculcate the 
feeling of self as Other for non-white audiences (Hall, 1989: 706-707). Further, 
while all participants may pre-reflexively aspire to the same norm, they do not 
have equal access to achieving it (Puwar, 2001). In suggesting a dimension of 
sameness among the habitus of participants, then, I do not deny that the cinema is 
a racialised and classed space. Instead, I suggest that at these matinees it is the 
shared dimension of habitus that is practically asserted.
I am by no means the first to suggest that this tangible difference in generational 
embodiments exists. Indeed, it is both a common sense observation and the
24 Indeed, the original use stems from Hoetnik’s (1967) term ‘somatic norm image’, which is 
broader and refers to ‘the complex of physical (somatic) characteristics which are accepted by a 
group as its norm or ideal', allowing for diversity in somatic norms across social groups, but 
problematically (for this project at least) implying rational choice is involved in the adoption of such 
a norm (Baker, 1983: 205).
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source material for the many stereotypes of older people that cultural gerontology 
has worked so hard to overcome (Featherstone and Hepworth, 2005). In Chapter 
Three I showed that Bourdieu (1984,1977) suggests the shift in value of cultural 
capital across age-classes means that certain generational similarities in habitus 
produce shared dispositions that cut across the usually dividing parameters of 
social class. He argues that different modes of generation are produced in 
‘conditions of existence’ that differ from those that came before or will come after, 
producing different generational habitus and embodiments (1977: 78). While I do 
not want to reproduce enduring homogenising notions of the ‘little old lady’, the 
overarching similarity in embodiment across women at both cinemas amounted to 
something rather simple and too pronounced to ignore: an almost determined 
neatness. It is important to stress that while this might be thought of as simply an 
issue of appearance, what is at stake for me here is not the distinction between an 
aged and ‘non-aged’ body. Rather it is an embodiment that speaks to generational 
habitus.
That this neatness was not limited to clothing is suggested by a comment from 
Ethel when she was telling me about her younger neighbour during our visit to see 
The Red Shoes:
If she’s a friend like we’re going out, I’d say ‘come on put on your...’ but she 
doesn’t dress like that, always her jeans and trousers and, er, she dress like 
a man. Nothing to do with me but, you know, something is up.
This is indicative of an embodied difference because Ethel made this statement 
while wearing trousers. In doing so, she shows that although fashion is often used 
as a shorthand for thinking through differently embodied practices, the difference
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is often not in what we are wearing, but in how. As Bourdieu explains it, ‘Bodily 
hexis, a basic dimension of the sense of social orientation, is a practical way of 
experiencing and expressing one’s own sense of social value’ -  a value that 
changes across generational fields (1984: 476, my italics).
In their exploration of body language, Lamb and Watson (1979) directly suggest 
not only a relationship between a society’s norms and fashion but also the 
relationship between fashion and the production of particular bodies. In doing so, 
they offer a way of thinking the somatic norm on generational terms that speaks to 
my findings. They argue that, ‘for one generation to adopt the style of another is 
almost impossible. Mother and daughter both wear jeans ... yet it is almost 
impossible for her [the mother] to sit and stand like her daughter, because she has 
the habitual posture of the mermaid, derived from an upbringing suitable to a ... 
skirt, and not designed for the unashamedly bifurcated animal’ (1979: 40). In this 
way they suggest that ‘since posture is partly determined by the conventional 
postural norms [of fashion], and since these change from generation to generation, 
whole adjustment to them does not change, it is easy to understand how postural 
expression widens the generation gap, before the young or old opens their 
mouths’ -  a generational incarnation of the somatic norm (1979: 36; see also 
Blaikie’s [1999: 8-9] concept of ‘cultural time’). Twigg (2012) has recently argued 
the mutually constitutive relationship between fashion and ageing through an 
analysis of the ways in which the high street is adjusting to the growth of the ‘grey 
market’.
To put this in Bourdieu-friendly terms, Lamb and Watson (1979) and Twigg (2012) 
show that while fashion is produced by and through practice, the practising of 
fashion also produces particular practising bodies and embodiments as they offer
implicit pedagogy of what is -  and what is not -  appropriate. This is the case for 
both men and women, and not just in the changing fashions of clothes. Bodily 
dispositions, embodiments, are shaped by and shape fashions and lived patterns 
of work, childrearing, dwelling, travelling and, among many other things of course, 
cinema-going. As Bourdieu (1984) explains:
The practical knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by 
‘reasonable’ behaviour within it implements classificatory schemes..., 
historical schemes of perception and appreciation which are the product of 
the objective division into classes (age groups, genders, social classes) and 
which function below the level of consciousness and discourse’, in the 
body. (1984:471).
This matters because it means that differences in our embodiments imply not just 
a natural ageing process but, rather, a naturalised way of being, inculcated across 
the life course. For example, significant changes in women’s rights across the last 
60 years position me as woman differently to participants, a shift that co­
constituted changing somatic norms of femininity and that is almost certainly partly 
responsible for my sense of our different embodiments.
The neatness I encountered at the cinema certainly extended beyond styling -  
hair, clothes, accessories and so on -  to incorporate, more significantly, 
mannerisms and movement, generating a sense of delicacy and precision that 
was seemingly at odds with my own practice. While this was most pronounced 
among African-Caribbean25 and white working-class participants, it was
25 African-Caribbean identity is generally thought to have emerged in the 1970s as a singular 
identity for a heterogeneous group in order to produce stronger support networks in the face of 
racism (Blakemore, 1997: 30; see also Hall, 1989 for a discussion of the development of this
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discernible in the practices of the majority of the women I attended the cinema 
with, with the notable exception of Joanne -  her refusal to ‘conform’ being a 
conscious feminist act. Tea was sipped, cakes were nibbled, and stairs were 
deliberately and carefully climbed:
Janice (go-along observation): At one point I found myself suddenly aware 
that I was leaning closely in towards Janice, I am amazed by how carefully 
she speaks, every word is enunciated clearly, but very softly spoken. Her 
features so delicately express... Suddenly aware of the loudness of my 
voice I found myself trying, and failing, to match such an approach
Jane (go-along observation): Not a small woman, Jane is incredibly discreet 
in her movements. I watched with awe as she navigated to the small table 
by the bar where the sugar and milk is. Subtly dexterous, she managed to 
carry a hot coffee in one hand while using the other for her stick. She didn't 
seem to even slightly disturb the flow of people despite the number battling 
to also get to the table and others standing inconveniently chatting... I 
attempt the same and within three steps have spilt boiling water all over my 
left hand.
Neither of these examples, nor those of Janet and Edith above, should suggest 
timidity. Instead this delicacy was authoritative, it was in control, and it was quietly 
assertive. This was shared across the women in my study and was responsible for
cultural identity). It is important to note here, though, that while I often group the African-Caribbean 
women together due to congruence across their ‘objective’ positions and some practices, Ethel’s 
conversations were littered with asides that defined her against Jamaican culture. For example:
‘But let’s say now I was a Jamaican. I’m not Jamaican’, or ‘and I told her [a neighbour with whom 
she is arguing], “you’re lucky, if I was a Jamaican” because you know what Jamaicans do. They 
don’t care two hoots’. My intention is not to imply that ‘African-Caribbean’ is a homogenous group, 
any more than ‘White British’ is. It is more to group participants within broad social categories 
where they arose in the data and are significant to understanding cinema-going.
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the sense of bodily affinity that seemed to lessen the immediate effects of the 
differences described above in the moment of practice.
To me, this suggests that ageing is cultural but it is also of the body -  an argument 
that reflects recent developments in gerontology outlined in the second chapter 
(Twigg, 2004). Here though, I would like to argue that bodily ageing is not just 
about the wrinkles and grey hair or aches and pains that feature so heavily in 
stereotypes, but also in the way that bodies are shaped by culture over time — the 
comportments and dispositions of modes of generation adhering or aspiring to 
subtly shifting fashions in the shared somatic norm. As Bourdieu says, the 
oppositions between styles of dress between age cohorts, ‘expresses rather more 
than a simple generation gap’ (1984:145). Symbolic capital reduces in old age, 
not just because of a biological process of bodily decline that is constituted 
negatively by a society that valorises youth, but also because our dispositions 
speak to earlier times. Our body becomes not just ‘old’ but ‘old-fashioned’. This is 
important for understanding cinema as practice in this context because it suggests 
cultural ageing is not just about appearance, it is also what one does. The act of 
going to the cinema for this audience is, in part, a continuation of what feels 
natural. And what feels natural is a product of history made body, a history that co- 
constitutes habitus and impacts upon practice in the present. In this way, just by 
being there the audience is already generating an affinity.
As Bourdieu explains the ‘systems of durable dispositions’, of the habitus function 
as the ‘principles of the generation and structures of practice’ (1977: 72). As such, 
what we do now is always in part constituted by our past practices. Since these 
vary from generation to generation, it makes sense that this past-in-the-present 
was evident in the doing of cinema. In his study of cultural taste, Bourdieu (1984)
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himself found that difference in films seen and frequency of cinema attendance ran 
across age lines (1984:19, 99). This is in part what leads Bourdieu (1993: 96-98; 
1984:140) to suggest that capital cannot be measured by education alone, and 
points to the inability to measure social position in any such formulaic terms. This 
is reflected in marketing and market research within the film industry, in which 
audiences are divided into age and gender cohorts, rather than class or ethnic 
categories (UK Film Council, 2009; Levy, 2001), and in the marketing concept of 
‘time signatures’ which ‘prescribes a different mindset for each cohort as it moves 
through time carrying with it sets of values specific to the period of its own 
socialisation’ (Blaikie, 1999:173). In my research, the similarities in practice along 
generational lines seem to relate to the films seen and frequency of cinema-going 
across life, to the genesis of habitus and associated taste (Bourdieu, 1984).
This relates to the two elements of cinema that I discuss in the following sections: 
the public nature of the practice and the significance of taste. Both of these can 
further evidence that a mode of generation is being practically enacted at the 
cinema and help explore the significance of this further. This is important for my 
project because if, as Sobchack (2004, 2000), Marks (2002, 2000) Bruno (2002) 
and Voss (2011) argue, films are understood through the body, then we must pay 
attention to the difference made by different practising bodies -  and perhaps 
acknowledge that some forms of difference, or affinity, emerge in the moment of 
viewing. The next section, then, explores the habitual nature of attendance for 
participants. This is reminiscent of practices described by Kuhn (2002) in her oral 
history of cinema-going in the 1930s and 1940s, a habitual attendance that 
continued during the war and into the late 1950s -  decades in which participants 
were going on their first trips to the cinema -  and suggests an inculcated
175
relationship to cinema as practice. This came out most strongly in my research in 
the distinction between domestic and public viewing, one that I think is suggestive 
of a shared generational habitus generated through practice across life and drawn 
on in the public space of the cinema. In emphasising this public-ness, this theme 
also implies that the nature of cinema as an extra-domestic activity contributes to 
its practical logic for participants.
3.2. The public dimension of cinema and its relation to domestic viewing 
practices.
Cinema-going is differently practised across life. As I will show in the next chapter, 
the different stages engaged by participants correspond in many ways to those 
identified by Jancovich (2011) in his research with residents of Nottingham. They 
differ, however, in one important respect. When it comes to cinema-going after 
retirement, the most common way that Jancovich’s respondents aged over-60 
attended the cinema was in their role as grandparents. While some of the women I 
spoke to did take their grandchildren to the cinema they also, as I have suggested, 
habitually maintained their own independent cinema-going. Jancovich’s (2011) 
respondents cited the dominance of young people, and the associated threats, as 
the reason for not attending the city centre cinemas. By contrast, the matinees at 
the Rio and Clapham Picturehouse clearly offered the women who took part in my 
research an opportunity to ‘take over’ the cinema-space, even with the small 
number of other audience members at the Picturehouse.
For Pam and Janet this meant a welcome avoidance of crowds, but for the 
majority it was an opportunity to engage in casual sociability -  something that
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became clear during our trips there together and arose strongly in my analysis of 
go-along data:
Theresa (go-along, before Alice in Wonderland): I arrived to find Theresa, 
foot in plaster, stretched out in a booth chatting away to the bar staff. There 
is an easy familiarity between them. Theresa said she always comes on her 
own but clearly she is also always ‘with friends. ’
Rama (go-along to it ’s a Wonderful Life): Shed dressed up but not for me -  
she had her Areola [a local theatre] acting class afterwards. Two of the 
people that do it with her were also there, sat in our row, and I was 
obviously disrupting their usual casual chats.
Norma (go-along to Salf\: Watching Norma come towards the cinema, she’s 
greeted by waves from staff at the cafe across the road and as we sat in the 
cinema cafe, Sandy [a staff member] came over for what seemed to be a 
regular chat. She had seemed so lonely to me when I interviewed her...
These quotes reinforce the importance of the public nature of cinema-going. As a 
public practice often repeated in the same place, cinema-going encourages light 
and casual socialising, from which all participants clearly derived pleasure. And 
this is not just conjecture on my part; it was also expressed in their statements 
about attending the matinees:
Joanne (go-along, before Nine): I love cinema, whatever it is, because, I 
think the main reason I love it is because you share it with a heck of a lot of 
people. It’s not like sitting in the front room with a DVD or video, in fact I 
haven’t even got a telly
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Susan (interview): It’s nice to go there and you’re not pay this big 
money...So there’s no. I want to go there for friends...everything there is 
nice.
Pam (go-along, before Inception): Very often if Jill and I want to meet we’ll 
look to see what’s on ... she lives in Clapham over there and I live in 
Balham so it’s an easy place to meet up and she goes here a lot, she loves 
the Clapham Picturehouse so it just sort of evolved really over a long period 
of time.
Such statements reinforced my own sense that an important appeal of the event 
for participants is the casual sociability offered at the cinema (Hubbard, 2001). 
Combined with habitual attendance it has developed into a distinct sense of feeling 
‘at home’ on the part of my participants that seemed to translate into a very 
relaxed manner that was significant to the constitution of cinema space. Although I 
am interested in this symbolic extension of the domestic sphere into the cinema, 
discussed in Chapter Seven, here I would like to dwell on the significance of 
cinema-going as a public practice, assessed against actually watching at home.
With the exception of Joanne all participants owned a television that they watched 
regularly. Most cited soaps, cookery or news programmes as their preferred 
entertainment. Television viewing was most significant to African-Caribbean 
participants who were more likely to reference television programmes in our 
discussions than they were film. Many participants said they would watch a film on 
television if something of interest was on but this was generally described as less 
pleasing than watching at the cinema because of the potential for interruption by 
the telephone, visitors, families, sleeping, or domestic responsibilities. By far the
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most common method of viewing films at home was on DVD. Indeed, the recent 
acquisition of, or search for, a new DVD was a frequent theme in our 
conversations. There is, of course, nothing unusual or spectacular about this; the 
production and distribution of DVDs is a multi-billion pound industry and almost 
certainly engages people across the age spectrum.26 Something that differed from 
my own domestic viewing practices, however, was that DVDs were predominantly 
used as a way to watch old favourites, rather than new releases that participants 
had missed or chosen to skip at the cinema in favour of a DVD viewing.
When a film that interests me is released I make a decision about whether or not it 
is ‘worth’ a trip to the cinema, or if I’d rather just wait until it comes out on DVD. 
Mine is not an unusual approach, I don’t think, and can be seen as a more 
personal version of the decision made by distribution companies when they 
determine whether a film gets a cinema release or goes straight to DVD. For 
almost all participants, however, far and away the preferred way to consume any 
film is at the cinema, shifting to DVD only when they have reluctantly missed its 
public exhibition:
Lauretta (interview): We bought a lot of DVDs so we could watch them at 
home. But if they’re new I think it’s better, I prefer, going to see them on a 
huge screen I think it’s, er, it’s much more satisfying.
Janet (interview): If it’s new it’ll only be things I missed and wonder whether 
I should have watched and I’ll check when they come on DVD
26 Although, with the rise of streaming, downloads and torrents, this practice increasingly engages 
fewer members of younger generations (Lobato, 2011).
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Lynda (go-along, before Last Chance Harvey): One [Harry Potter] is on tape 
and the other four are on DVD. But I’ve seen them all at the cinema. I want 
to see Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince, which is year 6.
The suggestion, as indicated by Lauretta and summarised by Pam’s quote below, 
is that watching a film on DVD is a lesser engagement so that, as Lynda implies 
above, DVDs become a way of revisiting favourite films rather than an alternative 
consumption strategy.
Pam (interview): I do tend to buy DVDs, urn, not in huge numbers, but only 
if I’ve enjoyed a film I’d probably buy a DVD, urn. Sometimes somebody will 
give me, like we didn’t get to see An Education and Jill bought the DVD and 
gave it to me and said ‘what do you think?’ and I said ‘rubbish’ I didn’t like it 
at all... But, you know, that was an instance where I only saw it on DVD and 
I always prefer to watch things at the cinema first.
The exception to this are Jenny and Wendy who both enjoyed ‘movie nights’ at 
home with their niece and grandchildren respectively, although this can be seen as 
an engagement with younger generations’ viewing practices and domestic 
enactment of the sociability of the cinema that reduces the need for a public space 
(for an interesting discussion of the sociability and significance of movie nights see 
Jones, 2011). These viewing practices are important on two counts: first, the 
valorising of cinema-going over domestic viewing practices can be understood as 
a direct descendent of early film viewing practices undertaken a time when the 
cinema was the only option; second and relatedly the public nature of cinema- 
going has significance for this generation as, alongside other activities, it enables
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the maintenance of a position in the civic sphere through familiar practice (on the 
first of these points see Allen, 2011).
Although television became mainstream by the late 1950s, and films became a 
regular part of the programming by the 1960s, the delay between cinema release 
and showing on television was so extensive that it would have merely reinforced 
the notion that domestic spaces are intended for ‘second run’ viewing (Maltby,
2011; Holmes, 2005). The same applies to the introduction of VHS, with the fast 
turnaround we know today only in place since the turn of the millennium, as DVD 
sales have become increasingly important to revenue and simultaneously 
increasingly threatened by piracy (Lobato, 2011). This chimes, of course, with 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the habitus, as we inculcate practices appropriate to 
our social position in early life so that they, and our position in social space, 
become naturalised and continue to make sense (literally feel right) across life. In 
addition to this shared history, there is now an added shared dimension of the 
practical logic of cinema going: domestic viewing as compared to cinema-going 
seems to take on important connotations for this generation in later life as new 
taxonomies of opposition take hold (active/inactive, engaged/isolated, 
independent/burdensome), and ‘getting out of the house’ takes on new 
significance.
While this relates to a historically grounded shared taste in cultural activity -  going 
to the cinema feels right -  it seemed to relate to a shared taste at the cinema too: 
across the course of the interviews and go-alongs a distinct coherence among 
diverse participants was in their tastes in film, a coherence that proved important 
to the affinity I am attempting to describe here.
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3.3. Bodily assertions of taste: the co-constitution of a mode of generation 
and cinema as practice.
While the women that I attended the cinema with were a diverse group, for whom 
the film was not universally relevant to cinema as practice, there were 
nevertheless definite commonalities across their asserted taste in films. For 
example, almost all of the women stated a dislike for (excessive) violence:
Joyce (go-along -  as we watched the trailers before Up in the Air): ‘Oh, I 
don’t want to see this, Invictus, Oh, this is going to be good. I was worried it 
was going to be violent and wasn’t interested. This looks very inspirational’.
Wendy (interview): ‘my very favourite, the film I’ve seen more often than any 
other, and that’s about 14 or 15 times... Is Some Like it Hot I can watch 
that, I love all the Billy Wilder movies. Those are probably my favourite. I 
like drama really, I like a bit of psychological stuff. I hate violence, can’t bear 
violence.
Ann (interview): What I call crash bang films that they have a lot of now, I 
tend to avoid. By crash bang I mean where there are lots of bangs and lots 
of crashes and things chasing, well no I like car chases, but excessive 
violence. No I can’t do that kind of thing -  completely pointless. I need a film 
to have a bit of intelligence, a good script. That’s what a film has to have, 
and they’re fairly rare.
This should not be seen to represent conservativism, a rejection of any explicit or 
shocking content — Wendy’s love of thrillers and Ann’s enjoyment of a good car 
chase are indicative that this is not where such taste stems from. It is more an
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insistence on context, on the justification for such content in a film. Pam expresses 
this well, I think:
Pam (go-along, before Inception): I probably wouldn’t go and see anything I 
knew was going to be very violent, although I have seen, I did see an Italian 
film a couple of years ago, with Jill again, which was about the mafia in 
Italy, urn, in Rome and it was incredibly violent but it was almost like 
watching an opera: it was so beautifully done and so dramatic and, you 
know, and of course it was in another language so that’s always better, and 
that sort of overrode, a bit like, urn, Martin Scorcese’s Goodfellas I think, 
which is again incredibly violent but also somehow it’s absolutely right for 
what it’s talking about and it compels you to watch it. So, sometimes. But I 
wouldn’t go and see something that’s just overtly violent or trashy. No, I 
wouldn’t.
These quotes, of course, suggest a relatively subtle threshold between acceptable 
and unacceptable content that could imply an individual, subjective analysis. My 
argument here, however, is that while these tastes are individually expressed, they 
speak to a collective cultural history and position the women -  just as my tastes do 
me -  within social space in particular ways. Indeed, the shared tastes I want to 
draw out here also chime with those found in the older members of families 
studied by Leder (2009) as she explored tastes in film among different generations 
in the UK and Germany. In both studies there was substantial dislike expressed for 
contemporary sex scenes, albeit with varying acceptance. Of my participants 
Theresa probably outlines this best:
Theresa (on a go-along, before Alice in Wonderland): Of course, it was 
much more evocative in that day and age. This now, that’s really not 
evocative. Or I don’t think it is. It was much more evocative and sensuous 
when it was what you didn’t see, like the beach scene with Deborah Carr 
and Burt Lancaster. And On the Waterfront Yes it was there, but you didn’t 
see any sort of sex performance did you...The thought was there you see, 
but the deed was never done... And the ones that were overtly sexual, Body 
Heat, I thought that was erotic with it...I don’t mind it, [the way sex is 
presented in film now] but let’s just say it doesn’t stimulate the romantic in 
me.’
Again, Theresa is not directly rejecting sex on the screen perse, just the tendency 
in contemporary films to err on the side of explicit representations. Here she says 
that a more subtle representation of sex is ‘more evocative and sensuous’, 
suggesting an affective dimension of film taste, a dimension that I discuss further 
below. This also seems to be reflected in Rama’s assessment of sex and violence 
in contemporary films:
Rama (interview): The way they used to do it, it was romantic, isn’t it? When 
you see the Casablanca those two men they love the woman, they’re 
honouring the woman, yeah? And now when you see it they’re just getting 
naked or the two...the man loves the woman and they’re fighting over it. Ha! 
They’re killing each other or they plot to kill. So, you know, the whole nature 
of the thing is changed. I can do the science fiction bit but I can’t do this 
fiction bit about human behaviours and what they do, especially this new 
movie, they’ve got to sell it with lots of violence and sex.
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For Rama, the lack of subtlety lessens the resonance of the diegesis and disrupts 
her suspension of disbelief. It disturbs, if you will, the surrogate body as it draws 
affectual awareness back to the material space of the cinema (Voss, 2011).
The final, overriding, element of shared taste is of a different kind. It moves 
beyond content to genre. There was an almost universal love of musicals 
expressed by participants:
Joyce (interview): But musical films are my favourite. When I was a kid films 
like Gigi and The Sound of Music
Maria (interview): Any Busby Berkley film, and Esther Williams. But, 
musicals, as I say, I love them I really do.
Joanne (interview): [my favourites are] Anything, anything, with singing and 
dancing
Mavis (go-along, before Julie and Julia): I love musicals, any kind of 
musical, jazz musical I like, classical musical I like, I just like them.
It would be easy to assume that such clearly expressed tastes might determine 
what films participants chose to watch at the Clapham Picturehouse, or whether or 
not they attended that month’s Rio matinee. But, as the previous discussion 
suggests it might, the importance of attending often overrode such concerns and 
the majority of women would go regardless of what film was showing. While this 
was not quite equal across cinemas -  participants attending Clapham 
Picturehouse had a choice of five films while the Rio audience was only offered 
one -  if none of the films particularly appealed, participants from the Picturehouse
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would still go and watch what they considered the best option.27 Within Bourdieu’s 
(1984) work, of course, stated likes and dislikes are not the sum of taste. Rather, 
taste is understood to be pre-reflexive, a bodily sense of enjoying something, or 
not, a sense that is generated through habitus. That participants would attend 
regardless of what was playing resulted in us often watching films together that 
contained content that went against their stated taste and gave me the opportunity 
to observe the ways in which it appears to manifest in bodily responses. Such 
responses, I will argue, speak to the significance of the affective dimension of 
habitus at the cinema, and to the collective -  differentiating -  nature of affect 
(Tolia-Kelly, 2006).
Some of the bodily responses I observed were very expressive and almost 
certainly consciously performed. For example, as I watched Alice in Wonderland 
3D with Theresa, she exaggerated the impact of the 3D effects by ducking to 
dodge objects that appeared to be coming out of the screen. But at other times 
bodily responses were subtle and seemed to be triggered by a connection of film 
and participant that hit at a deeper, pre-reflexive level. This doesn’t have to imply a 
deep emotional connection, rather moments where the habitus and film collide to 
co-produce pre-reflexive responses, such as Janet’s tears described above or, at 
the other end of the spectrum, Joan and Diane’s laughter during Four Lions. 
Although these responses were later reflected on by these women -  ‘it made me 
cry’, ‘it’s a moving film’ (Janet), ‘that film made me laugh, it was a right send up’ 
(Joan) -  as Sobchack (2000) explains, such reflection comes after, is a result of, 
the almost simultaneous pre-reflexive bodily response.
27 Although Janet R and Ann, who attended the Rio and Clapham Picturehouse respectively, offer 
exceptions to this over arching trend.
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There are other examples in my observations, too, that did not so clearly relate to 
emotion as such:
Joyce (go-along, Up in the Air): At the end of the sex scene Joyce lets out a 
big sigh and begins to pick at her hands and twiddle her foot.
Ethel (go-along, The Red Shoes): Almost before the moment of impact [of 
Victoria Page after she jumps, or falls, from her balcony], Ethel’s entire 
body stiffened and her head pushed back into the chair. As she relaxed, 
she kissed her teeth and muttered ‘Why did she have to kill herself?’
Joanne (go-along, Nine): Penelope Cruz seems to be doing a lap dance for 
the entire cinema, Joanne seems unfazed but the loud cinema has been 
silenced in what feels like a collective grimace.
Norma (go-along, Saif): She sits with her bag on her lap and taps her hand 
on it throughout -  rarely sits still, moving her hands and crossing and 
uncrossing her legs. It’s sort of too much action and she starts to yawn 
when a man shoots knives out of his feet and Norma jumps to cover her 
face, as if trying to catch up with the action on screen.
Pat (go-along, The Secrets in their Eyes): There’s a point at which it 
switches, and we are suddenly ensconced in the unravelling of a violent 
murder of a young woman. Pat’s laughter hangs in the air and she begins to 
wring her hands and fiddle with her rings. Her coffee is set down. She looks 
distressed, Pat groans.
In her exploration of mother and baby screenings, Boyle (2010) noted a similar 
bodily reaction to the films being shown. In her case, the women seemed to
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instinctively cover their baby’s eyes whenever vividly violent content appeared. In 
interviews, all participants said that they knew the violence wouldn’t have an effect 
on their baby, but that they nevertheless felt uncomfortable. Boyle concluded that, 
‘films that provoke particular anxieties over their roles as and responsibilities as 
mums could be uncomfortable, not because the women were genuinely fearful for 
their babies..., but, rather because viewing ‘unsuitable’ films and, in particular, 
doing so in public, could not be easily reconciled with their aspirations as mothers’ 
(2010:287).
This analysis might seem at odds with Boyle’s (2010) claim that such a response 
was instinctive. Through Bourdieu (1977, 1990a), however, we can see that such 
instinct might stem from habitus, an incorporation of social norms into the body. 
The affected body is triggered into action before there’s time to consciously 
process that ‘the image is violent but it doesn’t matter because it won’t affect 
them’. Instead it is habitus responding, a bodily expression of an inculcated sense 
of what is appropriate or inappropriate behaviour that co-constitutes the affectual 
habitus and impacts upon how we feel particular images (and cultural practices). I 
believe that, while there are different cultural connotations and judgements at 
stake to those of the women interviewed by Boyle, the subtle embodied responses 
shown by the women I attended the cinema with can be seen in a similar way -  as 
a public (pre-reflexive) dissociation, or association, with particular content and 
tastes. And while there were, of course, important exceptions to the generalised 
tastes suggested above,281 think that the similarities point to something about
28 For example, Jenny, who stated a sincere dislike for horror, which could seem to correspond to 
the shared rejection of violence on screen also claims Quentin Tarantino as one of her favourite 
directors (‘anything Tarantino does, we will go and watch’). His films are famously full of what one 
might term senseless violence. Similarly, while no one explicitly expressed a liking for sex on 
screen, as we watched a particularly intense raw scene in I Am Love (Guadagnino, 2009) Wendy 
turned to me with raised eyebrows and what can only be described as a cheeky grin. This was
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practice that takes us back to the above discussion of the somatic norm. It 
supports my suggestion in this chapter that cinema here co-constitutes a mode of 
generation, attenuating differences among the audience and enacting a fluid but 
enduring collective identity.
With birth years varying from 1926 to 1950, and from a variety of backgrounds, the 
content of the films participants’ viewed at the cinema across the life course will 
have varied significantly but they would nevertheless have shared a relative lack of 
explicit content in terms of sex and violence. The Hays, or Production, code which 
censored the ‘moral’ content of American-produced films was fully adopted in 
1934, and only began to loosen its tight grip after 1952, at which point elongated 
kissing was still subject to controversy (Couvares, 2006: 4-9). While European 
films famously offered more sexually explicit imagery, the trajectory of British film 
censorship mirrored that of America and also began to relax in the mid-1950s 
(Richards, 1997). There are important exceptions to this, not least the surprisingly 
violent and incredibly popular Scarface (1932), and the sexually explicit Last 
Tango in Paris (1972), which gained mainstream release after its Oscar 
nomination. But the majority of mainstream films remained visually conservative 
with violent and sexual content controversial until well into the late 1970s, as Pam 
shows through her remembered reaction to the arrival of British ‘kitchen sink’ 
dramas in the 1960s:
‘We all thought they [kitchen sink dramas] were amazing. They had sex in
them, we’d never seen that before. Especially L Shaped Room, that was
followed after the film with a very positive assessment of the film’s erotic depiction of sex from her 
and her friend Sheila.
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like we recognised ourselves on the screen. You know, there were people 
living in bedsits like in real life’
This content would also have been common to the films viewed by those 
participants not born in England, as the American film industry dominates across 
the world, even in places with strong local film cultures (Miller, 2000:145). As 
such, although they grew up in different places, one experience shared by 
participants would have been the films on offer at the cinema. Laurice and Mavis 
referenced this shared cinematic history during our go-along, as they bemoaned 
the assumption of ‘difference’ between their cinema experiences and those in 
Britain:
Laurice: the fashion, they go and come, go and come. And you see some of 
these films, we saw them already at home, even in Jamaica where we 
come from, we saw them at the cinema. Out there as well!
Me: Do you like to see them again?
Mavis: I don’t mind, I don’t mind, that’s what I am saying I don’t really care 
about it -  but the older ones we seen at home are nice, the older films are 
nice...
While this continuity between viewed content perhaps implies that films play a 
socialisation role for cinemagoers, developing particular expectations and 
accepted behaviour, if we read it through Bourdieu’s (1977; 1990a) work, we can 
see that cinematic norms become incorporated into the habitus so they are 
absorbed into the body. In this way the somatic norm relates not just to
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appearance and behaviour, but also -  through associated dispositions -  to affect 
and sensation.
It seems to me, then, that the responses to films described above can be 
understood as the knowing body’s rejection of acts on screen that feel 
inappropriate in public. As an embodied subjective incorporation of objective 
structures, cultural capital co-constitutes our affective habitus (Probyn, 2004). As 
such, it feeds into how we engage film meaning and therefore positions us in 
particular (collective) ways in relation to the co-constituted representation. In this 
way we can begin to recognise that what are often understood as conscious 
‘resistant’ readings are not, they are co-constituted by affective habitus resulting in 
a difference in the moment that film becomes cinema. I think that this generates a 
way of thinking through cultural (habitual) sensoria that enables an expansion of 
Marks’ (2000) term outlined in Chapter Two and suggests its significance for 
understanding all cinema practice. The film becomes not an entity with pre-existing 
meaning that either is or is not resonant, but is instead understood as containing 
meaning that is co-constituted by affective habitus. This is, in part, constituted by 
cultural capital developed across life, an idea I build on in the next chapter to 
argue that it generates a cinematic habitus. Therefore we can begin to see how 
the embodied generational difference described above has a very real impact on 
cinema as practice.
Taste is fundamental to Bourdieu’s (1984) understanding of distinction, and 
cultural capital is commonly understood as key to his understanding. This capital 
becomes the means through which certain tastes are legitimated and others 
deemed illegitimate, thus reinforcing status within society. However, of equal 
interest to Bourdieu (1984) in his study of taste is the ways in which such capitals
are developed and maintained across life -  the development of the habitus 
(Lizardo, 2011: 2). Here I hope to have shown that the taste shared by the women 
in the cinema -  stemming from a shared dimension of habitus -  contributes to the 
‘riskless risk’ found by Hubbard (2002; 2003a) to be so important to the pleasure 
of cinema-going. Here it offers a form of sociability, mostly spoken in silence 
through sensing, reacting bodies as they watch the films. It asserts, maintains, a 
dimension of habitus -  a mode of generation -  through cinema. In this way, these 
bodily expressions of taste reinforced the importance of cinema as a public event 
to participants at both cinemas, as such pre-reflexive expressions of taste en 
masse practically emphasise the commonalities between a diverse group. The 
‘riskless risk’ described by Hubbard is generated in spite of differences that may 
be emphasised in other fields. However, as both Bourdieu (1984; 1977) and 
Hubbard (2002; 2003a) point out, in generating the sense of sameness and 
practically emphasising the shared dimensions of habitus, there is always an 
exclusionary ‘difference’ simultaneously constituted. Here, though, the distinction 
of taste may come down more to physical and symbolic rather than cultural capital. 
The distinction being asserted does not seem to be against those with different 
tastes in film, but with different ‘tastes’ in practice -  or at least different abilities to 
engage in cinema as practice. It is against those who ‘don’t make it out’. Those 
stuck at home. It is against the ‘Fourth Age’.
4. Conclusion: generational habitus and the practical negation of the Fourth 
Age at the cinema.
My key concern in this chapter was to explore the question ‘how might 
differentiated bodies practise the cinema differently?’ As shown, across research 
and data analysis, two significant ‘types’ of difference emerged: that between
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audiences at and between the two cinemas, and their corresponding social cinema 
scenes; and an overwhelming affinity between participants’ embodiments which 
generated a sense of difference to my own. In outlining both, I hope to have shown 
that such a question cannot be dealt with in linear terms. Rather, adopting 
Bourdieu’s (1990a, 1984,1977) theory and its associated commitment to in situ 
empirical work, it becomes clear that multiple levels of difference and sameness 
co-exist and are drawn out or attenuated depending on the field of practice.
The maintenance of habitus across the life course generates shifting age 
categories that determine at which age we are considered ‘old’ -  both biologically 
and socially. Featherstone and Hepworth (1986) have argued that the growth of 
the Third Age (and its emphasis on consumer freedom) has produced a ‘trend 
towards increased age-denial’ (Blaikie 1999:174). Blaikie (1999) links this to the 
growth of the anti-ageing industry and a corresponding lifestyle expectation where 
members of the Third Age are expected to stay active to stay young. In this way, 
an aged somatic norm is generated that is co-constituted by the generational 
habitus. This, I think, relates to the ‘practical use’ (Bourdieu, 1977) of cinema for 
participants. As domestic viewing set-ups become increasingly cinema-like, 
offering a cheaper and, arguably, more comfortable film-viewing experience, one 
could assume that the ‘use’ of cinema-going is becoming less clear (Allen, 2011). 
To me, however, read through Blaikie (1999), it implies that cinema-going offers 
something to participants in excess of what these domestic viewing practices 
might. It emphasises the importance of the public nature of going to the cinema 
and, with it, the practical compliance to ‘active ageing’ (Boyle, 2010; Stewart,
2003; Hubbard, 2002; Hansen, 1991).
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While cinema is, of course, not the only public practice engaged by participants, it 
is distinct among them, as the cultural consumption involved offers an 
engagement with society on a material and symbolic level -  enabling not just the 
maintenance but also the strengthening of cultural and physical capital. In contrast 
to domestic viewing I would suggest that cinema as practice offers a habitual 
maintenance of independence and responsibility, and a pre-reflexive assimilation 
to the aged somatic norm associated with this mode of generation -  co- 
constituting a sense of solidarity among the audiences. Going to the cinema and 
enacting a mode of generation, then, can be seen as a practical negation of earlier 
ways of practising later life, of previous modes of generation, and emphasising 
membership of a new identity -  that of the ‘young-old’. Unfortunately it seems that, 
like much of the ‘positive’ representations of active ageing, this serves to further 
negate those in the Fourth Age -  who not only represent an earlier form of 
practising ageing, but also are unable to achieve the contemporary somatic norm 
of later life encouraged by narratives and representations of active ageing (Katz 
and Marshall, 2003; Hugman, 1999). In this sense it presents a form of symbolic 
violence -  a form of domination that Bourdieu defines as ‘exercised upon a social 
agent with his or her complicity’ (1992:167).
In an attempt at confronting the question to which the findings discussed in this 
chapter talk in a way that has implications for cinema as practice beyond the 
audience with whom I conducted research, I would like to suggest that the 
discussions above imply that differentiated bodies don’t practice cinema differently 
in a way that can be mapped and predicted. Instead, such differentiation is 
emergent through practice. The discussion of taste proposes that this is in part 
produced through the affective dimension of habitus and the ways in which it
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engage the film on the screen, and visa versa. This assertion begins to suggest 
some of the findings that emerged from my exploration of the question ‘how is 
representation experienced in practice?’ I shall continue these discussions in the 
following chapter by exploring the themes drawn out in data analysis that spoke to 
this question more directly. In doing so, I engage further with the pattern of 
cinema-going across the life course and its impact upon the constitution of film 
meaning in the moment of viewing. In this way, I attempt to carry these 
discussions of difference through to an understanding of representation that 
recognises the fluidity in the meaning made in the moment, as film becomes 
cinema through the (differentiated) viewing body.
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Chapter Six. The temporalities of practice: Film, memories, and 
developing the cinematic habitus
‘My whole effort is to discover history where it is best hidden, in people’s
heads and in the posture of their bodies.’
Bourdieu, 1990b: 46
A concern with the body, with space and with film runs through this thesis. 
Although inseparably intertwined at the cinema, each one became a protagonist in 
the key findings from my empirical work, acting as the point of access for the 
issues. If the previous chapter was shaped by concerns with the body, this one 
takes as its starting point the film itself. The following discussion builds on the 
ideas raised in my engagement with taste, difference and affective habitus to 
consider how, once comfortably in their seats, socially positioned bodies interact 
with the film on the screen. As such, this chapter attends to the question ‘how is 
cinematic representation experienced in practice?’ but it also -  since the film itself 
distinguishes cinema from other cultural practices -  contributes to the 
conversation begun in the previous chapter about thinking through how 
differentiated bodies might practise the cinema differently. With its implication of a 
concern with subjectivities, the use of the word ‘experience’ here may seem out of 
tune with Bourdieu’s theory. However, for him ‘[tjhere exists a correspondence 
between social structures and mental structures, between the objective 
dimensions of the social world... and the principles of vision and division that 
agents apply to it’, so that nothing is ever entirely subjective or objective (1989a: 7, 
quoted in Wacquant, 1992:12).
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Despite making it clear to my participants that I was interested in their 
contemporary cinema practice, memories of cinema-going and of films featured 
often in our conversations. As such, during data analysis I found that memory 
emerged as a significant theme. As I began to explore it, memory became 
increasingly relevant to my understanding of representation in practice, an 
understanding that emphasised the temporalities of practice outlined in Chapter 
Three. The recurrence of these memories in my data encouraged me to join the 
growing literature exploring the relationship between memory and film, and offer a 
contribution by way of considering memory at the cinema (Mclver, 2009; 
Stubbings, 2003; Kuhn, 2002). It arose with the emergence of three key themes 
that I consider in this chapter: memories and patterns of cinema-going across the 
life course; memories of film and embodied knowledge and; lived biographies at 
the cinema.
Thinking memory through Bourdieu, however, has particular implications. Most 
important, perhaps, is that while memory is often experienced and understood as 
subjective, Bourdieu’s theory of practice considers it also inseparably intertwined 
with objective structures, through the habitus. What is more, the concept of 
memory might be better understood through Bourdieu as a form of embodied 
knowledge. As with all embodied knowledge, such memories offer pre-reflexive 
guidance in practice. These embodied memories -  through habitus -  shape 
perception, and in doing so, position us in social space — albeit in fluid and 
relational ways as discussed in the previous chapter. This does not mean that they 
are not personal memories, more that the personal memories reflect not just 
subjectivities but the objective structures in which they were developed and those 
in which they are told (see also Kuhn, 2002, on cinema-memory). I hope to show
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through the following discussion that by acknowledging memories at the cinema, 
not just of the cinema, we begin to see the ways in which our multi-dimensional 
habitus works to co-constitute film as it becomes cinema, offering a way of 
engaging Marks’ (2000) evocative understanding of cultural sensoria outside of 
intercultural cinema to explore the ways in which it might be understood as at play 
in all film viewing.
Beginning with a discussion of the recurring themes within the women’s memories 
of cinema-going, I show that much of what they recalled chimes with memories 
offered by participants in Annette Kuhn’s (2002) exemplary oral history of cinema- 
going in the 1930s. But, due to my interest in contemporary cinema-going 
practices, they lead me to a discussion of the ways in which these memories, or 
past practices, shape our cinema-going across life. Of course, as we go to the 
cinema we also watch films, and memories of films themselves featured in many 
of our conversations, often drawn upon to discuss the film we had just seen 
together. Through Bourdieu, I understand these memories as embodied products 
of the habitus, which he describes as ‘the product of all biographical experience 
(so that, just as no two individual histories are identical, so no two individual 
habitus are identical, although there are classes of experiences and therefore 
classes of habitus -  the habitus of classes)’ -  a description that allows our position 
in social space to remain in part ambiguous until it is relationally enacted in with 
fields (1993: 46). Finally, I move on to discuss a broader memory-type not directly 
related to film or cinema but which I nevertheless found significant to cinema as 
practice and to the co-constitution of film viewed -  that of our wider biography.
My aim, then, is to consider how such embodied memories -  understood as 
embodied knowledge -  impact upon representation in practice. Doing so inevitably 
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leads to a consideration of how differentiated bodies practice cinema differently as 
it provokes questions around how we practically co-constitute the film in the 
moment of viewing -  in practical time. In this way, the discussions here build on 
those in the previous chapter. Although this conversation leads me to draw 
significantly on talk, when understood in relation to my observations it hints at a 
broader importance for embodied knowledge at the cinema. Let me begin, then, 
with the casual oral histories gathered through conversations with participants.
1. Cinema-going throughout life.
As suggested above, recollections of past cinema-going featured heavily in our 
interviews and go-alongs. Some participants spent their adolescence or childhood 
in the ‘golden age’ of cinema with very different practices to those we have today. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, this was the period when cinema-going 
peaked, with 80% of the UK’s population attending at least once in 1946 (Hicks 
and Allen, 1999:26). This was also a period of habitual cinema-going for younger 
audiences, here epitomised by Joanne and Jenny’s memories.29
Joanne (interview): In the 1930s, that was a heyday for us -  two films on a 
Sunday, there was a change -  there was Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday 
another film, Thursday, Friday, Saturday you got a change of programme. 
As well as the film, you saw a newsreel, a second film feature, you stood up 
at the end and it was continuous performance.
29 These memories actually bracket the peak period of the 1940s, with Joanne’s coming from the 
lead-up to it, and Jenny’s coming from the period of decline in the mid 1950s. Nevertheless, 
cinema-going in the 1930s was already high and in the 1950s it remained a widely partaken 
practice, with numbers falling significantly from 1,101 million in the mid-50s to under half that in 
1960 (Docherty et al., 1987).
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Jenny (go-along, before Sherlock Holmes): then we moved to one of the 
brand spanking new housing estates in London and the bottom of our hill 
was the Regal Cinema and we used to do Saturday morning pictures 
regularly and mum and dad would take us to see all the big epics, you 
know, Sound of Music, well Sound of Music’s much later but Seven Brides 
for Seven Brothers, The King and I, all of the musicals we used to go to and 
Saturday morning pictures every week so I grew up going to the cinema at 
least once a week, probably twice a week.
While both of these memories suggest that cinema-going was a common and 
accessible practice, far more of the participants remember their early cinema- 
going as a thing of contention and struggle. For some this was a matter of money, 
the ‘nickel’ or ‘penny’ required still too much to come by:
Lauretta (interview): Oh I used to love it! But getting that money to go to the 
movies, which is what we call it, was extremely difficult. I mean we would 
sell at the, you know, or collect bottles and take them to the store for the 
return money, you know, that you got. We were a family of six, we didn’t 
have any money, urn, so my mother they both, both my parents worked.
Urn they couldn’t afford to give us money to go to the movies and if they did 
you know it was a big, big, treat that you couldn’t get that money to go. But 
we did go, we somehow did go.
Jean (go-along, before Good Hair): I mean you have to remember that in 
the 1950s, you know... people didn’t go, it was expensive.
Or, sometimes, it was a practice deemed inappropriate for a girl:
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Pam (interview): You didn’t go. I wasn’t allowed to go to Saturday morning 
pictures, don’t know but I wasn’t allowed to go... I think my mother thought it 
was common, I think, you know, that a rough crowd went. I suspect she 
thought that more boys than girls, which it probably was. And they used to 
throw things down from the balcony and, you know, none of my friends, 
none of my girlfriends went so I suppose...
Others remember having to earn their trip to the cinema:
Susan (interview): I remember that you had to ask the parents and they said 
“oh yes you can go but you know your duty”. You have to either go and get 
some water, you have to go and feed pigs or whatever but they make sure 
you have to do something before you go... You have your, you have to go 
with big people before they allow you to go on your own, parents was so 
strict.
Whether earned, fought for, or easily accessible, one refrain runs through all of the 
reminiscences offered by these women — that going to the cinema was a real 
treat, something they relished doing:
Theresa (go-along, before Alice in Wonderland 3D): I can remember vividly 
my father taking me as a treat with some other children to the Granada in 
Maidstone to see the first Alice. Imagine that... I remember him carrying me 
because I’d trodden on a nail and couldn’t walk. And I was in slippers.
Maria (go-along, interval of Calamity Jane): Three cinemas along the Angel 
High Street and my Dad when he was home on leave or anything, it was 
just after the war maybe, and he’d come home and it would be the big treat
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that he used to take us to those, there were the three cinemas there -  The 
Angel, The Empire and The Bluehall.
Although most are from a later period, these memories very much reflect those 
recorded by Kuhn (2002) in her detailed oral history of cinema-going in the 1930s. 
Taken together, they generate a picture of cinema-going practice very different to 
that found in 2010.1 have shown that such apparent epochs of cinema-going are 
found across the decades and have been well documented by film historians, with 
practices often changing simultaneous to exhibition sites and film form -  each one 
constituted by the other (Maltby et al, 2007; Gomery, 1992). But these statements 
are not just small contributions to a growing oral history of cinema-going. I think 
they also hint at the ways in which the women I went to the cinema with had 
already, at a young age, been positioned differently in relation to the practice. 
Their subjective experiences had been limited by -  for example -  not having 
enough money, gendered and classed expectations about ‘appropriate’ behaviour 
and particular familial relationships. These personal memories, then, while 
subjectively experienced, speak of particular positions within social space and 
suggest inculcated collective relationships to the cinema, within limiting structures.
Jancovich (2011: 89) points out that the temporalities of cinema-going are multiple 
Alongside historical time (understood through modes of spectatorship and 
exhibition practices), he suggests, is the more personal trajectory of generational 
time. In the previous chapter I showed the importance of this to the distinct mode 
of generation I found emergent at the cinema across my research. For most, 
cinema is of course not a new practice engaged for the first time in retirement. As 
discussed, it can help enact a mode of generation precisely because of a shared 
history of cinema. Indeed, when I came to analysing the data I found that there 
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were a surprising number of crossovers in personal narratives regarding the 
significance of cinema across the life course. This suggests perhaps that an 
emergent collective identity is always part of the practical logic of cinema, albeit for 
different purposes at different stages of life or different cinema events. For 
example, one oft-repeated and therefore seemingly significant stage of cinema- 
going reported by participants was in formative years of dating:
Pat (interview): I can remember going to see West Side Story on a date.
Urn, things like that. Usually it was big films, you know you went on. I don’t 
know whether I sort of used to say ‘well if I’m going to go out, I’m going to 
see something I can’t afford to go to myself. Ha ha. It was quite calculated 
really, ‘ooh well I’d like to see West Side Story but it’s only on in the West 
End’, you know.
Joanne (interview): before this in the thirties I used to go regular -  blokes 
used to take you to the cinema. They always wanted to sit in the backseat 
but I wasn’t having any of that.
Theresa (interview): The big musicals [Carousel] was sort of my favourite, 
because that was where I had my first kiss from a boyfriend. So I was about 
18... And Oklahoma. I was with another village boy.
More enduringly, for many it had formed an important part of the development of 
significant relationships later on:
Wendy (go-along, after I Am Love): My first husband...got tremendously 
interested in movies. And when, we’d go on a Monday, so we were always 
going to the movies... So that was a big part of our free time.
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For quite a few participants at the Clapham Picturehouse particularly, this meant a 
sharing and development of cultural capital in their early years of courting, a 
sharing that became an important part of their on-going relationship. Jenny and 
Pam show this well:
Jenny (interview): I mean Frank [her now husband] was an art student and 
he used to run the film society at Camberwell so he used to choose the 
films and he’d been to see a lot more films than I ever had. I just used to go 
and see what was on that week at the Regal but he’d go up into Soho and 
pick up films to show to the film club at college so he’d seen, you know, all 
the Polanski films, he’d seen foreign language films and more, more sort of, 
erm, not rare but difficult films that weren’t on the general circuit but then I’d 
seen all the musicals he’d never seen any of them, they weren’t his bag.
Not the sort of thing he wanted to show the students at Camberwell. I 
suppose film was one of the things that brought us together.
Pam had a similar experience and for her cinema-going had also been a way of 
getting to know London:
Pam (interview): When I met my husband, I mean he was a great Hitchcock 
fan, so we used to go and see his things wherever they were on, you know,
I can remember trekking over to Dalston [most likely to the Rio!] and places 
like that because he’d heard they had something on at this cinema, you 
know things like that. I went to see all of those.
As careers became increasingly demanding and many participants had children, 
there was a corresponding reduction in cinema-going, with most only engaging 
with cinema as parents dropping their children off on a Saturday morning:
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Giuseppina (go-along, before An Education): You couldn’t do it now but I 
didn’t think about it. I used to leave my children here for Saturday pictures. 
They went to see John Travolta, you know all the time he’s in the films for 
the children. They went to the one in Holloway, one in Finsbury Park, that’s 
gone now, and Wood Green was one as well.
Pat (go-along, after The Secretin Their Eyes): At that stage [when she 
stopped going to the cinema] they used to go because there was always a 
Saturday morning children’s programme, I don’t think they still do it. You 
know a children’s programme Saturday morning. So they would go, yes, urn 
I don’t know what, I mean it was cowboy movies that type of stuff and all 
three of them did that.
Ethel (interview): Everybody used to go to the matinee on the Saturday 
afternoon, Sunday, at nights, but I never come to watch any [film] play. Not 
this one. I send the kids. Having the husband, I’ve got to wash, iron, things 
like that. I just stay at home.
Taken together, these quotes suggest that practices of cinema-going, and our 
relationship to them, change not just across the life course but also across 
historical time. As the cinema-going habits of these women shifted during their life 
course other wider changes were occurring: cinema-going and its place in the 
social calendar changed significantly, as did the position of women in society and, 
indeed, that of older people.30 The two, it seems, are intertwined -  historical
30 The universal state pension came into effect in 1948, as part of the implementation of the 1946 
National Insurance Act. The formalisation of retirement that this legislation brought is widely 
understood to have contributed to the social construction of older people as an economic burden 
(Green et al., 2009; Gilleard and Higgs, 2000; Laws, 1996).
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changes do not happen in the abstract but are instead lived and constitutive of 
habitus.
These quotes offer descriptions of and insight into the shared shifting significance 
of cinema-going practices across the life course, a shared trajectory that 
reinforced my analysis that a distinct mode of generation was being co-constituted 
with cinema as practice. But they also suggest something else of more relevance 
to the question being attended to here. Because my research design led me to go 
to the cinema with participants it was here that many of their memories were 
shared with me. Rather than view these reminiscences as separate to 
contemporary practice, I began during my analysis to see them as integral to 
understanding the women’s cinema-going in the present, just as my own were for 
me. Understood through Bourdieu, these memories come to suggest the implicit 
learning of the developing habitus and, as well as cognitive recall, we can see that 
there is a bodily counterpart. These remembered activities were not just taken in 
through the rational mind, but the movement and positionings that went with the 
more habitual practices, such as going to the cinema, are also inculcated into the 
body. In this way, the body at the cinema is a particular, socially shaped one. It’s 
shaped by our past practices and subjective experience, but never separate from 
‘objective’ social structures that co-constitute our position in social space and 
emergent identities. These practices produce embodied knowledges that then pre- 
reflexively inform practice in the present and place limits on the collective identities 
that we can be a part of. This, I hope, begins to hint at the importance of the 
(positioned) body to the way that representation is experienced in practice.
Having received little attention in the academic literature, the sociability of cinema
and memories of cinema-going have more recently been drawn out in oral
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histories (Kuhn, 2002, 2011; Mclver, 2009; Puwar, 2007). Film memories came out 
just as strongly in my research, which was not aimed at collecting them, and 
enhanced the distinct temporalities of practice. This means memories can help us 
to explore the ideas being raised here further. Indeed, I hope to show that their 
prominence in post-film discussions suggests something about the associations 
we make as we watch films. These associations position us in relation to the 
representations on the screen, but that also differently constitute the film in relation 
to us. To help me build this argument, the next section offers a discussion of the 
ways in which I found memories -  as embodied knowledge -  important at the 
cinema.
2. Memories of films as embodied knowledge.
Having established some of the shared patterns of cinema-going across the life 
course, and suggested that they impact upon our practice in the present, I use this 
section to consider the ways in which embodied memories of the films seen impact 
upon our practical engagement with cinematic representations. Although most of 
my go-alongs were to films that neither the participant nor I had seen before, the 
trip to go and see Calamity Jane (1953) with 76-year-old Maria was different. 
Before the film started, she explained that she vaguely remembered having seen it 
at the cinema when it first came out:
Maria: I did see it. I can’t tell you how many years ago. But it must have
been about ’40 when it first came out. Any idea when that was?
Me: I think it was - it must have been 50s actually, late 50s?
Maria: 60, 70, 80, 90,100. Yeah, 40 or 50 years ago. So I know there’s a lot
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of singing, a lot of dancing. Don’t know what else...
This is a misremembering of the film -  or a misplaced assumption about the film -  
because although it is a musical there is actually very little dancing; and Maria’s 
memory was not too clear. However, as the film wore on, I could almost see the 
memory rising up within her.
It was pouring with rain that day and Maria had been a little tetchy on arrival at the 
cinema, not as warm towards me as she had been in our interview. Her left foot 
was in plaster so movement was quite restricted and because she has no direct 
public transport to the cinema, she had had to walk. I was aware that this would 
have been difficult for her so I apologised as soon as she arrived to meet me and 
she replied sharply, ‘I thought I might as well get it over with’. This air of 
annoyance remained with Maria and she angrily went without her usual tea and 
cake, seemingly trying to make a point of forgoing any pleasure for the duration of 
the trip. However, as the film started, Maria perceptibly relaxed. Her body, which 
had been stiff and tense, fell back into the chair and then, gradually, she began to 
sway to the music, eventually -  apparently unable to help herself -  singing along 
to the opening lines of The Black Hills of Dakota’, and later joining in more loudly 
with the big hit ‘Secret Love’. As the film finished in a musical climax, Maria turned 
to me grinning broadly, clearly elated, the sparkles in her eyes revealing a 
complete transformation in mood. In our chat after the film, she calmly reflected on 
this. First through her enjoyment of earlier narrative forms, a description in which 
her clearly affected body was left out:
Maria: It’s the predictability of every step of the way. Because those films
were like that, you could predict... Now anything like that would be, you
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know, funny endings and not very pleasant endings and things like that. In 
those days they were predictable and you just knew what to expect just to 
come next. I suppose that was then, everything was predictable then wasn’t 
it?
But when she came to explaining her feelings on hearing the songs, the sensing 
body re-emerges briefly:
Maria: It was good. It was making me cry. You know, “oh that’s lovely”, and 
I welled up. There were a couple of songs, and the music was there as well 
on a couple of them, and as soon as you heard the introduction, you just 
remembered the song. There were a couple of them in there. I think they 
must have been the most famous one because the others [can’t hear], all 
the funny ones. But the ones obviously, they must have been a hit at the 
time because they’ve stayed and I think that there were others singing to 
those two particular songs.
Me: Why do you think that made you cry?
Maria: It’s just an emotion that hits you, an emotion yeah. I’m quite an 
emotional person probably... And remembering the song and remembering 
the words, thinking, “aahh”.
The combination of my earlier observation of Maria as she watched Calamity Jane 
and our conversation after the film enabled me to consider the connection between 
her conscious, reflexive, memories and a dimension of memories that appeared to 
be embodied, experienced pre-reflexively. It seemed that Maria’s memories of the 
film impacted significantly on her film experience. Her comment that ‘everything
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was more predictable then, wasn’t it?’ implies that the memories of the film took 
her back to the time when she would have first seen it. The bodily response I 
observed further suggested that embodied rememberings of films seen impact 
upon sensations of viewing in the present and, possibly, the representation. These 
memories are gained across life and incorporated into (as well as engaged 
through) habitus; they are absorbed into the body. As such, understood through 
Bourdieu the subjective experiences they represent are intertwined with the 
objective structures with which they were co-constituted. On a very basic level, 
broader social structures influence films made and where they are distributed; and 
cultural capital may guide those we chose to watch although, as I have argued, 
there is a generational dimension to this (Bourdieu, 1984). When memory is 
triggered by film it is affecting and we sense the past as we make sense of the film 
-  it is a knowledgeable body that acts as surrogate for the film, not an empty 
vessel of unmediated sensation (Voss, 2011).
Jones (2001) offers an evocative exploration of this layering by exploring cinema 
memory at matinees of ‘classic’ films shown in a ‘period’ cinema in Tampa,
Florida. While watching Casablanca (1942) there she looked around the theatre 
and noticed that many members of the audience were old enough to have been to 
see the film at the cinema on its first release. Herself attending the theatre to 
watch this film as an act of nostalgia for a time she can’t remember, she thought 
about how different the experience must have been for the older audience 
members with personal memories of the time. Importantly, she begins to analyse 
this as a double vision -  she argues that when we watch old films at the cinema 
that we saw on their first release, what we are actually doing is watching our past 
selves watching the film for the first time. ‘It is likely that they remember the
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experience of seeing the film when it first was shown in the 1940s and, more 
important, they see their past selves seeing i t ... They are able to see, when they 
watch Casablanca today, the gaze of themselves seeing the movie in 1942’
(Jones, 2001:382).
To extend the analysis of these ‘cinema ghosts’, Jones (2001) went to see one of 
her own formative films -  Saturday Night Fever (1977) -  and noted a similar effect. 
Interestingly, although she initially felt consumed by memories of her 16-year-old 
self, and the memories that all of the props sparked off, she also found that she 
had an emotional response to the film itself. Jones argues this suggests, ‘that 
watching Saturday Night Fever is divided between the film’s narrative and my own 
personal narrative’ (2001:285). This layering effect that is, according to Jones 
(2001), experienced as we watch films that we saw on first release, certainly 
seems to chime with Maria’s viewing of Calamity Jane. However, I think that 
Maria’s response to Calamity Jane can contribute to Jones’ (2001) understanding 
of the way that memory works at the cinema. It seemed that Maria’s emotional 
response was in fact triggered by, rather than existing in spite of, her memories. 
This is not just about the cognitive memories, but also those correspondingly in the 
body. Because these knowledges are inculcated through experiences, they at 
once position us and show themselves as natural. The emotional response that 
Jones (2001) here puts down to an inevitable reaction to the film’s narrative may 
well instead be drawn from an interaction between her socially produced sensing 
body and the film. This means that which feels entirely subjective (the memory) 
and that which feels objective (an expected emotional response written into the 
film’s narrative) are, in fact, one and the same -  interacting to further (re)produce 
habitus.
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Key to the understanding I am developing here is Bourdieu’s suggestion that:
The habitus is the principle of a selective perception of the indices tending 
to confirm and reinforce it rather than transform i t ... it adjusts itself to a 
probable future which it anticipates and helps to bring about because it 
reads it directly in the present of the presumed world, the only one it can 
ever know1 (1990a: 64).
Although here Bourdieu is talking about perceptions of the social world, thinking 
through the sense of this framework implies that the meaning garnered from a film 
does not pre-exist the engagement of our habitus with the film-field. This is the 
process through which it becomes cinema, and responses that seem to be related 
to something inherent within the film are also the result, in part, of something that 
is inherent to us -  the habitus.
Indeed, we can perhaps extend the significance of Jones’ (2001) insights beyond 
an understanding of the particular film experiences she describes. Initially, at least, 
it seems clear that a similar response could be conjured by watching a film seen 
before, not just those seen on first release. While watching Calamity Jane I noted 
my own familiarity with the film and experienced a similar layering to that 
described by Jones (2001):
I am unexpectedly reminded very strongly of my Dad's house -  Manda and 
Dad’s joint love of Doris. And as I watch these opening scenes I 
simultaneously watch the opening scenes of all of her other films that we 
used to watch on Sundays, especially Move Over Darling [a Doris Day film 
from 1963]. I am at once in their living room, eating tomatoes and 
sweetcorn with balsamic vinegar, waiting to go back to Mum’s, and in the
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Rio with Maria. Neither is more or less real to me, I am simultaneously in 
both, and yet both are experienced differently because of their engagement 
[with one another?]. Doris feels like a long lost friend.
These different embodied memories (accessed cognitively and sensorially) are 
experienced subjectively, but they were inculcated within, and reproduce objective 
structures. I have shown the ways in which such structures position Maria and me 
as separate modes of generation, but dependent on the film-field, different multiple 
and overlapping dimensions of habitus will be brought to the fore for pre-reflexive 
interpretation, positioning us (albeit less perceptibly) as women, for example, 
and/or along the lines of social class. Bourdieu argues that our assessment of 
‘legitimate culture’ is inculcated in early life through the family or educational 
practices, forming part of habitus. This transposable disposition’, he suggests, 
‘inclines its owner towards other cultural experiences and enables him [sic] to 
perceive, classify and memorise them differently1 (1984: 20, my italics). While 
Bourdieu (1984) is referring here to the ways in which our habitus shapes practice 
so that we generally seek out ‘cultural experiences’ appropriate to our position in 
social space (not because we consciously view them as such, but because they 
feel right), I would like to extend this here to suggest that habitus impacts upon 
how we feel and make sense of film. Indeed Voss, whose understanding of film’s 
‘surrogate body’ is outlined in Chapter Two, argues that a ‘film, or any other 
aesthetic content, is not simply a random, formless object, and our reactions to it 
are not formless and random projections’ (2011:144). Instead reactions stem, in 
part, from gradually developed expectations of the medium and genre that comes 
into play as we watch films (Voss, 2011:143). What appears to be a natural
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response to a film text, then, is the product of (embodied) history, here understood 
through the habitus.
Our conversations across go-alongs, combined with my observations, suggested a 
similar overlaying of film-memory at play across all cinema. This may help to build 
on Jones’ (2001) important insight to further develop an understanding of cinema 
as practice. In the following section, I explore some of the ways in which films 
seen -  as well as where, who with and when -  provide a form of intertextuality in 
practice as we simultaneously engage our affective embodied habitus, and the film 
on the screen, to constitute meaning in the moment of viewing.
2.1. Co-constituting meaning: films as pre-reflexive trace memories at the 
cinema.
Analysing my go-along transcripts and on-the-spot film analyses, I found that a 
layering of film memory may be present on a more subtle spectrum across most 
film viewing, as almost every post-film discussion was laced through with 
references to films previously viewed. While here I return to oral data, I do not 
want to lose sight of the embodied nature of memory. I want to argue here that, 
combined with observations, those films reflected on in conversations -  and those 
not consciously remembered -  contribute to the affective dimension of habitus 
and, therefore, the surrogate body we offer film and through which it becomes 
cinema (Voss, 2011).
Such is the power of the oscillation between the film being viewed and films 
previously viewed, that some directors make a feature of it -  Quentin Tarantino 
being a notable example. Indeed, 62-year-old Jenny -  with whom I went to see
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Guy Ritchie’s Sherlock Holmes -  cited Tarantino as one of her favourite directors, 
and when we got out of the film remarked:
Lots and lots and lots of references to other stuff actually all the way 
through. Yeah I mean, Guy Ritchie obviously a very clever bloke. I like it 
when directors think their audiences are clever enough to know what they’re 
talking about. I mean there were lots of literary references as well, you 
know, C Lewis and dark arts and stuff, you know.
While I missed the references Jenny refers to in Sherlock Holmes, the notes from 
my go-along with Joanne to see Rob Marshall’s Nine show that my own oscillation 
between the film I was watching, films watched, where and with who as well as my 
thesis, had a significant impact on the film seen in the moment of viewing. Nine is 
a musical adaptation of Federico Fellini’s film 8 V2 (1963). The note below shows 
my reaction to a scene in which two of the characters visit the Trevi Fountain, a 
landmark also featured in a highly iconic scene that forms the centrepiece of 
Fellini’s La Dolce Vita (1960):
They sit at the Dolce Vita fountain and my viewing is simultaneous, I see 
them and I see Anita Eckberg in the water, taking me to Chris’s [a former 
boyfriend with whom I first watched the film] sitting room, that horrible red 
sofa. I am also thinking about Joanne and writing these notes, thinking 
about my thesis and what it will end up being about These things do not 
cancel each other out, I do not move in a linear way from one to the other, 
instead they are all in me at once -  in sensation, in emotion, in imaginings 
and in visions -  layered and each fragment enriching the other in the 
moment.
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Here, again, we can see the layering identified by Jones (2001), but in more 
fleeting ways. Indeed, I remember having this feeling and trying to write it as 
quickly as I could in the dark, but the simultaneity of the experience was difficult to 
capture. In the quote below, Ann appears to also be referencing a layered effect 
upon watching Kurasawa’s The Seven Samurai (1954). Here this was not because 
the director was referencing another film, but because of a later American 
interpretation:
Ann: Well I thoroughly enjoyed seeing it again. Urn, I kept mentally 
comparing it with urn...
Me: The Magnificent Seven?
Ann: Thank you. The Magnificent Seven. Yeah, which, er, is not a very 
good idea. I couldn’t get it out of my head, it was like I was watching the two 
of them. Kept expecting what’s his name to come on screen, the good 
looking one...
For Ann, as she says, this was a repeat viewing but rather than the embodied 
memories of the Seven Samurai she was more consciously overwhelmed by her 
more recent viewing of Magnificent Seven. Others were reminded of films even 
when the reference didn’t appear to be purposeful on the part of the filmmakers:
Jenny (go-along, after Sherlock Holmes): I mean it sort of reminded me of 
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, you know the first time I saw that 
one, you know the camaraderie between the two of them and also there 
was something about the way it was filmed, you know it was sort of super 
Technicolor, super real, super, super life size.
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Although most often films would trigger memories of films, other media memories 
were also triggered. During the interval at Julie and Julia (2009), a film about 
American chef Julia Childs’ formative cooking experiences in France as a young 
adult, and a woman in New York (Julie) who tries to cook all of the recipes from 
her first cookery book, Laurice and Mavis dived straight into a discussion of 
cookery programmes:
Laurice: It’s like watching Saturday morning cooking. Yes, you can watch 
the recipes and do it, but do it your way. Some people try to do it just the 
same and it’s good but better to do it your way
Mavis: When we cook a steak you know what they say? They say we 
murder it. Because that’s how we know to cook it, we cook it well done
Laurice: This is another one, Come Dine With Me, you ever watch that? 
These people are so dirty, like the ones in this film here. You know when 
they get people in their house and the woman and man, they go nosing, do 
you know what they do? They give them less.
Mavis: I give her five, I give her three, I give her one because she bought 
me so and so.
These examples suggest an intertextuality between memory and film that appears 
to be prompted by all films, purposefully or not. They also, I think, show how 
accumulated (embodied) cultural capital impacts upon practices of viewing, 
influencing the shape of the film seen. These reflexive and pre-reflexive, bodily, 
associations appear to influence the shape of representation in the moment of 
viewing, enacting a particular film experience and contributing to this embodied
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knowledge. This suggests -  as I said earlier -  that apparently personal responses 
to films through memory are also shaped by, and contribute to, the habitus. It is 
this point that I want to draw out further across this chapter and extend beyond 
memories of films to consider how wider habitus functions at the cinema, 
impacting upon representation in practice.
This relates to Marks’ (2000) productive concept of cultural sensoria in which she 
argues that ‘sense organs are the site where culture crosses the body’ (2000:
199). For her, however, what is of interest is that these sensoria, ‘can be 
translated into, and translate, cinematic languages’ (2000: 206). As such, she is 
keen to explore the affinity, or not, between the cultural sensoria of the filmmaker 
with that of the spectator, arguing that certain films will resonate with certain 
cultures and not others and we cannot identify with sense memories that we have 
never had (200:198). What I want to show here is that such sense memories are 
key to all film viewing, and are not only conjured when the image on the screen is 
designed to evoke particular culturally generated sensoria. To do this, it is 
important to first explore further the types of film memories that emerged in our 
conversations because I think that they can help think through their embodied 
counterparts.
We can see from Ann’s quote about The Magnificent Seven that sometimes the 
memories of films triggered when watching a film are not completely clear -  she 
can’t remember the name of the film and refers to a man I assume to be Steve 
McQueen, who stars, as ‘the good looking one...’. As I analysed my data I became 
interested in quite how vague some of the memories mentioned in our film talk 
were. Sometimes it was as though participants were trying to remember a dream:
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Pam (go-along, after Inception): There was one film, I can’t remember what 
it was now, where you enter into things through a sort of one of these virtual 
experience things, you know you put these things on and then you were in 
it, and then somebody else in there trying to kill you, you know, in this virtual 
world. And it [Inception] was a bit like that, really, you just felt as though 
they were in there just playing mind games and I sort of thought well it’s 
either a game or it’s a thriller and it didn’t seem to know which one it was 
really, did it?...
Theresa (go-along, after Alice in Wonderland 3D): And there was another 
one I saw here... it was about a corporate rip o ff... Matt Damon. It was a 
sort of double bluff. Very well done, I can remember enjoying it, but nothing 
else at all.
Joan (go-along, after Four Lions): ...urn, they made a film I can’t remember 
what it was called, about dinosaurs which I actually loved and Paul 
Robeson where he sings [singing] ‘All old man river’. I remember it fondly 
but can’t remember what that’s called or what happened.
Other participants commented on this fading, or ‘trace’, memory of films too. Pat
reflects on it as a frustration that comes with getting older:
Pat (go-along, before Secrets in their Eyes): And this is another thing that 
as I get older I find terribly annoying. If people say ‘have you seen such and 
such’ and I know damn right I’ve seen it, do you think I can remember the 
storyline? I tell you what, next week Five Easy Pieces is on...Wonderful film, 
Jack Nicholson, wonderful actor and I can’t remember from the beginning to 
the end of the story but I can remember certain scenes because he’s such
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a good actor and it’s such a good film, so certain scenes from films I’ve 
liked I can remember, but if I try to put a name to them or even say who was 
in it I don’t and, you know. It makes me very angry. I just know it was good, 
you know generic good or generic bad. It’s very strange.
But while this theme might seem to be a side-effect of working with older 
audiences at the cinema, Rama, who had been told by a friend’s daughter that she 
might have dementia after failing to remember the name of a film she’d just seen, 
denied this had any connection to ageing:
Rama (go-along, interval of It's a Wonderful Life): So that was, that was the 
movie All About Eve, I don’t remember what I saw. I have never 
remembered what I saw...so I spoke to someone and she laughed and she 
said to me ‘Rama I can’t remember [either], it’s a bad memory, it’s got 
nothing to do with dementia’... Something has to be special or 1 don’t 
remember them. And so she gives me a whole lecture of two and a half 
hours about why can’t I remember it.
The fact that, at 30 ,1 also experienced these barely-there, dream-like memories of 
films appears to suggest it is not age-related. Instead, I think, it is an example of 
the developing habitus in action. Bourdieu’s bodily learning tends to be discussed 
in terms of physical activities, such as sport or dancing. However, I think that these 
fragments, read through theories of embodied spectatorship, point to an embodied 
learning of affective responses to film content producing a form of cinematic 
habitus. Our responses, the pleasures we get from cinema, appear naturalised but 
are, in part, the product of limiting structures. This incorporates not just subjective 
memories of films, but objectively produced notions of appropriate and
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inappropriate responses closely linked to moral judgements. This does not mean 
that we consciously follow norms of behaviour, rather that these principles of 
behaviour ‘exist in a practical state in agents’ practice and not in their 
consciousness or, rather, their discourse’ (1977: 27). This relates back to 
discussions of taste in the previous chapter and again suggests the practical 
emergence of a mode of generation at the cinema. However, as also discussed, 
not all practising bodies have equal access to achieving the (somatic) norm 
(Puwar, 2001). Rather than return to this discussion, though, I would here like to 
linger on considering the generation of cinematic habitus, in order to think through 
how representation might be experienced in practice and offer an extension of 
theories of embodied spectatorship (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 2004, 2000; Bruno, 
2002; Marks, 2002, 2000).
Despite his engagement with significantly different theoretical frameworks, Victor 
Burgin’s (2004) work on the ‘remembered film’ can be helpful here I think. Burgin 
(2004) offers a personal exploration of the ways in which fragments of film memory 
can be so incorporated into our personal memory that they become separated 
from their source. Elements of his analysis can help to understand how these 
evanescent memories work at the cinema.
Walking a theoretical terrain that takes in Barthes and Freud, Burgin sets out on 
his journey concerned by the ways in which fragmented memories of two films had 
merged with an imagined memory of his mother when she was growing up. 
Acknowledging work that argues we increasingly encounter ‘displaced pieces of 
films’ on the internet and in other media (2004:10), Burgin is interested in the 
ways in which we also generate shards of films in our ‘psychical space’, creating 
the equivalent of Freud’s ‘day’s residues’ (2004: 58). As residues, these film
fragments do not always form linear memories. More often they form fleeting 
senses of something once known, much like in a dream, memories similar to those 
described above. To explore the ephemeral nature of these memory fragments, 
Burgin turns to Barthes’ account told in Camera Lucida (1982) of the unexpected 
sadness he felt on viewing a 1926 photograph of a family from Harlem. Barthes 
works backwards from this emotion to interrogate its source and he finally 
determines that a necklace worn by the woman in the photograph had prompted it. 
After a long route around the picture, he concludes that this necklace had 
unconsciously reminded him of an aunt who had once worn something similar and 
this (still imperceptible) memory prompted him to think about her ‘dreary’ life. As 
Burgin explains, ‘Barthes says that the photograph “worked within him” before he 
knew where the feeling came from’ (2004: 60).
What Burgin does is relate this back to the ‘day’s residues’ spoken about earlier. 
He is concerned with the ways in which these are incorporated into our 
understanding of the world, arguing that we often combine memories from films 
with personal memories. We do so in such a way that the memories from film 
become residual and ‘the narratives [in which they were once embedded] have 
dropped away’, creating a ‘hybrid object’ made up of ‘real’ and ‘reel’ memories 
(2004: 58). It is this falling away of narrative context that can perhaps be seen in 
the quotes above, in which sometimes only the affect or experience of a film is 
remembered through the body, rather than the details. Burgin’s thesis suggests 
that this may have an impact on our film experience as he -  calling on Freud again 
-  argues that emotions from films can similarly become separated from their 
original narrative, so that ‘an affect may be experienced in isolation from the 
representation with which it was originally associated’ (2004: 61). While Burgin’s
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concern is with how this detachment functions in our everyday lives, this is 
important at the cinema too. It begins to explain how film-memory may work 
through the sensing body, even when we are not consciously aware of the 
emotional associations being made.
Read through Bourdieu (1977), we can suggest that what is described by Burgin in 
psychoanalytical terms is co-constituted by objective structures, which practically 
position us in relation to the film through embodied cultural capital. In an argument 
reminiscent of Barthes’ above, Sobchack (2004, 2000) has shown that our body 
often responds directly to the film, and the account she provides of her fingers 
sensing a hand on screen before she could consciously comprehend it in many 
ways recalls Barthes’ account of looking at the 1926 photograph. This begins to 
suggest the development of a cinematic habitus -  memories and experiences of 
films, as well as practices of viewing that have built up over life and become 
incorporated into our bodies so that elements of them become part of our affective 
habitus, co-constituting meaning in the moment of viewing through differently 
affected surrogate bodies (Voss, 2011).
Developing this, I would like to suggest that film memory works in two interrelated 
ways at the cinema. First, because of the ability of films to recall film (and other) 
memories, they offer an inherent intertextuality which effects our film experience 
through conscious recollection and relational meaning-making, continually 
(re)positioning viewers in relation to the film while also influencing how the film 
becomes cinema. Second, these film fragments, incorporated across life result in 
not just a cognitive recognition but a sensory one, one that can be, but is not 
necessarily, entirely independent of cognitive recognition. The body oscillating 
between the real and the as-if-real worlds of film and ‘reality’ (Sobchack, 2004,
2000) is a body mediated by memories that we cannot always directly recall, and 
which -  while being constantly in process, negotiated and renegotiated across 
fields -  nevertheless position us in relation to the screen.
Importantly, as Jones (2001), Voss (2011) and Sobchack (2000) all make clear, 
and my notes and quotes from participants suggest, this does not mean that such 
memories override our engagement with the film, disrupting our ability to take it in. 
Rather, this seems to hint at the complex experience that watching a film is. It is 
an experience which, in the context of cinema-going, has us (as embodied 
audience members) simultaneously sitting in the seat at the cinema, surrounded 
by others known and unknown; in the world of the film, engaging with spaces and 
characters known and unknown; and in the memory-, thought- or fantasy- world.
To me, what this begins to suggest is that, rather than diverting our attention, 
distraction is a central part of the film experience and our meaning making 
processes, and not in the way it is conventionally understood to be. It is not a 
simple distraction from ‘real’ life and its material constraints. Rather film relies on 
our simultaneous engagement with the ‘real’ world in order to be meaningful, in 
Bruno’s (2002) words, films rely on this for their emotion.
While we were not physically moving in and out of the cinema, like the 
cinemagoers in Srivinas’ (2010) study, these oscillations -  noted by Sobchack 
(2004, 2000) -  suggest to me that although we are sitting still at the cinema, film’s 
emotional narrative is nevertheless constituted through a process of fading in and 
out of representation via memories and embodied knowledge. This knowledge is 
not produced through the purposeful learning of film scholars or cinephiles — 
rather, it stems from the implicit learning of practice. It is this that we draw on to 
literally make sense of the film. While this collaboration, between viewing body and 
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film, may be acknowledged in work on embodied spectatorship (Sobchack, 2004, 
2000, 1992; Bruno, 2002), it is generally othered in analyses -  positioning the 
imagined spectator while negating the researchers’ own positioning which, in part, 
is responsible for producing the analysis offered (see also Bourdieu, 1977: 24). My 
own research further suggests that this positioned intertextuality-through- 
embodied-memory that collaborates with the film to produce cinema relates not 
just to filmic memories but also to wider biographies and practices.
The next section continues this argument by considering the role wider 
biographies play at the cinema -  both those elements with which we consciously 
engage and those made in our body. While here again I draw on data from go- 
along conversations, the embodied element is not, I hope, lost. Rather, chiming 
with claims in the go-along literature (Anderson, 2004; Kusenbach, 2003), the films 
seemed to have triggered pre-reflexive or at least taken-for-granted knowledge. 
Having access to this knowledge can begin to show the relationship between 
habitus and representation and further attend to the question that is the focus of 
this chapter.
3. The ways in which embodied biographies impact upon cinematic 
representation.
At a go-along early in my fieldwork I went to see Last Chance Harvey with Lynda 
at the Rio. I spent the first half of the film dutifully making notes on Lynda’s 
cinema-going practices (or at least those I could observe), and jotting down my 
reactions to the film, ready to have a conversation during the interval. As soon as 
the film stopped and the lights came up, however, she offered an opinion that cut 
through my careful note taking:
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I do wish they got the buses correct. I mean one minute you’ve got a 
Metroline bus behind you in a taxi in one shot and then in the next shot in 
the same taxi two minutes later you’ve got a First bus. Hold on, what 
happened there? How did he get into the scene? Don’t ask. If you must use 
buses at least get something right. Because now they’re not all red buses 
per se, that’s it. End of subject. There used to be. But now you’ve got all the 
different bus companies and filmmakers are gona have to start watching 
that one because it shows: If they don’t know the difference between a 
Metroline, who runs the 43 and a couple of others, and the First bus which I 
didn’t see the running number of... So, you’ve got all these different bus 
companies and they all look different.
The film that triggered this reaction follows the developing romance between 
Harvey Shine (Dustin Hoffman), an American who writes advertising jingles, and 
Kate Walker (Emma Thompson), who works for a market research company 
based at Heathrow. Harvey travels to London to attend his daughter’s wedding 
and plans to leave as soon as the ceremony is finished, before the reception 
begins. At the rehearsal dinner it becomes clear that he has been sidelined by his 
ex-wife’s new husband, who his daughter has asked to give her away. When he 
leaves the wedding the following day, a traffic jam prevents him from getting to 
Heathrow in time for his flight. He phones work and is fired. He heads to a bar in 
Heathrow where Emma Thompson happens to also be on her break. The film 
follows the progress of their relationship, as well as her struggles to control her 
anxious and clingy mother and his to develop a meaningful relationship with his 
daughter.
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On the basis of this narrative, I had been expecting to have a conversation about 
the nature of relationships, fathers, weddings, travel or something else that 
appeared to me to be directly relevant to the film we were watching together. In 
fact all of that did happen, and with unexpected revelations on Lynda’s part, but 
the first thing Lynda did as the lights went up was to complain about the buses -  a 
detail I had, perhaps unsurprisingly, failed to notice. Lynda’s extraordinary ability to 
identify buses by their colour and to know where they should and shouldn’t be 
stems from her two marriages, both to men who were ‘on the buses’. We had been 
talking about this before the film started, and although she had her own career, the 
buses had clearly been an important element of Lynda’s life. So much so that here 
her sensitivity to them appeared to disrupt any aimed for effect or affect of the film 
being screened.
Lynda had warned me about this habit of hers, to spot continuity errors, and she 
puts it down to her own career, a point of pride from her time in printing. Before the 
film started she described having spotted such an error in a detective series her 
husband was watching. She explained:
Urn. You know what I mean. You can see it, and you think to yourself ‘hold 
on’. They’ve had to retake that because somebody’s done it... because that 
wasn’t quite like that when it started so therefore... Hmm. That’s a retake, 
so they’ve done the splice and sort of mixed one with the other. It’s 
something that depends on how blatant it is. I think partly it’s because the 
job I did in the print was to spot errors. Cos I did a lot of proof reading as 
well. I wasn’t paid to proof read, I was paid to typeset... But, if I spotted a 
spelling error I wouldn’t do it. I would correct it as I went.
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While this is a crude example, which perhaps implies the producer/consumer 
model I am keen to escape, it serves as an example of a theme -  of embodied 
biography as impacting on our engagement with film -  that was to recur across the 
majority of my go-alongs in a variety of different ways. Sometimes, as with this 
example, the impact of biographies were spoken about in a taken-for-granted way 
(as though this were a universally experienced issue with the film), exposing the 
naturalised assumptions of habitus. At other times the film resulted in 
conversations about elements of a participant’s biography that were heretofore 
undisclosed -  implying that a triggering of such memory occurs during film 
viewing. To me, both suggest the same process: that a film’s meaning and affect 
are co-constituted by embodied biographies in the audience. I say co-constituted 
because these positioned biographies do not just influence the ways in which we 
produce film meaning in the moment of viewing, but also because films, in turn, 
impact upon the ways in which we relate to these biographies (see also Gillespie, 
1995 on ‘TV-talk’).
If the word ‘gift’ is replaced with the word ‘film’ then this begins to suggest 
something similar to Bourdieu’s analysis of the meaning of the gift in Kabyle 
society in that, ‘it receives its meaning, in any case, from the response it triggers 
off, even if that response is a failure to reply that retrospectively removes its 
intended meaning’ (1977: 5). By recognising the practical temporalities of film 
representation we can begin to see that meaning does not pre-exist the film’s 
engagement with the audience in practice. Instead, it is made in the moment, in 
practical time, a time that is both instantaneous and historical. Although it might 
seem spontaneous, any meaning we make is necessarily from a particular position 
in social space and as Bourdieu argues, by virtue of being so, tends to reproduce
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that position. In the following two sections I consider the ways in which biography 
emerged as key in my research. First, I explore the relationship between affective 
habitus and the co-constitution of film before moving on to look at the ways in 
which the film serves to draw out such pre-reflexive biographical information.
3.1 Affective habitus and the co-constitution of film as it becomes cinema.
During our conversation before seeing Four Lions, Joan touched on precisely this 
point when she was speaking about early memories of cinema, with her friend 
Diane. They had begun by talking about Joan’s first experience of seeing Ben Hur 
(1959):
Joan: I remember enjoying it [Ben Hur] like that but my mother was brought 
up really poor, in the Victorian era and in a very, very poor part of London, 
Bethnal Green, and she had great empathy and sympathy for the people 
who had absolutely nothing, you know the ragged schools and all that and 
they lived in a tenement building, erm, they were poor children, mum and 
dad, in about two rooms, and it was largely a Jewish community.
Diane: I was gonna say that, you’re not Jewish are you?
Joan: No, but you don’t have to be Jewish to be born in Bethnal Green. Ha 
ha... And I was brought up with all of these sad, sad stories
Diane: What like silent movies?
Joan: No, you know like the mother is either abandoned or the father’s at 
sea, she’s got no money, she’s got this shawl and the ailing baby and the 
ailing child and all she’s got is an attic and then one of them dies, one of the
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children dies and this sort of thing so I think always as a youngster quite 
liked anything where like there was triumph.
Diane: Survival.
Joan: And you think, you know, ooh, when they were whipped [in Anthony 
Adverse (1936)], God my heart used to bleed. But you know as you get 
older you start getting hard. Ha ha, but I mean some of the influences I think 
in your life make you feel in particular ways...used to feel it, you know when 
the other one was whipped and all that.
As Joan spoke, she moved her body in a way that appeared to imply a defeat 
against emotion, exhaustion from the empathy felt. At the word ‘whipped’ she 
flinched, each time she said ‘ailing’, she clutched her chest and screwed her face 
up tightly as though she was recalling those sensations on the spot, so entrenched 
were they.
Pat, who was a ‘looked after’ child and didn’t live with her mother and five siblings 
until the age of eight, also explains her earliest memory of the cinema in such a 
way as to draw out the affective habitus in film viewing:
Pat: Well, one of the first [times I remember going to the cinema], I am not 
sure if it was the first, is to see Bambi and I can remember it taking over my 
emotional senses, urn, because at the time losing his mother, or he gets 
lost, I can’t remember the story now.
Me: the mother gets killed.
Pat: Is it that she gets killed?
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Me: Yeah, she gets shot.
Pat: That’s right and the little baby’s left, that’s right. And I can remember all 
the feelings of my younger life and just crying. I think I missed a lot of it, a 
lot of the story, simply because I was overwhelmed with emotion. That I do 
remember.
What is striking about these two examples is that neither Joan nor Pat suggests 
that their life experiences influenced how they understood the meaning of the film. 
Instead, it is that these life experiences impacted upon how they felt on viewing 
these films. This indicates that these biographical details, shaped by and shaping 
of our position in social space, suggest not just an inculcation of ways of seeing 
(as indicated in Lynda’s quote), but also ways of feeling, of being affected by films.
These affects, bodily sensations and the comportment that accompanies them, 
speak not just of individual histories but also their entanglement with socially 
incorporated ways of being, generated within and producing structuring structures, 
as part of the affective dimension of habitus. Joan’s memory here more obviously 
suggests a social body than Pat’s, which stems from such a decidedly personal 
experience. However, it was by virtue of inculcated implicit norms surrounding the 
importance of the mother, combined with Pat’s personal experience of being a 
looked after child that Bambi was able to generate this affect. Of course, in most 
societies the importance of the mother is a shared value, and it is this that the film 
is talking to in trying to produce a particular affect in this scene. The extremity of 
Pat’s response -  of being overwhelmed by emotion -  stems from it conjuring up 
emotions relating to the ‘real’ world, enacting a particular cinema. While, as I have 
said, it is important to acknowledge that meaning is made within the limiting
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structures incorporated through the habitus, this serves as a reminder that they 
are also, of course, set by the limiting structures of the film itself. Nevertheless this 
suggests to me that film meaning is made in collaboration with habitus, and 
generates a more fluid understanding of representation.
This chimes with an important element of Bourdieu’s practice theory — that the 
body and mind are fundamentally intertwined, and here I would like to argue that 
each influence our experience of, indeed co-constitute, representation in practice. 
While these two quotes suggest an understanding of the ways in which 
biographies can impact upon our experience of films, there were, as mentioned, 
other times when the film served to draw out biographical information.
3.3 Film as a trigger for biographical knowledge.
Sometimes films drew out biographical details in rather predictable ways. For 
example, after watching I Am Love (2009), a film that follows an affair and the 
subsequent unravelling of a family, Wendy and Sheila reflected on their 
experiences of infidelity and relationship breakdowns. But at other times it was 
more subtle and drew out elements of biography that I could not have predicted. It 
is perhaps import to note here that in using the word biography I hope to avoid the 
sense that these are all memories of long-gone times. Instead, the films often 
brought out recent events or on-going concerns. On a go-along to the The Red 
Shoes with Ethel, for example, she somehow linked the madness of the female 
protagonist with the madness of her downstairs neighbour who had been making 
her life misery for years.
One moment key to my recognition of this theme was in the interval during a go- 
along to De Lovely, which I was watching with Janet R. Janet R had been very 
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welcoming but quite closed in our interview, giving what felt like stock answers to 
my questions. But in the interval to the film she suddenly opened up about a very 
personal issue. What brought this forward was a scene in the film that I had almost 
missed because, as she correctly points out below, it was insignificant to the film 
experience I was enacting. There had been a very short section of a scene in 
which Cole Porter (of whom De Lovely is a biopic) discovers his wife has had a 
miscarriage. In the interval Janet R remarked:
Yes. And the other thing. This won’t mean anything to you but when she’s 
just had the miscarriage or having the miscarriage, she says, ‘oh well never 
mind this obviously wasn’t meant to be’. That comes from somebody who’s 
never gone through it.
Me: Oh, I’m sorry. I assume that means that you have?
Janet R: Yes, twice. There were two in between number one and number 
two. I had two miscarriages. You know, it’s so common, but until you’ve 
gone there yourself, until I’d had a miscarriage, I didn’t know anybody who 
had and when I talked about it I discovered all these people who had been 
through it. And when I told our children, I can’t remember at what stage, one 
of the boys said, ‘that means there would have been five of us’ and I didn’t 
want to say, ‘well no, we wouldn’t have gone on to have you’. That’s not the 
thing you say is it? ... And when I had them, I mean I don’t know the rules 
now, until you’d had three miscarriages they don’t actually do any 
investigating. But you know, I think oh well, maybe there was something 
wrong with the baby. Because it is medically referred to as an abortion, 
which I found quite distressing... And then you hear that people go on and
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on and on trying. Because I’d already had a baby at least I knew I had that. 
But each time I miscarried I got closer to Rachel [Janet’s first daughter], so 
if anything had happened to her I would have been, I might have been...
By revealing deeper levels of biographical information and emotion, this begins to 
hint at the ways in which film can function not just as an object of but also a tool in 
research. As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was having these conversations on 
different go-alongs that drew me to thinking about the ways in which film’s virtual 
mobility provided a similar methodological function to the walking in go-alongs 
(Pink, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b; Moles, 2006; Anderson, 2004; Kusenbach, 
2003). This example clearly cannot be considered ‘pre-reflexive’ knowledge — it is 
a memory of a very significant event in Janet R’s life. But it is a deeper level 
memory and more involved biographical fragment than the narratives given in 
interviews. In this sense, while not pre-reflexive, this information has had 
significant impact on the film constituted by Janet R and it is unlikely to have been 
brought out in a conventional interview situation. Drawing memories such as this 
out not only raised the potential of go-alongs for exploring films and cinema-going, 
and vice versa, but also drew out an element of representation in practice that I 
would like to explore further here.
Another example of this came after watching Up in the Air with Joyce at the 
Clapham Picturehouse. During the film the two main characters -  Ryan played by 
George Clooney, and Alex played by Vera Farmiga -  attend the wedding of Ryan’s 
sister. The night before the wedding, his sister has second thoughts about the 
marriage. As I experienced it, this was a scene in which Ryan (reluctantly) got to 
show his softer side as he supported his sister through her cold feet. The issue 
was not her wedding, but his character development. By the end of the film I had
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forgotten all about this bit of the plot but as we sat down to speak about the film 
one of the first things that Joyce said to me was:
Joyce: I related to it on several levels. First I’ve been fired twice from a job 
so I know what that’s all about... And I’ve also called off a wedding. Ha ha!
Me: Really?!
Joyce: Uh huh, not the night before though. Urn, six weeks before. I had a 
grandfather who had wonderful handwriting and that weekend he was going 
to address all of the envelopes and this was a man, I was living in New York 
then and he was in Jersey. Who knows why, I was 26, who knows why, or 
25, why I was even doing this. Maybe because of the girlfriends at that age 
had put me on to it. I was already seeing someone else in New York too 
which is even doubly stupid. And, urn, I didn’t plan it, urn, that it was going 
to be that weekend I was going to tell this man. He was a lot older than me 
and when I think about it now it’s quite extraordinary. I was 25, he was 43 
with four children, the youngest being five. And he had teenage daughters, 
one of the oldest who was not a fan of mine, so I mean I was one year older 
than her! So urn and I, he picked me up. I used to. I guess 1 used to go 
home every weekend and urn he picked me from the bus on Friday night 
and we were out at a restaurant and I just said to him ‘I can’t do this’ and he 
really left the table and he was physically ill and I had to drive home. Drive 
us home. Drive me to my house and then, urn, but there was no way.
Evidently, my experience of these films had differed significantly from the women I 
was with, both of whom had been reminded of painful experiences in their life by 
virtue of what appeared to me to be insignificant scenes, or sub-plots. This of
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course often happened in reverse, and there were many films that I watched 
during my research where I experienced emotional responses or made 
connections that were not necessarily there for the woman I was watching with. 
And, while different genres did appear to do this to varying levels, this prompting of 
emotion doesn’t have to be to do with an element in the plot. As we have seen, it 
can be to do with memories of having watched the film before as well as other 
films or television programmes seen, and it can also be triggered by non-verbal 
elements of film -  music, imagery, lighting, costume and so on. One example of a 
completely unexpected connection was when I was watching Nine (2009) with 
Joanna. The film is about the production of a grand musical and so involved a lot 
of glittery show costumes. On reviewing my notes during data analysis I found a 
record of an unexpected effect the glitter had on me:
The glitter on the costumes has a very peculiar effect on me, it makes me 
feel nostalgic for something... I ’ve just remembered what it is! My Dunlop 
trainers that I had as a teenager [they had a glittery ‘Dj. Nostalgia rushes 
over me, I am in my design GCSE classroom, back at school, smelling 
those stairs...
As with Jones’ (2001) memories during Saturday Night Fever, this memory did not 
overwhelm my engagement with film. Instead it in part determined it, without such 
embodied sensorial memories I would have watched a different (albeit subtly) film.
Although the examples given above stem from things participants said, what 
interests me here is not what my data suggest about meaning making after the 
viewing event. Rather, I am keen to explore the practices of viewing at the cinema 
and the process of meaning making in the moment that this talk implies. I am keen
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to think through how this reciprocal relationship between biography and 
representation impacts upon the meaning making process in the moment of 
viewing and, thus, on our experience of representation in practice. I would suggest 
that these lived biographies impact upon our experience of media ‘texts’ not 
always through conscious acceptance or rejection of the representation but, rather, 
through the gradual inculcation of expectations, interests and embodied pleasures. 
These, in turn, co-constitute affective dimensions of habitus and associated 
embodied enactments of representation and narrative -  offering a version of 
cultural sensoria (Marks, 2000) understood through Bourdieu that enables the 
consideration of it at play in all cinema. It suggests that the different layered 
dimensions of habitus are practically engaged in the meaning making process, 
drawn out with particular film-fields.
We have seen that Bourdieu (1977,1990a) offers a way of understanding how 
these biographies might be present, impacting upon our film experience through 
the habitus, without us necessarily consciously calling them up. If the habitus is ‘a 
past which survives in the present’ in the form of ‘embodied histories’ (Bourdieu, 
1977: 82), then considering it via Sobchack’s (2004, 2000, 1992) work suggests 
embodied biography might be influential at the cinema, sometimes in 
imperceptible ways. As outlined in Chapter One, Sobchack (2004, 2000) uses her 
concept of the cinesthetic subject to move beyond understandings of film viewing 
as a predominantly cognitive experience. Instead, she argues that although we do 
not actually feel the film touch us or taste the food on the screen, the lived body of 
the cinesthetic subject experiences an ambiguous oscillation between the ‘real’ 
and the ‘as if real’ that serves to momentarily conflate the lived body of the 
spectator and the representation on the screen (2000: 23).
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Sobchack’s (2004, 2000) work provides a useful framework for understanding and 
advocating for the embodied experiences of cinema as practice. However the 
cinesthetic subject that she presents is an ‘essential’ one. While she 
acknowledges that the body at the cinema is ‘always also a qualified body’, she 
does not suggest the ways in which such difference might be incorporated into her 
understanding. What I hope my data has helped to draw out is that this oscillation 
is neither universally experienced, nor entirely individual. In an attempt to 
incorporate an understanding of difference to Sobchack’s work, I would like to 
suggest that those biographical details brought out through the film talk quoted 
above do not just indicate the conscious incorporation of experience in our 
engagement with film. Instead, they are the surface representations of a process 
that also occurs within our bodies as they respond to the films and co-constitute 
meaning in the moment, through differently positioned sensing bodies. This is not 
an issue of legibility. While we might agree on the overarching story of a film, we 
are far less likely to agree on whether we like it or dislike it, on how it made us feel.
In this way, these discussions begin to open up a conversation about the ways in 
which our embodied biographies might come to influence how representations are 
experienced in practice — a key question for this project. Importantly, it begins to 
offer a way of thinking through the ‘perversity of spectators’, identified by Staiger 
(2000), without reverting to an understanding that relies on a universalised 
conception of the spectator, or on differentiated audiences that have a pre­
determined, predictable, acceptance or an rejection of a film’s ‘preferred reading’. 
Instead, dispositions are ‘objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to 
attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product
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of the orchestrating conductor’ (1977: 72). Our embodied biographies become 
inseparable from the film made cinema and co-constitute the experience, the 
perception, of representation, if not indeed the representation itself.
Like my arguments in section two this is reminiscent of Srivinas’s (2002,1998) 
concept of ‘participatory viewing’, in which audiences are understood a producer 
rather than consumer of meaning as they use their biographies and repetitive 
viewing to (loudly) disrupt film narratives at the cinema. As I hope to have shown 
here, this process -  of audience members being part of meaning production -  
does not require explicitly disruptive behaviour such as that described by Srivinas. 
Instead, it can be an embodied and pre-reflexive disruption that nevertheless 
results in the meaning made through cinema, and indeed in our subsequent film 
talk. While I would like to present an understanding of film audiences as active 
producers of meaning, I do not wish to suggest that we all have equal access to all 
meanings. As shown in the previous chapter, these embodied biographies position 
us relationally over time in social space, not just in relation to others but also to 
film representations. Such positioning impacts upon our affective habitus and co- 
constitutes representation and practice.
Differentiated bodies, then, can indeed make their own meaning, but only within 
the multi-layered limiting structures that have produced their habitus (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 54). As such, in suggesting an active audience I do not wish to shift away 
from the politics of representation. Rather, I am hoping to offer an interpretation 
that is drawn from a lived audience and therefore enables us to consider these as 
lived politics, maintaining an understanding of pleasure, and assuming neither a 
passive spectator nor one that is actively resisting meaning.
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4. Conclusion: engaging the cinematic habitus to understand representation 
in practice.
Hugman (1999:194) notes that contemporary western society tends to limit the 
value of older people to their role as ‘lived history’, valuing only their ability to tell 
us about the past and thus negating any contribution older people may make 
through their activities in the present. Keen to avoid reinforcing this, I made it clear 
to my participants that I was mainly interested in their contemporary cinema-going. 
Nevertheless, almost all offered up memories such as those quoted throughout 
this chapter. While this could be seen as an example of them fulfilling an 
inculcated expectation to talk about the past, it seems clear to me that these 
memories were nevertheless with these women -  and mine with me -  at the 
cinema, and some were specific to the triggers in the film we had just watched 
together. I hope to have shown here, too, that these memories are not just 
experienced cognitively, but also through the body. A remembering body is 
affected differently. As we have seen, this suggests that we make films differently 
in relation to subjective experiences. These subjective experiences are, however, 
constituted within objective structures. Because of this, we are relationally 
positioned in social space by subjectivities. These positions, in turn, influence our 
affective habitus, which co-constitutes film as it becomes cinema. This further 
develops a positioned embodied filmography, which in turn continually affects 
representation, and is used by the surrogate body to make sense of the film (Voss, 
2011; Bruno, 2002).
By understanding cinema as practice through Bourdieu’s theory, I hope to have 
gradually developed a sense of our developing cinematic habitus at play here. In 
doing so this chapter begins to offer insight into how representation might be
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experienced in practice, and shows that it is inextricably linked to how 
differentiated bodies practise the cinema differently. It is this habitus, our 
structured and structuring lived past experiences, that influences our practice in 
the present, while being influenced by it. Understood in this way, the construction 
of a ‘preferred reading’ does not necessarily have to be a rational, conscious, 
action of rejection. Instead, it is an inevitable consequence of going to the cinema: 
our cinematic habitus in many ways determines the limitations surrounding the 
ways in which film becomes cinema. That is not to say this is always pre-reflexive, 
clearly many of the memories and concerns quoted in this chapter are conscious 
and we are aware of thinking them at the cinema. It is this fluid movement between 
the two key themes from my data -  biography, and film or cinema memory -  and 
the film on the screen that means our practising bodies co-constitute 
representations and narrative. This suggests that the meaning making moment 
ensures differentiated bodies practice cinema differently, as cinema is enacted in a 
sense through such difference.
Stewart (2003), whose work on early black spectatorship is discussed in Chapter 
Two, argued that the mixed programmes provided by cinemas in the early 
twentieth century complicate attempts to understand this audiences’ engagement 
with classic Hollywood films and their racist content. Cinemas in the 1910s, she 
explains, did not screen one feature film that the audience watched from start to 
finish. Rather, they offered a varied programme including shorts and live 
performances. The meanings of the classic Hollywood films, then, were not fixed. 
Rather, they were enacted in the moment of viewing and in relation to the other 
elements of the programme. Her concept of ‘reconstructive spectatorship’ 
emphasises how black viewers reconstituted the racist screen and asserted
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themselves through spectatorship, disrupting the denigration by determining how 
meanings were made (2003: 653). I hope to have shown that while these mixed 
programmes no longer exist, the practice of enacting meanings in the moment is 
very much alive in our cinematic habitus.
As I argued in the previous chapter, the nature of cinema-going as a public 
practice is significant to this as such meaning is co-constituted collectively with the 
other bodies in the audience. In this way, the viewing body does not arrive at the 
cinema as a pre-existing entity but is instead defined in practice and in relation to 
the material spaces of viewing. The discussion in this chapter has begun to 
suggest the ways in which film’s spaces might be constituted through a lived 
audience and their affective habitus. The following chapter continues this 
discussion, as well beginning one around the ways in which the viewing body is 
not just shaped through past practices but also exists in a co-constitutive 
relationship with the space of viewing. I move on, then, to explore the ways in 
which the spaces of cinema are constituted, those both on and off the screen.
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Chapter Seven. The sensual geographies of cinema space.
The previous two chapters have outlined some of the ways in which we can 
understand cinema as practice, and explored the alternative but complementary 
insights offered to studies of film and cinema when we do so. In arguing that our 
cinematic habitus co-constitutes the film in-the-moment of viewing the previous 
chapter brought the temporalities of practice to the fore. But if practice is temporal, 
it is also spatial and in this chapter I aim to continue these discussions by paying 
attention to the spatialities of cinema, specifically those related to the film on the 
screen and the material space of viewing. In doing so this chapter speaks to the 
question, in what ways are the spaces of cinema constituted?
Considering my interest in this question, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
spatialities appeared very important as I analysed my data. Although I may have 
been more aware of them as a result of this ‘foreshadowed problem’, by engaging 
with my own research via existing work I hope to show in this chapter that to 
understand cinema as practice, a consideration of its spaces -  material, imaginary 
and symbolic -  is essential. Three key elements came out of the analysis: the 
different ways in which (ageing) bodies interact and co-constitute the material 
spaces of cinema; the spatial mobility of the films themselves and, finally; the 
inclusion of domestic practices in the public space of cinema. My aim through this 
discussion is to show that this project can offer a valid contribution to the existing 
work on the spatialities of cinema, just as that work offers support for some of my 
findings. The focus of this chapter, then, is the third of the three key elements that 
I argue make up cinema as practice: space. To explore it, however, I inevitably 
engage with both the body and film, further indicating the ways in which the three 
are co-implicated in cinema as practice.
As Chapter Three explained, Bourdieu’s treatment of space is influential to the 
understanding that emerged from my research. Although, by his own admission, 
his understanding of the Kabyle house reverts to the kind of structuralist analysis 
his theory of practice aims to overcome, key across all engagements with space in 
his work is his emphasis on understanding it through the body. Qualifying his own 
analysis, Bourdieu makes clear that the built form of material (‘inhabited’) space 
should not be understood as representations, abstracted from practice, from use 
by bodies. Instead, it is our body ‘which structures practical space’ (1977: 2). But 
just as space is constituted through the body, so does material space contribute to 
the on-going formation of habitus. The built form teaches bodies their relationship 
to its structures, offering a form of ‘implicit pedagogy’ (1977: 94). This analysis has 
quite a lot in common with the understanding of exhibition space put forward by 
Bruno (2002) and other work on histories of cinema (Allen, 2011; Gomery, 1992; 
Hansen, 1991). Importantly, however, Bourdieu offers a contribution to these 
understandings by emphasising that such structures are ‘read with the body’, 
bodies which ‘make the space within which they are enacted as much as they are 
made by it’ (1977: 90). This suggests that the material spatialities of cinema are 
co-constituted by the audience.
In the first section of this chapter, then, I engage this debate through my empirical 
work, outlining the understanding of cinema space that arose from the data. As the 
above might suggest, rather than offering an analysis of the cinema architecture 
and the audience or practices of spectatorship it can be interpreted to ‘imagine’ or 
invite, this section explores the ways in which the lived audience uses cinema 
sites in practice. Doing so has much in common with the aims of the critical 
geography of architecture (Jacobs, 2006; Lees, 2001) introduced in Chapter Two,
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but while I am keen to draw out the ways in which I found such spaces to be 
constituted by embodied practice, I don’t want to lose sight of the ‘implicit 
pedagogy’ of buildings that Bourdieu (1977) emphasises in his understanding. As 
such, I engage observation notes from across go-alongs to draw out the ways in 
which I found the material space of cinema differently constituted by participants 
and me, while also emphasising the significance of material space to producing 
(older) bodies that know their ‘place’ (1977: 94).
When exploring visual practices a focus on spatialities is not just about the venue 
of viewing. Rather, as Rose (2011:11) points out, ‘the sorts of geographies 
practically constituted through such [visual] events may well exceed the immediate 
location of their event’. Chapter Two outlined work from the geography of film that 
suggests the building itself does not represent the sum of cinema space 
(Lukinbeal and Zimmerman, 2008; Aitken and Dixon, 2006; Crang, 2002; Clarke, 
1997). And Bruno’s (2002) work in particular shows that the virtual mobility offered 
by moving images means that when we go to the cinema we do not just 
experience its material space, we journey through a number of spaces with the film 
and in so doing co-constitute them. In the second section I discuss the ways in 
which such journeys emerged in my research. Bruno (2002) accessed this mobility 
by conducting analyses of particular films and positioning film within a history of 
haptics in architecture and art. For me, it played out in practice through the many 
imagined journeys undertaken by the lived audiences at the Rio and Clapham 
Picturehouse. In considering the spatialities of cinema, then, I am not just 
interested in the material dimension but also, and inseparably, the imaginative and 
the affective — and the ways in which these journeys described by Bruno (2002) 
are undertaken by differentiated sensing bodies.
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Complicating the argument further is that in addition to this ‘elsewhere’ accessed 
through the screen, there is another space being emotionally constituted: a sense 
of home. Rather than see these two apparently opposing forces (of home and 
away) as contradictory, however, my research suggests that their mutually 
constitutive relationship is vital to understanding cinema as practice. I am 
interested, then, in the journeys, home and away, taken by embodied audiences at 
the cinema and this discussion constitutes the third section of the chapter. 
Bourdieu reminds us that it is important not to assume that practices are 
experienced or undertaken in universal ways by homogenous bodies. Instead 
members of the embodied audience are socially and politically situated. Having 
established an interest in the mode of generation being practically asserted at the 
matinees under study, here my concern is with the particular relevance such a 
dialectic might offer older women at the cinema, and the ways in which it might be 
understood to contribute to a logic of practice that keeps them coming despite the 
apparently ageist (and racist and sexist) screen by which they are confronted.
1. Making the spaces of cinema: the co-constitution of embodied practices 
and spaces of viewing.
As mentioned above, Bourdieu argues that we must ‘not forget that the “book” 
from which children learn their vision of the world is read with the body, in and 
through the movements and displacements, which make the space within which 
they are enacted as much as they are made by it (1977: 90, my italics). Although 
he is referring here specifically to learning in early life, we can see that this 
process continues in various ‘inhabited spaces’ across the life course, as they are 
co-constituted by practising bodies. As outlined in Chapter Two, Laws (1996) 
offers a genealogy of the different spaces associated with older people across
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time, arguing that they constitute what it means to be older in society at particular 
historical periods. This is not a one-way influence, however, and Laws points to 
the reciprocal relationship between the social and the spatial to understand how 
aged identities are (re)constructed by, and reflected in, built environments (1996: 
91). Since Laws’ work, many others have adopted this approach in various 
settings but all remain focused on spaces of care -  either care homes or home 
care (McHugh, 2000; Hockey, 1999; Moss, 1999; Mowl et al., 1999). Reading this 
work in light of the discussions in Chapter Five, I would like to suggest that there is 
a spatial element to the mode of generation enacted at the cinema as it produces 
a new space of ageing, just as it is in part produced by it. The two are mutually 
constitutive.
In Chapter Two, I explained that a growing interest in film exhibition has produced 
a number of analyses arguing that across history different modes of spectatorship 
have in part been constituted by the cinemas they were housed in, as well as 
broader changes in society (Jancovich et al, 2003; Bruno, 2002; Hansen, 1991; 
Gunning, 1989). Bruno (2002) takes this a step further in arguing that 
spectatorship is an architectural practice (2002: 44). To Bruno, film becomes 
cinema through its interaction with architecture. Her understanding encourages an 
acknowledgement of cinema as situated embodied practice, as she evocatively 
argues:
‘Film is always housed. It needs more than an apparatus in order to exist as 
cinema. It needs a space, a public site -  a movie “house”. It is by way of 
architecture that film turns into cinema. Located in the public architecture of 
the movie theatre, the motion picture is a social, architectural event.’ (2002: 
44)
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Bruno takes this theory into the analysis of the different modes of cinema offered 
by two specific sites -  Kiesler’s Film Guild and Loew’s Paradise Theatre — 
arguing that ‘the configuration of the [Kiesler] movie house “projected” a specific 
film experience to its spectatorial body’ (2002: 47).
Exploring my research questions at the cinema, I became interested in this 
interaction between film, bodies and architecture. I was struck by the ways in 
which the built form of the cinema seemed to be constituted differently through 
practice. As discussed, this is a point of interest, too, for a growing body of work 
within the geography of architecture keen to avoid black box producer/consumer 
models by exploring the ways in which practices co-produce buildings through use 
(Jacobs and Merriman, 2011; Saville, 2008; Jacobs, 2006; Llewelyn, 2004, 2003; 
Lees, 2001). Drawing on geographies arguing that consumption is as an ‘active, 
embodied and productive practice’, Lees (2001) calls for such an approach to be 
applied to architecture, explaining that it enables the exploration of ‘the ways that 
the built environment is shaped and given meaning through the active and 
embodied practices by which it is produced, appropriated and inhabited’ (2001: 
55). This, then, offers useful way to bring together my findings with Bruno’s (2002) 
work as we begin to see the architecture produced in part through practice. In this 
way, the effects and affects of building design cannot be fully understood without 
exploring practices of use. Buildings from this perspective are constituted in 
interactions with lived bodies -  an approach that chimes with what I find the most 
productive elements of Bourdieu’s comments on space, and that resonates with 
my findings discussed below.
Schatzki’s (2005; 2003) work on practice-arrangement meshes is also 
complementary to such an approach. He uses the term arrangements to
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encompass ‘both entities in, and layout of, material settings’ (2003:195). These 
are given co-constituted meaning through practice, as they are constituted in 
particular practice-arrangement meshes. Although accessed via different 
theoretical frameworks, this has much in common with Nast and Pile’s (1998) use 
of the term ‘proxemics’ -  described by them as the relationship between 
‘spatialised practices of the body and the bodily production of space and place’ 
used to understand the ‘mutual constitution of places-bodies’ (1998:309, 305). 
Taken together this work supports my findings, and implies that an exploration of 
the ‘movie house’ is necessary if we are to understand cinema as practice. 
Undertaking such an inquiry from a practice perspective emphasises the lived 
relationship between audience and the exhibition site and my go-alongs led me to 
confronting this directly, in the moment of practice. The interactions found there 
offer a perspective that suggests a potentially fruitful extension to Bruno’s (2002) 
compelling understanding.
1.1. Navigating the interior of the Rio Cinema.
The auditorium at the Rio is divided in two, with a wide balcony at the back, 
stretching across the full width of the room, suspended above stalls which begin 
underneath it and spread out to the stage at the bottom of the screen (see figs. 5 
and 6). This spatial division created a de facto segregation as, with few 
exceptions, those who sat upstairs were relatively able-bodied, while those in the 
stalls (frequently on trips with care homes) were often more infirm. This was a 
division noted by the event organiser as she encouraged me to recruit from 
upstairs because the people who sat there tended to be more ‘lively’. Almost all of 
the women I attended the cinema with chose a balcony seat, often explaining that 
they did so in order to let others more in need take the ground floor seats. Patricia
was an exception to this because she always sat downstairs despite being 
relatively able-bodied.31
Figure 5. The stalls at the Rio with the balcony intersecting
Although the women who went upstairs claimed that it was to leave the more 
accessible seats for those less able, it was clearly a matter of importance to them 
that they belonged up there. It seemed to relate to the emergent mode of 
generation discussed in Chapter Five, and to a practical disavowal of the physical 
deterioration in later life for as long as possible. I suggest this because while for 
Janet R and Susan this walk didn’t seem to offer any particular obstacles, for most 
participants getting up the stairs was in fact not easy (see figs. 7 and 8).
The staircase it seemed became a site of assertion and struggle. The way that 
some of the women ascended the steps made me tangibly aware of every feature, 
seeing and sensing a very familiar space anew through an unfamiliar practice- 
arrangement mesh (Schatzki, 2005; 2003). Participants, for example, used the 
layout of the curved staircase in such as way as to transform it into a system of
31 At the time of our go-along she had just returned from a two week walking holiday traversing the 
St James’ Way in Spain, a medieval pilgrim route to the cathedral in Santiago de Compostela.
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support while simultaneously exposing to me its status as a barrier -  constituting a 
different space to that which I had perceived on many previous trips up the ‘same’ 
staircase:
Ethel (go-along): As we walked up the stairs I couldn’t help notice Ethel’s 
delicate body take on a certain determined strength. She grabbed the 
bannister and pulled herself up with her right hand, step by step, one at a 
time, clutching her coffee in the other. When we got to the top I realised she 
had been bent over almost double during this process when she 
straightened up, reorganised her clothes and exhaled. The effort she had 
taken to get there was palpable.
Joanne (go-along): The larger-than-life Joanne shrunk before my eyes as 
we walked upstairs. I had never noticed a limp before but as she tackled the 
stairs she seemed to noticeably rock side to side, as though it took all of her 
strength to climb each step. She held on to the wall as she went and 
through her expert use it seemed as though that was its always-intended 
function.
Maria (go-along): Despite Maria’s foot being in plaster she insisted on 
walking up the stairs. Handing me her crutches she looked up to the top of 
the first flight and took a deep breath. Having braced herself, Maria began 
walking up, using a skilled sequence of manoeuvres that made the evident 
effort seem somehow effortless. First she put her ‘able’ foot on a step, 
followed by a two handed grab of the bannister and delicate placement of 
her plastered foot onto the same step, a movement that was repeated up
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the first section of stairs when she rested on a landing that sits between two 
sections of the stairs, and which I had never noticed before.
Although these notes describe a physical struggle, in offering them I do not wish to 
reproduce a representation of older people as fragile or infirm. While the 
descriptions may be of a struggle, in the moment the acts spoke of strength and 
elegance rather than weakness or degeneration, and did nothing to disrupt the 
determined neatness described in Chapter Five.
Figure. 6. View from the Rio balcony
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Figure. 7. The sweeping staircase in the Rio foyer
Figure. 8. The top of the main Rio staircase, and the smaller flight to the balcony
One of the ways I found this interesting also relates to arguments in that chapter. 
While the women could have strolled easily to a seat in the stalls, they 
nevertheless took the slightly more difficult route upstairs, implying that sitting 
there has greater significance. To me this began to hint at a broader implication for 
the practice of cinema. By going to the cinema, participants were (re)inserting their
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bodies into public space and everyday practice, generating an alternative ‘space of 
ageing’ by doing what feels right. In this way the ‘new’ space of ageing and mode 
of generation are mutually constitutive (Laws, 1997). In addition, by going up the 
stairs at the Rio, membership of the active ageing, of the ‘young-old’, was being 
further asserted. Perhaps most importantly, in taking this journey the women 
revealed a malleability to material space that I had previously been unaware of. It 
suggested that the seemingly fixed nature of the cinema interior is partly defined in 
the moment through embodied practice. This was perhaps brought to the fore 
because of working with older bodies, many generating subtle but significant 
barriers to movement, but my experience both resonates with and contributes to 
the approach adopted by the critical geography of architecture. This experience it 
emphasised not just that buildings are made in the moment through practice, but 
that the making of these buildings will differ depending on the body that is 
undertaking the practice (Hansen and Philo, 2007; Dorn, 1998).
This raises my second interest in these observations — the ways in which bodies 
and material space constitute one another in (cinema as) practice. I discuss this 
further in section 1.3 but first I would like to outline similar uses of space at the 
Clapham Picturehouse. While its four screens remove the de facto segregation 
provided by the balcony dividing the Rio’s only one, trips to screenings upstairs did 
offer similar examples of the women practically transforming the space to their 
bodily needs.
1.2. Moving about at the Clapham Picturehouse
While the majority of my go-alongs at the Clapham Picturehouse were in one of 
the two ground floor screens (see figs. 9 and 10), I went upstairs three times: twice
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to the first floor -  with Joyce to watch Up in the Air, and with Theresa to watch 
Alice in Wonderland 3D -  and once on the second, with Joan and Diane, to watch 
Four Lions (see figs. 11 and 12).
Figure. 9. The ground floor of the Clapham Picturehouse (screens three and four)
d
0
Figure. 10. Inside screen four at the Clapham Picturehouse. Image courtesy of Picturehouse 
Like Janet and Susan, Joyce and Diane tackled the stairs with ease and their
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movement rendered a familiar space, albeit slightly changed. Theresa and Joan, 
however, used the fixtures and building in different ways that again exposed 
elements I simply hadn’t been aware of before and seemed to reconstitute the 
material space of the cinema in the moment of practice.
Theresa (go-along): As we walk up I notice how skillfully Theresa navigates 
the stairs despite her cast She put her bag so that the strap is across her 
body, popped her glasses on her head and handed me her coffee, she uses 
one hand and then another to pull her up the steps. At the top, Theresa 
joked that the thick carpet common in cinemas always makes her feel 
secure because even if she were to fall on her face, it wouldn’t be too bad. 
Having never thought about it before I am suddenly aware of the particular, 
muffled, sound [offered by the carpet].
Joan (go-along): Four Lions is at the top cinema at the Clapham 
Picturehouse -  up about six flights of stairs. But Joan, who is incredibly 
elegant but significantly frail, insists on still going. She found it quite difficult 
to walk up but used the bannister as a resting place to catch her breath at 
regular intervals. She starts to wheeze as we go up the final few steps so 
insists on waiting outside the auditorium before we go in because she 
doesn’t want to interrupt the trailers for the other audience members. As we 
wait outside, the wall becomes a resting place and Joan props herself up 
while me and Diane get her some water.
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Figure. 11. Stairs up to Screen Three at the Clapham Picturehouse
Figure 12. Stairs up to Screen Two (the top) at the Clapham Picturehouse
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What the examples above suggest is that while the physical structure of the 
building and fixtures may not change, practising bodies adapt (as much as it is 
possible to do so) exhibition sites to their needs. And they do so in habitual, rather 
than reflexive ways. Fundamental to this is the fact that, as Saville (2008) 
emphasises in his exploration of the way public space is constituted differently 
through the skilled Parkour-practising32 body, such changes do not literally amend 
the materiality of the space. Instead, the ‘physical space changes very little...[it is] 
the perception of space that shifts’ (2008: 909). This is of course a bodily 
perception and while I did not share it, being with participants as they moved 
through the space in a way so different to me did significantly shift my own 
naturalised perception and exposed to me the nature of seemingly objective 
elements of buildings as in fact fleeting, unstable and personal.
The go-along meant that I was able to observe the women’s negotiation of the site 
-  one which made me aware of my own — and witness the ways in which this 
seemed to generate a conversation with the building, ‘transforming’ certain fixtures 
and fittings to give them what I saw as new functions but which were, of course, 
only ‘new’ to my embodied perception (and constitution) of the space. Such spatial 
strategies were not just present as we walked up the stairs. Instead, they 
continued as we entered the auditorium.
op
Parkour is a predominantly urban practice that in its contemporary incarnation originated in 
France, with a movement spearheaded by David Belle. Its practitioners, traceurs, train their bodies 
to be highly skilled at jumping and leaping over walls and other ‘obstacles’ in the urban fabric.
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1.3. Inside the auditoria: the co-constitutive intersections of body, space 
and film.
The first go-along I undertook for this thesis was discussed in the previous chapter 
— I went to the Rio with Lynda to see Last Chance Harvey. After a strenuous 
climb up the stairs, Lynda strode into the auditorium only to stop abruptly and 
stand still, staring straight ahead. This stillness only lasted for a few seconds but 
felt quite significant and just as I was wondering what was happening, Lynda 
turned to me to explain that she had to let her eyes adjust. She then grabbed onto 
the partition at the back of the balcony and used it to guide her along the platform 
before getting to the row of seats in which she had left her bag and coat. This 
moment of stillness on entering the auditorium was to be repeated on almost every 
go-along and the corresponding use of elements of the buildings’ fixtures and 
fittings as guidance or support would almost always follow it. We can see it in the 
description offered in Chapter Five of both Edith’s and Janet’s navigation of the 
auditorium on leaving the cinema, and a note from my go-along with Norma 
describes it well:
Norma (go-along, Salt): Norma opened the door of screen two for me as we 
entered, inviting me in to her space. When she came through she stopped, 
coffee in hand, shoulders back, and looked at the screen in front of her, 
adjusting her eyes. As we walked towards her regular aisle seat -  six rows 
from the back -  she put her coffee in her left hand while with her right she 
carefully but smoothly felt the top of each seat along the way. This seemed 
to be partly for guidance but also support as she lent on each chair as her 
hand touched it. In this way their curved backs ceased to represent 
potential places for us to sit. Instead, because of the casual and adept way
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Norma put them to work, I suddenly saw them as a series of posts, there to 
be used in precisely this manner.
For me, this unfamiliar use of a familiar interior once again constituted a different 
embodied relationship to the exhibition site to that which I usually experience.
As such, while I felt that the built structure of the cinema remained objectively ‘the 
same’, my perception of it was changed on each go-along. That participants’ use 
of the space modified my perception implies there is something transformative 
about cinema as (an inter-subjective) spatial practice that is worth exploring. 
However, while I have presented a dynamic understanding of the material spaces 
of cinema, here it is important to acknowledge with Bourdieu that this is not a one­
way relationship -  through use, buildings shape bodies too. In taking practice 
theory to the cinema, then, it is important to consider the role the exhibition site 
plays in constituting the embodied audience.
While I am here keen to avoid a producer/consumer model of understanding 
architecture it is important that in emphasising the fluid constitution of space in 
practice, we do not end up inverting it by implying complete freedom in such 
constitution. It is worth therefore highlighting the co- in the co-constitutive 
relationship between bodies and space. The material structures of both limit the 
spaces and bodies that can be mutually constituted and, just as the perceiving 
body shifts the space by drawing out different elements through practice, so too 
does the space draw out particular bodily capacities that serve to position us in 
space. In this instance, there was an impairment drawn out by the built structures 
of space as they encouraged the pre-reflexive strategies described above, 
strategies that could just as easily be applied by children, pregnant women,
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someone with a broken leg and so on. This is a complex and nuanced co- 
constitutive relationship, though. While engaging this space may gradually -  and 
increasingly -  implicitly ‘teach’ impairment to ageing bodies, in moving through the 
space they challenge this in unexpected and resourceful ways. In doing so, they 
further constitute the emergent mode of generation appropriate to the puMcisation 
of spaces of ageing.
In arguing this I do not mean to imply that there is a fixed objective space which 
older bodies shift through engagement with an embodiment and practice 
unforeseen by the architect. Instead, the difference between participants’ 
movements through space as compared to mine exposed that I took my own 
constitution of the space for granted and had assumed it was an objective 
perception. While my perception of space significantly shifted by moving through it 
with older bodies in need of (often minimal) support, this does not mean 
participants experienced it as a shift. Instead, this was the space they were always 
‘in’ when at the cinema, just as my ‘objective’ perception usually is for me.
Much like my arguments about film itself, this work of co-constitution suggests that 
modes of spectatorship ‘housed’ by cinema architecture do not pre-exist the living 
audience. Instead, I would suggest that Bruno’s (2002) argument can be 
productively extended to suggest that the film becomes cinema through 
architecture as it is constituted by the (differentiated) practising viewing body, just 
as buildings are constituted by it. Here, as in Stewart’s (2003) analysis, the body 
becomes a mediating force between screen and architecture. And, as Stewart 
(2003) argues, neither the film nor the architecture are engaged with by neutral 
bodies — they are instead socially positioned and determined in relation to each 
other, and the spaces of cinema. My research suggests that by offering such
261
embodiments, co-constituted with architecture, as ‘surrogates’ to its emotion, film 
becomes part of a three way mutual constitution (Voss, 2011; Bruno, 2002). Bruno 
(2002) implies this in calling for an understanding of film representation as 
negotiated by embodied spectators and, separately, through architecture but she 
does not explore how in the moment of practice the two come together as 
differentiated embodied spectators negotiate and differently constitute buildings. 
Nor does she consider how they shape one another.
By analysing such spaces through lived use, it becomes clear that they are not just 
constituted through overarching practice (i.e. cinema-going), but also by different 
practising bodies. As bodies change across the life course the implicit pedagogy of 
architecture changes too and it impacts upon our habitus. In so doing, it co- 
constitutes a subtly different viewing body. If we take embodied theories of 
spectatorship seriously, then we must integrate an understanding of this social 
body into our concepts, as I attempted to do in the previous chapter. In this way 
we can begin to escape not just a universalised understanding of the viewing 
body, but also of the ageing one (Kontos, 1999). Specific bodies relate to 
architecture and in doing so constitute different spaces. It seems to me that in 
practice, then, it is in the interaction between audience, architecture and film -  
rather than that between the screen and the walls -  that film becomes cinema.
This doesn’t just challenge fixed understandings of cinema architecture, but also 
suggests a wider amendment to Bruno’s (2002) understanding.
That film becomes cinema via the mutually constitutive architecture and viewing 
body implies that cinema is generated differently by different habitus that are, in 
turn, part developed through each viewing event. We can move beyond just the 
able/disabled or young/old understanding that might be unintentionally implied 
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here to think that all bodies (or, more specifically all habitus and related 
dispositions) mutually, and inter-subjectively, constitute the spaces of cinema 
through practice. In the following I will argue that this does not just apply to the 
cinema building and interiors but to the spaces on the screen too. To begin this 
discussion, I once again return to Bruno’s thought-provoking work before exploring 
some of the journeys taken on our trips to the cinema. In doing, so I hope to build 
on ideas developed in the previous chapter and Chapter Five by thinking through 
the ways in which cinematic habitus and the spaces on the screen are co­
constituted.
2. Watching the film: how the viewing body is implicated in the spatialities 
and ‘virtual journeys’ of moving image.
Drawing on Eisenstein’s argument that walking through and around architecture is 
similar to the montage of film, Bruno develops an architectonics of cinema in which 
‘a spectator is not a static contemplator... she is a physical entity, a moving 
spectator, a body making journeys in space’ (2002: 56). Rather than considering 
cinema audiences as static voyeurs, Bruno argues, we should spatialise our 
understandings and recognise that ‘because of film’s spatio-corporeal mobilisation, 
the spectator is a voyageur, a passenger who travels a haptic, emotive terrain’ 
(2002:16). Arguing that tourism and train travel changed the ‘relation between 
spatial perception and bodily motion’ in the early twentieth-century, Bruno 
suggests that they laid the groundwork for our embodied experience of film 
viewing, in which we are at once still and moving. With this in mind, she argues for 
an understanding of the female spectator as a voyageuse, as ‘a relative of the 
railway passenger and the urban stroller’ (2002:17).
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As suggested in Chapter Four, this character closely links to Friedberg’s (1993) 
flaneuse, a female spectator of early film who was mobilised by film and shopping, 
both of which, she argues, played a key role in the feminisation of public space in 
the early twentieth century. Friedberg (1993) claims that the site of exhibition and 
the films they screen stem from the same tradition of mobility and combine to 
create the ‘mobile virtual gaze’ of cinema (Friedberg, 1993: 89). Importantly, as 
Bruno notes, this mobility is not just that of the spectator moving through the film 
— the film becomes mobile through the body too. Because of this, Bruno’s (2002) 
voyageuse can, I think, be linked to Voss’s (2011) concept of the surrogate body 
that, by virtue of the ‘mental and sensorial-affective resonance’ of the film, ‘“loans” 
a three-dimensional body to the screen’ (2011:145). Both highlight that without a 
sensing body the film simply would not ‘make sense'. As such they are useful for 
thinking through the ways in which film’s spatialities are constituted.
This sense of movement-through-film described by both Voss (2011) and Bruno 
(2002), and the medium’s concern with travel, it would seem, has not gone away. 
Across the course of my research I saw images of what was presented as London 
(The Red Shoes, An Education, Last Chance Harvey), Yorkshire (Four Lions), 
Liverpool (Nowhere Boy), Italy (Nine, Letters to Juliet, I Am Love), Jamaica 
(Gainsbourg), Paris (The Red Shoes, Gainsbourg), Argentina (The Secretin Their 
Eyes), the South of France (Julie and Julia), New York (Julie and Julia, Letters to 
Julief), Los Angeles (Singing in the Rain), small town America (It’s a Wonderful 
Life), the Mid West (Calamity Jane) and several imagined places (Inception, Alice 
in Wonderland) to name but a few. As such, while my research design 
emphasised the importance of going to the cinema with the women who took part,
I was continually struck by a second trip we appeared to be undertaking together -
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that triggered by the film on the screen. This became apparent to me in three 
distinct ways: my own partial immersion in another symbolic space away from the 
cinema; the movement of our bodies when the film finished; and the comments 
made by the women during our conversations after the films.
In my own experience, the sense of going elsewhere is related, at least in the 
notes I made during the films, to expansive landscapes. For example, during a 
scene towards the end of Inception I wrote: ‘[As the] camera pans across the 
snow-filled landscape, I feel as though I am moving perpetually forward, into 
another world’. My sensing body echoed this feeling: ‘I feel nervous despite myself 
and my stomach flips. It’s like being in a really fast car, [as though] I am actually 
moving at this speed’. The sweeping landscape shots of Italy used in much of 
Letters to Juliet generated a similar response while the sun-saturated images in 
both this film and I Am Love, also filmed mainly in Italy, set off a sensation on my 
skin that effected my mood to such an extent I felt a profound sense of being on 
holiday. This was particularly strong during a scene from I Am Love in which Tilda 
Swinton’s character has headed up to visit a soon-to-be lover in his romantic 
hideaway in the hills outside of the city. During the scene, the couple sit outside 
and eat a simple lunch on a small sun-dappled table. The combination of food, the 
light and the sound conjured an intense feeling in me:
As he slices the cheese with a blunt knife there is something about this 
movement that makes me feel I am there, perhaps not there but 
somewhere. I can feel the sun on my skin and I can feel the light breeze 
taking the heat out of the day. I feel the calm of being somewhere beautiful, 
the elation of finding a secret place... While I am very much in the cinema, I 
am also somewhere else.
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I must stress here that were I not attempting to tune into such sensations, I think 
that the feelings triggered would have formed a naturalised perception of the film. 
By paying attention to the work my body was doing I could feel that I co-constituted 
the spaces of the film in distinct ways. And the way in which I was doing so 
appeared to be influenced by the (usually pre-reflexive) affective dimensions of 
habitus, not just in the constitution of the journey in the film, but also the psychical 
and sensational journey such affect would take me on via embodied memories of 
similarly made spaces and times. As suggested here, the depiction of food on the 
screen would often trigger particular, familiar, senses that would carry my whole 
body to new imagined places, as well as those I had been to before. Interrogating 
these moments in relation to the cinematic habitus discussed in the previous 
chapter, I came to realise that they stemmed from a combination of the imag(in)ing 
of the space on the screen, and a sensorial memory of places with which I 
associated certain tastes or practices of cooking and eating. In this way, the 
spaces of cinema were constituted through my surrogate body, which was itself 
co-constituted with the material space of viewing. To me this suggests a pre­
reflexive, affective collaboration between the screen, the architecture and me.
An obvious example of this comes from my viewing Julie and Julia. As explained, 
this film is about chef Julia Childs and a woman, Julie, who sets herself the 
challenge of cooking every recipe from Childs’ classic book Mastering the Art of 
French Cooking — a story that ensures many shots of food, either being prepared 
or being eaten. This meant that, despite my being significantly disengaged from 
the narrative itself, the film nevertheless continuously transported my body into its 
sensorial world.
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‘Butter bubbles up around a golden cooking chicken. My mouth is watering 
and I feel like I can somehow smell it through the sound. I catch myself 
leaning towards the image on the screen, as though if I just get close 
enough I could taste it too. The sound of the sizzling is so loud that my body 
seems to think its there, in the kitchen, and is preparing to devour the 
feast... my imagining intersects with a memory of my grandmother’s kitchen 
and the smells that would overwhelm me as she prepared her [signature] 
chicken dish’
Notably, I felt these sensations and bodily memories as a result of this audio-visual 
experience involving the cooking of chicken despite having been a vegetarian for 
23 years. And I had a similar reaction to many of the cooking scenes throughout 
the film.
These few examples, which represent a small sample of many similar notes made 
during almost all of the films we viewed, exemplify Sobchack’s (2004, 2000) 
argument. They also chime with the analytic description of her bodily sensations 
when watching film:
Our embodied experience of the movies...is an experience of seeing, 
hearing, touching, moving, tasting, smelling in which our sense of the literal 
and the figural may sometimes oscillate, may sometimes be perceived in 
uncanny discontinuity, but most usually configure to make sense together- 
albeit in a quite specific way. Although I cannot M y  touch Ada’s leg through 
her stocking or Stewart’s sensitized nude body on the screen of The Piano, 
although the precise smells of fresh laundry and the warmth of the linens 
that I see in Pretty Baby (Louis Malle, 1978) remain in some way vague to
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me, although I cannot taste the exact flavours of the pork noodles I see in 
loving close-up in Tampopo, I still have a partially fulfilled sensory 
experience of these things that make them both intelligible to and 
meaningful for me. (Sobchack, 2004: 76)
The main concern of Sobchack’s discussion is to reintroduce the sensing body into 
our understanding of film. I have shown that Voss (2011) takes this further to 
argue that the audience act as a ‘surrogate’ for the film, providing it with a lived 
form -  any sense of place produced by the film is equally provided by the sensing 
body. Here the kitchen depicted in the film cannot be reduced to its image -  it was 
made through my embodied, affectual, memories of my grandmother’s kitchen, 
triggered by the film’s spatio-temporality. It’s ability to take me elsewhere. The 
representation borrowed, as Voss (2011) suggests it might, my body’s sensorial 
memories in order to generate affect that convinced me of being in a kitchen. In 
this way the journey through the screen was co-constituted in the moment of 
practice through a collision between my sensing body and the film on the screen 
both, co-constituted with the material space of viewing.
While I recognise that in drawing this conclusion I may have been influenced by 
my engagement with the literature, that a journey had been undertaken did also 
seem to be reflected in comments made by participants. Some would comment 
directly on the ‘trip’ we had just been on together without referring to sensations:
Rama (Go-along, after It’s a Wonderful Life): We went to the olden days, 
isn’t it? We went on a trip back in time!’
Patricia (Go-along, as the lights came up after Singing in the Rain): ‘Do you 
know I forgot where I was?’
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While others did begin to hint at the sensorial element of feeling as though they 
had gone elsewhere:
Shelagh (go-along, after It’s Complicated): ‘Just stunning. Sometimes when 
they were, I felt I was in the car.’
Janice (after Gainsbourg): ‘His wife ... when they met, those rainy Paris 
streets, didn’t they look. Uh, I could almost smell them’
And more spoke generally about the journey offered by cinema, by the spatialities 
of film:
Lynda (after Last Chance Harvey): ‘I came out I was really, really, stressed 
out with all of it. I had so much in my brain, that I was ready to bite my 
husband’s head off with it. But because coming here like this and sitting and 
watching a film, I lose myself in the film, go somewhere else, and suddenly 
it’s not real world but it is fun world’
Ethel (before The Red Shoes): ‘I’m not travelling again. I used to go every 
year, sometimes twice. Flying I just don’t want to go. I don’t know why 
something just telling me don’t go back up there, this is enough. Sitting right 
here [in the cinema seats], this takes me as far as I need to go’.
Lauretta (Interview): ‘And, er, I can only think of that movie, the Italian film, 
Cinema Paradiso, that boy’s [the main character’s] love for film. That 
expresses i t ... we all sat there in that theatre you know the way he did, 
absolutely transformed, you saw life and people live a way that you didn’t 
live’.
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While these quotes could be understood as evidence of the classical ‘distraction’ 
from the world by films, as outlined in the previous chapter it is a distraction 
formed with our (cinema) habitus that relies on the surrogate body. And although it 
is difficult to ascertain or evidence the bodily dimension of journeys taken through 
film, there were certain behaviours that I observed that seemed to suggest a 
similar affective engagement to that I describe above.
In the description of my trip to the cinema with Edith, offered in Chapter Five, I 
referred to the way in which our movement at the end of Closing the Ring made 
me feel as though we had just woken up from a shared dream. A similar bodily 
shift punctuated the end of almost every film viewed and, taken together, offered a 
sense of us returning fully to the material space of the viewing site.
Wendy (go-along, I Am Love): The music comes to a loud almost 
overwhelming crescendo and as the titles come up Wendy exhales loudly, 
pushing her arms out in front of her. I realise Tve been holding my breath.
Barbara (go-along, Leaving): We sit and watch the titles until the end in 
silence. I never do this! When the lights come up Barbara shakes herself as 
if she’s trying to shake off the film, or shake herself into reality.
Susan (go-along, Gentlemen Prefer Blondes): The old familiar closing 
music rises up against the wonderful Technicolor end frame and Susan 
inhales loudly turning to me grinning. ‘So glamorous/ she says, in much the 
same way that you might say ‘delicious’ about something you’ve just eaten. 
It is as though she has just consumed the world of the film.
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This feeling of a bodily shift when the film finished is supported by and seems to 
support Voss’ (2011) argument outlined above that:
‘it is only the spectator’s body, in its mental and sensorial-affective 
resonance with events on-screen, which “loans” a three-dimensional body 
to the screen and thus flips the second dimension of the film event into the 
third dimension of the sensing body. The spectator thus becomes a 
temporary “surrogate body” for the screen and this body is, for its part, a 
constituent feature of the filmic architecture’ (2011:145).
I repeat this quote in full here because I would like to suggest that this sensorial 
‘resonance’ does not just rely on a film being ‘successful’ or not, as Voss (2011) 
suggests. Instead, as I argued in the previous chapter, it relies on affective habitus 
and, thus, different bodies will differently constitute its ‘three-dimensionality’. What 
I refer to as ‘imaginary space’ then is not conjured up by the mind, rather the body- 
mind that co-constitutes the cinema journey. Importantly, this is not undertaken by 
bodies in isolation but is, instead, inter-subjective: the members of the audience 
also affect the sensing bodies, as they set out on their journey together from a 
particularly constituted space of viewing.
This sense of having gone somewhere together was further strengthened by a 
loosening up of interviewees after the film. This was not just because watching a 
film appeared to trigger memories more or less forgotten, and heretofore 
undisclosed elements of biography. There was also because a tangible effect of 
our shared, if different, journey was that it offered us a common frame of reference 
through which to explore such embedded memories, thoughts or feelings. In this 
way, as suggested, watching a film together seems to offer many of the same
271
benefits as the ‘walking with’ described in literature on the go-along. But mobility 
here is virtual, it is about the sensual geographies of cinema -  those found in film, 
and made through the viewing body.
The examples given here suggest, with Bruno (2002), that we travel elsewhere 
when we go to the cinema. But as she indicates, this is not just a simple journey to 
pre-determined places projected on the screen. Instead this relies upon a journey 
through (sensorial) memories, without which it seems cinema’s virtual mobility 
might not be so affective. We may see other places but to go elsewhere we must 
feel them too (Voss, 2011:146). This is determined in collaboration with the 
embodied audience who while similar are anything but homogenous. Since 
different habitus offer different embodied knowledges and corresponding banks of 
sensorial memory, it seems clear that -  building on arguments in the previous 
chapter -  the journeys we take through film are also different. I do not mean that 
this works literally -  I did not have to have been to the place on the screen in order 
to feel as though I had travelled elsewhere. It is rather that much like the building, 
the spaces co-constituted by the sensing body and screen will change depending 
on habitus. Our sensing bodies, then, provide our routes through and to (a version 
of) the places on the screen. In doing so, our knowing bodies distract us with 
memories and fantasies which, in turn, engage us further with the moving image. 
Indeed, having conducted an in-depth study of a lived audience I am inclined to 
believe that the film only provides some of the itinerary. Our (cinematic) habitus 
provides the rest (see also Voss, 2011:143).
I do not want to lose sight here of the integration of the constitution of the building 
to this process. It is important not just because the surrogate body is, in part, 
positioned through its co-constitution of the viewing space but also because as we
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journey through film we are also anchored in our seats. In this section I have 
focussed on cinema’s mobility and, in chapters Five and Six, I have emphasised 
the significance of the public nature of cinema as practice. Despite this, there 
seemed to me to be another spatiality being enacted. There seemed to be a 
collective sense of home generated at the cinema by participants -  a symbolic 
space more often associated with the private realm. I am intrigued here, then, by 
how these two oft-opposed realms -  public and private -  intersect at the cinema. 
Working with female participants this has particular significance and here I once 
again begin with Bruno’s (2002) work.
3. Cinema as ‘mobile home’: how the incorporation of domestic practices 
and comportment transforms the symbolic-affective space of the cinema.
In suggesting we recognise the female spectator of early cinema as a voyageuse 
Bruno (2002) is concerned to break down a set of gendered binaries (home/away, 
mobile/immobile) that she see as ‘immobilising’ women. This notion of home’, she 
argues, ‘conceived as the opposite of voyage, is the very site of the production of 
sexual difference’ (2002: 86, Bourdieu, too, notes this in his analysis of the Kabyle 
house 1977:91). Once we mobilise our understanding of spectatorship as above, 
we can break down the understanding that ‘travel alone implies mobility’ (2002: 
103). It is important to do this, Bruno argues, because the projection of the 
mobile/sedentary dichotomy onto space is gendered, creating exclusionary 
structures. In her discussion, she mobilises an understanding of home by 
projecting it on to the space of the cinema. She argues that, because of its status 
as public/private space, when cinema first arrived in cities it offered a ‘safe’ place 
to engage with the technologies of tourism previously unattainable by women of
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lesser means (2002: 82). In doing so, it offered a route into public life and leisure 
that women had previously been denied.
Today, through work in geographical gerontology exploring the spatial 
associations of later life, we can see that this binary extends to older people 
whereby the (care) home is associated with old age and travelling with youth 
(Cutchin, 2009: 443; Hardill, 2009:1). Bruno here of course is evoking home, or 
‘domus’, as a theoretical aide in understanding cinema. My research suggests that 
such a metaphor is also generated in practice, and has implications for 
understanding cinema-going, perhaps particularly for older audiences. Offering a 
consideration of visual practices, Rose (2011) suggests that not only are they 
‘always embedded in particular places’, but also that ‘it is the practices undertaken 
in those places which reproduce them as those sorts of spaces (or not)’ (2011:
11). In going to the cinema with the women who took part in my research, I was 
persistently struck by the way in which they made the space feel as though it was 
somehow theirs. From opening doors in order to let me in to the ease with which 
they navigated the space, the overwhelming sense in my observations was one of 
them being ‘at home’ in the cinema. This is something that Srivinas (2010b) found 
among audience members in Bangalore. Although Rose (2011) is referring to the 
practices of looking that serve to maintain particular spaces of viewing, such as 
the way we look in a cinema as compared to the way we look in a gallery, her 
statement together with Srivinas’s (2010b) findings suggests that my sense may 
have been justified.
In practising domestic, the cinema space becomes an extension of that sphere. 
Some of my observations serve to draw this out:
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Shelagh (go-along, It’s Complicated): I arrived at the cinema to meet 
Shelagh and she was already hosting a group of friends around the table. 
As she spotted me she stood up beaming, opened her arms wide, and said 
‘welcome!’ I felt like I’d just arrived at her dinner party or something.
Daphnie (go-along, Lebanon): As we sat waiting to go into the cinema, 
people came in to drop off presents for her birthday and she seemed 
completely unfazed by it... She was a master of the space and moved 
around it very comfortably. She owned it, really, and I felt privileged that she 
had invited me in.
Both of these examples are from go-alongs to Clapham Picturehouse, but there 
was a similar familiarity with the space noted on go-alongs to the Rio.
Ethel (go-along, The Red Shoes): Ethel comes bounding through the door, 
picks her ticket up at the box office, slips past me and, without looking 
around, goes straight to the queue for cake, as though her body just knows 
what to do.
Rama (go-along, It’s a Wonderful Life): She is very smooth, very at home. 
As we talk she sits with her feet pushing against the end of the balcony.
She turns the space into a sitting room.
Patricia (observation notes after the go-along to Singing in the Rain): There 
is an almost arrogant ease to the way Patricia behaves at the cinema. She, 
in part, seems as though she is very relaxed there, and just feels quite 
comfy. But there’s also a more queen-like stature that suggests she owns 
the place.
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The sense of belonging that I am trying to draw out here was further enhanced by 
the fact that almost every woman I went to the cinema with had a specific seat that 
she sat in. At the Rio, where there was only one screen, this was literal:
Lynda: (observation notes after go-along): On arrival at the cinema I 
couldn’t find her. We were supposed to meet at the box office but I 
eventually came across her walking down the stairs which she was 
descending one at a time. She had already dropped her stuff off at the 
chair, to ensure she got her spot, and came to collect tea and cake for her 
and a friend who was looking after the seats. She knows the space and 
event so well I stepped back for a bit and just watch her familiarly glide 
through these tasks. She’s very comfortable in this space. We go upstairs 
slowly. I am happy she’s here and seems happy to see me. We get upstairs 
and I already know where to go -  where I initially found her... We sit down 
and it feels so contained, close and... cosy.
And, as discussed, Patricia insists on sitting downstairs:
In amongst all of the care home residents, some quite severely disabled, 
Patricia sits completely comfortable, unaware of the kerfuffle around her to 
find a seat for someone unable to walk upstairs. This is Patricia’s seat, it is 
where she always sits, and it appears she is not willing to give it up for 
anyone.
It was less of an issue at Clapham Picturehouse because there tended to be far 
more seats available but, nevertheless, every woman I went with expressed a 
preference for a particular seat in which they would sit when it was free.
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Joan (go-along, Four Lions): ‘I always go aisle. Never sit anywhere else. 
Always around the middle I suppose...not too near the screen, anyway, 
because my ears are bad.’
Daphnie (go-along, Lebanon): As we sit down in the back row, Daphnie 
explained that she always sat there so that if anyone tall comes in she can 
still sit up and see.
Pam (go-along, Inception): ‘I can’t sit with anyone in front of me but I don’t 
like to be the one in the front so I tend to come late and sort of find the 
perfect spot. But it tends to be about four rows back and somewhere near 
the centre.’
It is significant that although much has changed in cinema design across the 
course of participants’ lives, the general layout of auditoria has not shifted 
significantly. They might be various sizes and few now have balconies like that at 
the Rio, but while dimensions change the ratio of seats to screen remains 
relatively even. As such, those preferred positions in relation to the screen are 
habituated, practised across life, and relate to the ability for cinema as generic 
space to be made familiar place through practice. This could of course be felt on 
exploring any regularly practised activity -  if we were at the theatre, say, or a pub. 
But just because it might exist elsewhere, that does not mean it is insignificant to 
understanding the spatialities of cinema as practice. That this familiarity related to 
a sense of being ‘at home’ was further emphasised when, like in Srivinas’s 
(2010b) work, many of the women extended their hosting responsibilities to 
bringing me food to eat during the film.
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Lynda made a cake and brought two slices carefully wrapped in clingfilm, 
accompanied by a carton of soya milk drink. Joyce also brought homemade cake, 
along with a flask of tea and cups for both of us. Pat and Janice meanwhile 
brought grapes — Janice with some sliced apple, Pat with dark chocolate. When I 
asked, all of them said that they would bring a snack along as a matter of course, 
but that they had packed extra for me. Even when they did not bring their own food 
in, they were sure to provide for me from their free cake or biscuits courtesy of the 
cinema. Rama insisted on splitting her cake with me, and Daphnie snuck extra 
biscuits in to the cinema wrapped in a tissue. Others bought me a cup of tea, 
despite my protests and continued attempts to do the same for them. My sense 
that the cinema was being transformed into a semi-domestic space through the 
consumption and sharing of food was echoed by Janice on our go-along when she 
argued that the problem of noisy eating stemmed from the fact that ‘cinema has 
become an extension of people’s living rooms’. On no go-along did I feel as though 
I had instigated the meeting, it always felt that I was being taken around as a 
(sometimes unwelcome) guest.
Srivinas (2010b) similarly notes that the sociability found at the cinema in 
Bangalore translates to the notion of offering hospitality to those you are with.
Many women in groups bring food they have prepared at home or bought at a 
favourite shop in order to share it among their friends or family. This is, she 
argues, partly about limiting the risk of being in a public space, but it is also about 
the status in Indian culture of the cinema as a public/private hybrid (2010b: 297). 
Although on a much smaller scale, the food sharing I encountered -  coupled with 
my own intense familiarity with cinema-going -  resulted in a similar transformation 
of the space. Through their extension of some practices of home, the women had
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in many ways made the cinema their own. In doing so, my embodied perception of 
the space was changed through participants’ practice and I felt like a guest in a 
familiar, but again reconstituted, space.
In the previous chapter, I offered a discussion of cinema-going across the life 
course, showing that for many women the cinema has been a constant throughout 
their lived biographies, either as an absent practice (such as when they were 
raising children), or as a frequent one (almost all other stages). As discussed, this 
points to a shifting practical logic of cinema-going across the life course. However, 
the consistency of cinema and its (sensory) spaces as referent also hints at a 
certain stability and familiarity pre-reflexively at work in this co-constitution. As a 
constant presence (even through its absence) for many of the participants, 
cinema-going in later life appears to offer a familiar activity, unhindered by age. 
This was often reflected in the women’s statements about their relationship to the 
cinema, particularly for those women who had migrated to London. For Lauretta, 
recently arrived in London to live with her daughter following her husband’s death, 
the cinema offered a familiar world for her to retreat to.
(go-along, before A Single Man): In the beginning it was rather difficult 
because I lived in Princeton and you used a car to get everywhere and of 
course there were movie theatres all over the place so you had a choice. 
And I found it difficult but I’m adjusting. I’m really into films, always have 
been, and my husband was also so I’ve been doing it for years... One of the 
things I found really acceptable and I was happy to discover were these two 
movie theatres, they made me feel a bit more secure.
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Joyce, who had moved from New York to Balham nearly 20 years ago, found a 
similar feeling of comforting familiarity at the cinema:
(interview): I’ve been here for 21 years and, urn, I have been going to the 
Picturehouse almost since I arrived. Growing up in small town Jersey I went 
nearly every week -  just to escape! -  and for my 25 years in New York, I 
was on the Upper East Side for years and years in the 60s and 70s ... and 
then I bought a flat down in the [Greenwich] village. All these places ... the 
cinema has been my lasting companion.
While Laurice and Mavis, both of whom had come to the UK from Jamaica, were 
pleased to find a familiar spatial experience at the cinema:
Laurice: Yes, it remind us, it remind us of home
Mavis: Same as here, same like this darling!
Laurice: Same thing, same thing, upstairs, downstairs, same thing
Mavis: Same thing, I tell you something a lot of people don’t know, some 
people don’t know: all these things we have. All these things we have, just 
like home. So it’s nice.
These quotes, I think, suggest that while the films are not irrelevant, one significant 
source of pleasure at the cinema for these participants is the sense of familiarity 
that it once offered in a new country with many unfamiliar hostile spaces and 
practices. This was not just the case for participants who had arrived to the UK 
from other countries. It seemed to have a similar significance to others who had 
moved around throughout their lives, albeit across far smaller distances.
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Joan (go-along, before Four Lions): ‘Well I don’t know [why I like coming] 
really. It’s getting harder but I love it. I’ve been around but I’ve done it all my 
life, even during the war, and I’d miss it... You know I’ve got a problem with 
tinnitus and yet I still need a deaf aid in, really, but if I put the deaf aid in [it 
makes the sound too loud]... and you know I’ve lost central vision in this 
eye but I never realised. But I still love the smell and the feeling it gives me.’
And for Maria who had unexpectedly emigrated (back) to Italy for nearly two 
decades, it provided an anchor in a significantly changed and yet once familiar 
local area:
Maria (interview): ‘OK, 20 years ago I had to leave, my mother became ill in 
Italy, my husband had just died and I’d only just got married 25 years ago. I 
went, left my work to go and look after her thinking ‘oh in a couple of years 
she’ll die and I’ll come back’. I was there for 18 years because she didn’t 
die and she didn’t get completely better... so when she died I came back 
here, that was about 12 years ago, and everything had changed. There 
were a few things ... it was nice to still have the cinema because I knew it.’
Meanwhile, the cinemas long gone continued to dominate the remembered 
landscape of home for those who never left the area they had grown up in:
Lynda (go-along): So that’s why I stopped using all the local cinemas. Cos 
they shut all the local cinemas and turned them into... two of them were 
snooker Halls, one at Dalston into a snooker hall. And Kings Gym. One 
became a housing block, one was for retired people. Then the Savoy 
became a snooker Hall. Stamford Hill, one became. One is still there. The 
Regent is now Somerfield, the ABC is here Nettos is at Stamford Hill, was a
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Sainsbury’s at some point. The Ambassador became a mosque... They 
tended to disappear one after the other. It sort of cascaded along.
. Daphnie (interview): I was, as I say, I was three years old when I saw my 
first film. Now that is down what is now Sainsbury’s convenience store... 
Well, when I first started going of course there was the Pavilion and... And 
there was the Ritzy at Stockwell because I used to go there sometimes 
after... The other cinema was the, which is now the Inferno, and that was 
the Majestic and that was opened in 1912. And then it stopped being a 
cinema, and that was just a little before the Great War. And we think the 
temperance movement took it over as a billiard hall. There was one down 
the road, it’s a building just near Sainsbury’s and that was known as the 
‘young men’s temperance billiard hall’... Well it was different things, but it 
wasn’t a cinema again. The Floods was the only, you know where there’s 
that supermarket? If you stand and you look up you, or if you stand in the 
middle of the road, there’s, you can see they used to have side exits.
This sense of cinema as familiar and homely -  a constant through life -  might 
appear to sit in direct contradiction to my discussion of fluidity and mobility in the 
previous section and the significance of cinema as a public practice. Instead, I 
believe that by understanding cinema as a mobile home, we can point to a series 
of dialectics that are fundamental to understanding cinema as practice. Rather 
than either/or, cinema-going sits at the intersecting point between mobility and 
stability, fixity and fluidity, material and imaginative. It offers both ‘here’ and ‘there’. 
Importantly, it is not one or the other but always inescapably both. When we watch 
a film in the cinema, we are both ‘here’ and ‘there’, still and moving, ‘at home’ and 
in public, inside and outside, free and limited, safe and threatened. Many of these 
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tensions have been explored by geographies of home, further suggesting a 
correspondence between the two sites (Brickell, 2012; Blunt and Dowling, 2006; 
Schroder, 2006).
It seems to me that for the women I attended matinees with, it is the status of 
cinema as hybrid space in which the sense of belonging -  of being ‘at home’ -  is 
mixed with the public, that is vitally important to cinema as practice. As Bruno 
points out, the journeys taken at the cinema thus become a ‘dwelling-voyage’ 
(2002:103). I would like to suggest that the quotes and observations above imply 
two practical functions of the dwelling-voyage offered by the cinema that seem 
significant for cinema-going in later life (Bruno, 2002). First that in this familiar 
space the women could maintain a public practice with limited risk, as the site 
threatens little physical danger and offers a ‘safe’ place in which to maintain public 
identities, albeit on changed terms. Second (and as explored in Chapter Five) that 
in doing so, while going to the cinema means engaging with representations that 
contribute negatively to that public identity, the act of being there, watching such 
representations in some ways mitigates their effect -  by virtue of being there, you 
enact a mode of generation distinct from that either absenced or denigrated, you 
become one of the ‘ageing well’.
One of the contradictions highlighted by geographies of home is that it is a space 
of both fear and safety, of control and freedom. We idealise the home as a space 
of personal freedom, the site of -  and haven for -  the individual. Returning to the 
quotes from Joyce, Lauretta and Laurice and Mavis above, we can see that the 
cinema for these women conjures up similar associations. Once in the space, the 
sensations are familiar, well known even, and a changing body understands the 
material layout to such a degree that as described earlier, it can adapt it in much
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the same way as older people do their home -  by developing habitual pathways 
and positions that constitute a welcoming, comfortable space (Hugman, 1999). 
This spatial security, along with the mobility described above, contributes to the 
logic of practice and helps to -  pre-reflexively -  maintain cinema-going as a 
pleasurable, worthwhile activity. Part of this is the provision of a familiar space in 
which to negotiate changing identities -  both of which are formed relationally in the 
moment of practice (Boyle, 2010; Puwar, 2007; Stewart, 2003). This chimes with 
Bruno’s analysis of cinema as providing early female spectators with a route into 
public space from where they journeyed through film, simultaneously contributing 
to the change in their status and enabling them to explore the new public role in 
relative safety (2002: 82).
While I am keen to explore cinema as a mobile home throughout life it is important 
to emphasise, as argued in Chapter Five, that its status as not-quite-domestic is 
significant for cinema-going in later life. It has been suggested that, as our bodies 
age, home becomes an increasingly limiting and somewhat threatening place as it 
begins to represent the extent of our spatial world (Milligan, 2000; Moss, 1997). 
Laws (1996,1995) has shown that ageing must be understood as spatial practice. 
Her work indicates the ways in which associations of older bodies with particular 
types of space is marginalising and exclusionary, generating a sense of 
appropriate and inappropriate features of the landscape of ageing. Here, then, 
while cultural geographers have shown the screen to be ageist (cf. Robinson et al, 
2007; Bildtgard, 2000; Markson and Taylor, 2000), the women are creating new 
spatial associations and (re)forging a (positive) public identity through practice. 
Drawing on Laws (1995), McHugh (2000) shows that place-based images of 
ageing are part of the construction of ageism in society. Maintaining cinema-going
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as a spatial practice, then, constitutes an important shift in places of ageing in line 
with the mode of generation so that they include public spaces. It is able to do so, 
in part, because the familiar structures of material space meet changing bodies to 
produce an embodied perception of space that provides a sense of being ‘at home’ 
in public.
In arguing for an understanding of cinema as mobile home, I am clearly not 
suggesting an idealised notion of domestic space. Those elements that have been 
idealised are indeed an important part of the logic of cinema-going, just as they are 
part of the logic for aspiring to have a home. The cinema home, however, much 
like the domestic one, is a site of conflict and contradiction. And it is one that is 
practised -  and therefore constituted -  differently by differently embodied 
individuals.
4. Conclusion: the mutually constitutive relations between cinema’s bodies, 
spaces and films.
This chapter took as its starting point the question ‘how are the spaces of cinema 
constituted?’ While this implies the theme under discussion is space, the ensuing 
analysis shows that it is inseparable from body and film, just as space is 
fundamental to understanding them. Indeed, one of the key insights into the ways 
in which the spaces of cinema are constituted came through an engagement with 
participants’ bodies. Tuning into the disruption of my own taken for granted 
perception, I was able to consider the ways in which the material spaces of 
viewing are co-constituted with different bodies through practice.
Interpreting my findings through Bourdieu’s theory as well as geographical 
gerontology, the geography of architecture and Schatzki’s (2005; 2003) practice-
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arrangement meshes, they seemed to extend Bruno’s understanding of the 
architectonics of cinema. While I consider Bruno’s (2002) work very productive in 
interrogating the complex relationship between film and cinema architecture but it 
could nevertheless be enriched by a consideration of the lived audiences that co- 
constitute the building she considers so fundamental to shaping spectatorship. As 
suggested, my research offered an extension to this understanding suggesting as 
it did that in practice it is a three-way co-constitutive engagement between 
audience, architecture and film through which film becomes cinema. An assertion 
that impacts on both how we understand the nature of cinema’s spatialities and 
how representation might be experienced in practice. Here it relies heavily not just 
on the cinematic habitus described in the previous chapter but also on the co­
constitution of practising bodies and the architectonics of cinema.
This of course impacts on the spatialities on the screen, the exploration of which 
led me to the ‘virtual mobility’ of film. My data, read through Bruno (2002) and 
Friedberg (1993), offers an understanding of cinema as mobile practice. However, 
by engaging discussions of cinematic habitus outlined in the previous chapter and 
Voss’ (2011) concept of film’s ‘surrogate body’ I understand the spaces that are 
constituted by audiences as enacted through the remembering body — one 
shaped by the lived past of habitus. In this way it becomes clear that such habitus 
impact on the journeys available to us, and the spaces constituted at the cinema. 
Having undertaken research with a lived audience I would argue that the film only 
provides half of the journey undertaken at the cinema, it relies on our cinematic 
habitus for the rest.
This journey to elsewhere, however, was not the only space being constituted at 
the cinema. Across the course of go-alongs, I was struck by what seemed to be an 
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extension of the domestic sphere into the cinema site, and was keen to explore 
how this dialectic of home and away might contribute to the practical logic of 
cinema. In this context, going to the cinema is a way of maintaining another 
spatiality and regaining an (imagined) mobility through a familiar practice. While 
the screen may be ‘ageist’, it does not directly marginalise the living audience. 
Instead, by understanding cinema as practice, and considering all of the elements 
at play, we can see that it simultaneously offers the opportunity to not see yourself 
in the negative portrayal and, by virtue of being film’s surrogate body, insert 
yourself into the ageist screen by which you are absenced. This doesn’t just have 
a symbolic effect. Instead, there appears to be a second insertion -  of older 
people into mainstream society through the maintenance of everyday public 
practice.
Having outlined all of these interpretations from my data analysis, in the next and 
final chapter I revisit my research questions and attempt to draw some tentative 
conclusions on the key concerns of this thesis.
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Chapter Eight. Conclusion: proposing a geography of cinema
This thesis began with a problem. Why, when the representation of ageing in film 
tends to be understood in academic literature as negative, do the over-45s 
represent the fastest growing cinema audience in the UK? My project has been an 
attempt to explore this apparent paradox through a social-practice framework. The 
discussion has been broad and far ranging, taking in work from geography, 
gerontology and film studies -  all engaged through Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
and my own empirical work. Approaching cinema in this way raised three elements 
that I found fundamental to understanding the practice: the lived body of the 
audience, the films being watched and the material spaces of cinema. Drawn to 
these elements by my theoretical framework, the arguments outlined in Chapter 
Two and the questions they prompted me to ask, my empirical work suggested the 
need to bring them together in order to offer a lived understanding of cinema. It is 
this I have tried to generate a sense of in the preceding chapters. In doing so, my 
hope is that a new understanding of the term ‘cinema’ has been carved out -  one 
that combines existing meanings connoting film(s) or a place of viewing, and that 
has embodied practice at its heart.
The workings of film as a representational medium continue to dominate academic
work exploring cinema. While investigations of moving image’s unique form of
spatio-temporal communication are also produced, analyses of individual films,
genres, or the output of a particular director or country, remain most common (cf.
Harper and Rayner, 2010; Aitken and Dixon, 2006; Cresswell and Dixon, 2002;
Stam and Miller, 2000). Analyses of films take a variety of forms and engage a
myriad of theoretical frameworks but, as the cultural gerontology arguments
outlined in Chapter Two suggest, such studies generally consider the film in 
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isolation, with understandings of any (imagined) spectator drawn from the film text, 
and very little consideration of the significance of viewing context to such 
representations. This is an approach implicitly questioned by the ‘quiet revolution’ I 
outlined at the beginning of this thesis. The influx of older audiences to the cinema, 
despite representations that ostensibly marginalise them, suggests there is more 
to cinema than film.
Studies of ‘cinema’, though, remain rare by comparison, with the most considered 
examples often concerned by iconic historical periods of exhibition (Allen, 2011; 
Puwar, 2007; Maltby, 2003; Hansen, 1991). There are some exceptions but most 
of these studies offer conclusions without considering the relationship of exhibition 
practices to the film on the screen (Boyle, 2010; Srivinas, 2010; Stewart, 2003; 
Bruno, 2002). Similarly, both here and in work on film audiences, the role of the 
sensing body in such audiencing is rarely considered, despite it being shown 
elsewhere to be significant to spectatorship (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 2004, 2000; 
Bruno, 2002, 1993; Marks, 2002, 2000).
My methodology led me to studying cinema at the cinema, a surprisingly 
uncommon approach. Doing so suggested the inseparability of the three elements 
outlined above (and many others) in practice. For example, exploring 
representation and its effects by repeatedly watching and deconstructing a film 
offers a productive analysis of the politics of representation, but findings always 
emerge from a perspective that does not tell us about the workings of such politics 
in practice. Looking at the same film at the cinema draws out the significance of 
other elements to the film constituted. The significance of the communal space of 
viewing is brought into focus as it frames the bodies of the audience and the film
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text in particular ways that impact upon the meaning made in the moment — just 
as both the film on the screen and the audience constitute the nature of the space.
While all of the literatures referenced throughout this thesis offer vital contributions, 
my hope is that -  partly through the different knowledges my methodology 
encourages -  this thesis provides a persuasive argument for more closely 
integrating their insights towards an understanding of cinema that acknowledges it 
as made in the moment of practice through a co-constitutive interaction between 
the material spaces of viewing, the film on screen and the embodied audiences. In 
this final chapter, then, I want to return to the research questions with which this 
thesis is concerned, to explore how my understanding of cinema was arrived at 
and to pull out the theoretical and practical contributions it offers to existing work. 
Although in this study I have engaged and emphasised the older female body to 
generate my understanding, I aim here draw out those elements of my work that 
are appropriate to studies of cinema more widely.
8.1. How is film representation experienced in practice?
Despite arguments that film is a simulacral rather than representational medium, 
representation remains a core focus of much work on film (Clarke, 2010; Doel, 
2008). A good example of such an approach is the literature outlined in Chapter 
Two from cultural gerontology, analysing film representations of ageing. The 
discussion showed that this work claims such representations (or lack of them) 
serve to perpetuate negative stereotypes of later life and constitute old age as a 
fixed and universally experienced stage in the life course (Robinson et al, 2007; 
Bildtgard, 2000; Markson and Taylor, 2000). The role of film representations in the 
cultural construction of old age is drawn out, with ageing bodies understood as
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receptors of (negative) meaning, generated in part through films. These analyses 
offer powerful evidence of the construction of ageism in contemporary society, an 
ageism that is acknowledged by academia and my participants alike (Calasanti, 
2007; Bytheway, 2000).
In our conversation after watching The Secrets in Their Eyes, for example, Pam 
expressed her experiences of growing older in a way that resonates with many of 
the arguments in gerontology exploring representations of later life:
‘[W]hen you get to a certain age, especially if you’re female, there’s an 
invisibility about it and it’s so true, people will literally bump into you. Not 
unkindly but they don’t notice you, they think you’re less than others. I mean 
it, ageing, knocks one’s self confidence so it’s more exaggerated but on the 
whole it’s definitely there.’
Pam, though, was a committed attendee of the Clapham Picturehouse and, like all 
participants, certainly did not regard the film on the screen as contributing to her 
sense of marginalisation. This, of course, does not mean that the academic 
analyses are wrong, but it does suggest that film representations are not 
experienced in practice in the same way that they are understood by gerontology, 
for example.
Literature on embodied spectatorship, drawn on throughout this thesis, has shown 
that once the sensing viewing body is incorporated into understandings, seeing 
representation as stable and fixed becomes challenged (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 
2004, 2000,1992; Marks, 2002, 2000). In different ways, Voss (2011), Sobchack 
(2000) and Marks (2000) all emphasise the contribution our sensual bodies make 
to the film enacted in the moment of viewing. Ideas of representation become
insufficient to understanding film, as meaning is seen as a collaboration between 
body and screen in the moment of viewing, rather than a one-way projection. The 
significance of the sensing body to our experience of representation in practice 
was certainly drawn out in my research. For example, as described in Chapters 
Six and Seven, my understandings of the scenes of cooking in Julie and Julia or al 
fresco dining in I Am Love cannot be separated from the particular sensations they 
evoked. But what became clear in my own empirical work was something I missed 
when reading this literature first time round -  the significance of temporality that a 
concern with the body brings into focus.
All of the work on embodied spectatorship is concerned by the in the moment 
collaboration between body and film to produce embodied meanings. I certainly 
found such a temporality significant to cinema, but my empirical work suggested 
that this instantaneous enactment of meaning was not ahistorical. Memory also 
became fundamental to my understanding. There is, as outlined in Chapter Six, a 
developing interest in cinema memory, triggered in the main by Annette Kuhn’s 
(2002) detailed oral history of British cinema-going in the ‘golden age’ and 
including Puwar’s (2007) study of cinema-going among the Asian population of 
1970s Coventry. Such work brings out the social and spatial elements of cinema 
often left unexplored, and during go-alongs I found many of the memories offered 
by participants to be resonant of this work. But because my methodology led me to 
going to the cinema with participants, it was here that many such memories were 
shared. As such I was able to develop existing work by exploring the function of 
cinema memories in the present, as we watch films.
Jones (2001) had previously shown that exploring cinema memory in the moment 
of viewing has profound effects for our understanding. But her engagement is
292
limited to the memories evoked on repeat viewings of films that we had been to 
see on their first release. My research suggested the importance of memory to film 
viewing in the present had a wider significance and it became fundamental to my 
understanding of representation in practice. Further, understood through Bourdieu 
(1977,1990a) memory is a state of the body — it is a form of embodied knowledge 
that has been inculcated across life and incorporated into our habitus, affecting our 
practice in the present. As such, it links to theories of embodied spectatorship and 
similarly offers a sense of the instability of representation in practice. As Chapter 
Six has outlined more fully, at the cinema I found this embodied knowledge to run 
along three inseparable but nevertheless distinct lines: films previously seen, 
cinema-going across the life course and wider biographies.
For all participants, cinema had been an important practice since childhood. Its 
role in their everyday life varied across that time, but it nevertheless remained 
important and these past practices seemed significant to cinema in the present. 
Across all the go-alongs undertaken for this study, there was a consistency in our 
post-film conversations: they almost always brought us back to other films seen. 
Sometimes, these were clear memories and references but more often, and more 
significantly, they were fragments of ‘nearly there’ memories (see also Burgin, 
2004). These fragments, I suggest, were insights into those film memories evoked 
in the moment of viewing not just cognitively but through the body. My argument is 
that embodied rememberings of films seen and the associated cinema-going 
practices impact on sensations of viewing in the present and, therefore, the 
experience of representation in practice. Importantly, though, these memories do 
not exist in isolation and I found that wider embodied biographies were 
fundamental to — indeed inseparable from — the embodied perception of film
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representation. Taken together, I argue that affective responses to film content are 
inculcated across life, producing a form of cinematic habitus.
My use of the term habitus is significant here, as thinking memory and 
embodiment through Bourdieu (1977,1990a) enables me to reinforce arguments 
made by Sobchack (2000), Voss (2011) and Marks (2000) through a different 
theoretical prism. It also offers a contribution to this literature as it provides a more 
developed incorporation of social difference to the sensing body. Through 
Bourdieu (1977,1990a), the associations of memory with subjective knowledge are 
challenged. Indeed, the cinematic habitus that I suggest is fundamental to film 
speaks of our position in social space: the films seen, the cinema-going practices 
and the wider biographies from which it is shaped are all engaged within limiting 
structures that co-constitute the inculcated sense of appropriate (cinema-going 
and film viewing) practice in the present. Our social position, then, is incorporated 
into the body through dispositions that become key to how we make sense of film, 
and indeed to what film we watch. What appears to be a natural response to a film 
text is the product of history, of the cinematic habitus. To put it another way, our 
habitus co-constitutes the particular, social, ‘surrogate body’ offered to film and it is 
this positioned body that ‘oscillates’ between the ‘real’ and the ‘as if real’, through 
which it becomes cinema (Voss, 2011; Sobchack, 2000).
Such difference is not ignored by Voss (2011) in her understanding of the 
surrogate body, and the idea of cinematic habitus that arose as significant to my 
understanding is not so far away from the ‘projective additions’ she suggests we 
provide to a film’s narrative in the moment of viewing. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
one such addition that chimes particularly with my findings is the ‘disposition to 
endow film characters with one’s own biographical experiences and memories’
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(2011:192). But where I build on this is to suggest that such biographies and 
memories pre-reflexively co-constitute the film in practice, far beyond just the 
fleshing out of characters. Such arguments resonate with Marks’ (2000) ‘cultural 
sensoria’. Suggesting that sense organs are the ‘site where culture crosses the 
body’, Marks (2000:199) engages this concept to explore the ways in which 
filmmakers manipulate sensorial memories to move beyond the limits of 
representation and draw out narratives of exile and migration without relying on 
referential images. As I have argued throughout this thesis, my hope is that I have 
broadened the use of such productive thinking to develop the concept of cinematic 
habitus, extending the importance of the sensorial memories it implies to 
understandings of all films; of all representation in practice.
This understanding builds on Srivinas’s (2002,1998) concept of ‘participatory 
viewing’, in which audiences at cinemas in Bangalore are understood as 
producers rather than consumers of meaning, using their biographies and 
repetitive viewing to (loudly) disrupt film narratives at the cinema. As I hope to 
have shown here, this process -  of audience members being part of meaning 
production -  does not require explicitly disruptive behaviour such as that described 
by Srivinas. Instead, it can be an embodied and pre-reflexive disruption that 
nevertheless results in the meaning made through cinema. Further, rather than 
disrupting our ability to take the film in, such embodied memories are in fact vital to 
us doing so. Rather than film offering distraction from the ‘real’ world, I argue that 
distraction -  in the form of cinematic habitus -  offers ‘real’ to the film world.
Sensing bodies, then, do indeed collaborate with the film to make their own 
meaning, but only within the limiting structures that have co-constituted their 
habitus (Bourdieu, 1977,1990a). In suggesting an understanding of film viewing
that emphasises the pre-reflexive, bodily, fluid process, I do not wish to lose sight 
of the significance of the politics of representation. Rather, my methodology led me 
to understand this as a lived politics that is not so easily reduced to those issues 
reified by conventional film analyses. Key to this is that we do not engage practice 
as pre-determined, fixed entities, but nor do we engage as a blank canvas onto 
which meaning is written. Instead, meaning is co-constituted as film and body are 
positioned in the moment of viewing, influenced by each entity’s limiting structures 
but nevertheless enacted in the present, in practice. I use the term co-constitutes 
because, just as the film representation is not pre-determined, neither is our 
position in social space fixed. It is instead contextual and stabilised in the moment 
of practice in relation to the (in this case) film-field.
In sum, by recognising the practical temporalities of film representation we can 
begin to see that, while meaning is made in the moment, it is not ahistorical. 
Instead, it is made in practical time, a time that is both instantaneous and speaks 
to the past, influencing our sense of the future. Although it might seem 
spontaneous, our responses to films (the films we co-constitute) are necessarily 
made from a particular -  if contextual -  position in social space. But if cinema as 
practice is temporal and embodied, so too is it spatial. And, over the course of my 
research the spaces of cinema -  those on and off the screen -  proved 
fundamental to my understanding of film representation in practice. To fully explore 
this question, then, it is important to move on to another: how are the spaces of 
cinema constituted?
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8.2. How are the spaces of cinema constituted?
There are two key spaces of cinema considered in existing literature: those on and 
those off the screen. As Chapter Two explained, the majority of studies concerned 
with spaces of viewing tend to be historical in nature (Maltby et al, 2011; Gomery, 
1992; Hansen, 1991). The ‘new cinema history’ proposed by Maltby et al (2011), 
for example, explores the diverse socio-spatialities of film exhibition and the 
historical geographies of spaces of viewing. Such work challenges understandings 
of film history that assume a universal mode of exhibition, highlighting spatial 
differentiation and emphasising the distinction between rural and urban areas.
Here the buildings in which we watch are recognised as significant to 
understanding cinema. Far more common in geography, however, is an interest in 
the spatialities on the screen. As Chapter Two outlined, the geography of film 
powerfully engages the discipline’s understanding of landscape, spatialities, 
mobilities, scales and networks to offer spatialised analyses of films (Aitken and 
Dixon, 2006). This has resulted in wide-ranging work but perhaps the most 
enduring approach is exploring films as a form of social cartography -  a map of 
society’s fears, hopes, desires and anxieties that show the ways in which such 
‘social and cultural meanings are intertwined with space, place, scale and 
narrative’ (Lukinbeal, 2004: 248).
One of the most enduring engagements between geography and film studies is in 
literature exploring the relationship between urban (post)modernity and film 
(Hallam, 2010; Roberts, 2010; Webber and Wilson, 2008; Brundson, 2007; 
Dimendberg, 2005; Neumann, 2001; Ford, 1994; Natter, 1994). Like the early 
studies of film from Kracauer (1987/1926) and Benjamin (1969/1936), much of this 
work emphasises the correlation between the sensorial responses encouraged by
the (new) medium and the changing spatial and perceptual landscape of urban 
modernity, generated in part by the decentring of space-time caused by new 
technologies of travel such as the railway (Clarke and Doel, 2005: 45). Giuliana 
Bruno (2002) and Anne Friedberg (1993) take this furthest, arguing that such a 
history provided film with an inherent mobility. To Bruno, ‘a spectator is not a static 
contemplator -  she is a physical entity, a moving spectator, a body making 
journeys through space’ (Bruno, 2002: 56). The spectator becomes a voyageuse, 
moving through film as the film moves through her.
The significance of the spatialities on screen was drawn out in my research too. 
During our trips to the cinema, the films that participants and I watched seemed to 
generate a second shared journey: by watching the films together we were going 
elsewhere. This elsewhere could be literal and relate to material places depicted 
on the screen, but more often it seemed to be a journey to the film’s sensorial 
world, to a co-constituted sensory space. While my sense of this journey could, of 
course, have been a result of engagement with the literature, particularly Bruno’s 
work (2002), it did also seem to be shared by participants. Think, for example, of 
Rama’s comment after we watched It’s a Wonderful Life that: ‘We went to the 
olden days, isn’t it? We went on a trip back in time!’ It was also continually 
emphasised for me by the bodily responses I recorded, as the film drew to a close 
and the movements (albeit often quite subtle changes in comportment) of both me 
and participants, which seemed to suggest we were ‘waking up’. This movement 
provided a sense of return, in this case to the material and symbolic space of the 
cinema building.
Where I hope my research can contribute to work on the spatialities of film is in 
offering an analysis of the ways in which such spatio-temporality appeared to play 
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out in practice among audience members at the cinema. Building on my 
arguments in the previous section, I found that a film’s spatiality and 
corresponding mobility is co-constituted by our cinematic habitus. Read alongside 
Voss’s notion of the ‘surrogate body’ (2011), my examples suggest that when we 
travel at the cinema our destinations are not pre-determined by what is depicted in 
a film. Instead the spaces of cinema are co-constituted by the sensorial memories 
of our cinematic habitus. When we watch a film we may see many spaces 
constructed and places depicted, but the journey to elsewhere relies on affective 
resonance through a collision between the film and body in which they co- 
constitute one of the spaces of cinema. As such, and as I suggested in Chapter 
Seven, the film only provides some of the itinerary in our filmic journey. Our 
(cinematic) habitus provides the rest (Voss, 2011:143).
While Bruno (2002) puts most of her energy into arguing powerfully for the 
acknowledgement of film as an architectural medium, she also insists that the 
venue of viewing impacts upon this spatiality. As she suggests: ‘[w]e can be utterly 
different spectators when we watch the same film in different places, for different 
models of cinema are figured in the architecture of the theatre itself’ (2002: 45). To 
Bruno (2002), then, the architecture of the cinema building is fundamental to 
shaping the voyageuse that sits before a film ready to take it in. She is guided by 
the built structure into becoming a particular kind of spectator and engage 
practices of viewing specific to the regime of seeing suggested by this built form. 
To Bruno (2002), films become cinema through architecture. Watching films with 
participants at the cinema I too found that the space of viewing was significant to 
shaping the film co-constituted by the audience. However, and fundamental to the 
understanding of cinema I would like to put forward in this conclusion, the
299
architecture of the cinema was far more fluid in practice than implied by Bruno’s 
(2002) analysis.
Adopting the go-along meant I could explore the lived constitution of such spaces, 
and in this way the determining authority of the architect implied in Bruno’s (2002) 
analysis is challenged. In her study of black audiences of early cinema in Chicago, 
Stewart (2003) had already shown that the spaces of cinema are constituted 
differently by different audience practices, even those spaces that are in the 
‘same’ built form. In her study, this was evident in the difference between theatres 
on the ‘black belt’, which attracted all black audiences, and those downtown where 
black and white audiences would attend. Although I undertook my research in a 
very different context, I too found the material space of the cinema was shaped in 
the moment of practice. As Chapter Seven details, across the course of go-alongs, 
I was struck by the different spaces constituted by participants’ embodied practice 
as compared to those constituted through my own. In observing our movements 
through the cinema building, I repeatedly found a familiar space shift before my 
eyes as chair backs were turned into handrails, stairs became barriers and walls 
resting stops.
Where I hope to contribute to the work of Bruno (2002) and Stewart (2003) is by 
drawing this spatial contingency out and relating it to the bodies comprising the 
audience. Undertaking research in a contemporary context enabled me to be at 
the cinema and generate in situ observations from the body. By tuning into my 
own bodily co-constitution of the space and its disruption through participants’ own 
practice, I was able to recognise the difference between the spaces constituted by 
each of us as we moved around. This suggests, in line with arguments made in 
the geography of architecture (Jacobs and Merrimen, 2011; Lees, 2001) and
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Schatzki’s (2005) concept of practice-arrangement meshes, that the spaces of 
buildings do not pre-exist our embodied engagement with them. Instead they are 
co-constituted with the body in the moment through practice. Importantly, it 
enabled me to see that even able bodies are positioned in relation to built forms 
and co-constitute buildings in naturalised ways appropriate to inculcated embodied 
perception, to habitus (Saville, 2008).
One of the key ways in which participants appeared to constitute the material 
space of the cinema differently to me was in generating a sense of home, and I 
began to understand going to the cinema for participants as a way of maintaining a 
public spatiality and regaining an (imagined) mobility in a familiar space while still 
being part of society. In maintaining such spatialities the cinema became an 
important site of identity (re)negotiation in a period of change, much like for the 
mothers in Boyle’s (2010, 2009) study of Watch With Baby screenings. By 
suggesting that we understand cinema as both mobile home and virtual journey, I 
argue that we can more readily recognise the dialectics that are fundamental to it. 
Rather than either/or, cinema sits at the intersecting point between mobility and 
stability, fixity and fluidity, ‘home’ and ‘away’, private and public. It is never one or 
the other but always inescapably both.
It is precisely this status of cinema as a hybrid space -  in which the sense of 
belonging, of being ‘at home’, is mixed with the public and with going elsewhere -  
that seemed important to understanding the ways in which the spaces of cinema 
were constituted by the women I attended matinees with. Here a new space of 
ageing was being co-constituted in the public space of the cinema. As Laws 
(1996) shows, spaces of ageing co-constitute social understandings of later life. 
Here I would like to suggest that the cinema space forms -  for some -  an
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important part of generating a spatial identity for the Third Age. In this context, 
while the screen may be ‘ageist’, it does not directly marginalise the living 
audience. Instead by being there, and therefore pre-reflexively asserting 
membership of the ‘active ageing’, going to the cinema offers the opportunity to 
Other any negative portrayal on the screen and, by virtue of being film’s ‘surrogate 
body’, insert themselves where there is absence (Voss, 2011). This is coupled with 
a second insertion -  of older people into mainstream society through the 
maintenance of everyday public practice, and the co-constitution of an alternative 
space of ageing.
But while I would like to emphasise this fluidity of cinema’s material and symbolic 
spaces, it is important to stress that while participants and I were able to constitute 
the building to a certain extent, this was not without the architecture, in turn, 
constituting us through its ‘implicit pedagogy’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 90). In this context, 
once again, the co- in my use of the term co-constitution must be emphasised: the 
practising body is shaped by the material space just as the practising body shapes 
it. This is significant because, in this shaping, the space of viewing impacts upon 
the film made in the moment so that each space of cinema is integrated with the 
other through the body. This work of co-constitution, then, suggests that modes of 
spectatorship ‘housed’ by cinema architecture do not pre-exist the living audience. 
Instead, it is possible to extend Bruno’s (2002) argument to suggest that the film 
becomes cinema through the co-constituted (differentiated) viewing body and 
exhibition site -  the body is a mediating force between screen and architecture. It 
is the interaction between audience, architecture and film -  rather than that 
between the screen and the walls -  that film becomes cinema.
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My exploration of this question, then, drew out both material and symbolic spaces 
of cinema. It suggests that both spaces of cinema are spaces of identity formation, 
and that they are inseparable from the viewing body. But the spaces of cinema are 
multiple and they are constituted by differentiated practising bodies, just as those 
bodies are constituted by it. As this section has begun to suggest, the ways in 
which the spaces of cinema are constituted is tied to how we practice cinema. As 
such, in order to continue this discussion it is important to move on to discuss how 
differentiated bodies might practice cinema differently. I have, of course, already 
started this exploration with regard to film and space but the following section 
explores an emergent difference I found constituted through cinema as practice.
8.3 How might differentiated bodies practice cinema-going differently?
In the discussions above, a sense of embodied social difference has already 
emerged as key to my understanding of cinema. But while my argument for a 
cinematic habitus helps to suggest the ways in which differentiated bodies and film 
might be understood to be mutually constitutive, this question -  and the above 
discussion about cinema’s spaces -  also points to another finding: my argument 
that a distinct mode of generation was being enacted in the shared space of the 
cinema. Throughout this thesis I have drawn on work from film and cinema history 
that explores the public dimension of exhibition, and the audiences it implies 
(Allen, 2007; Puwar, 2007; Jancovich et al., 2003; Stewart, 2003; Bruno, 1993; 
Gomery, 1992; Hansen, 1991), as well as the small amount of work produced in a 
contemporary context exploring cinemas and their audiences (Boyle, 2010, 2009; 
Srivinas, 2010a, 2010b, 2002, 1998; Hubbard, 2003a, 2003b, 2002). I have shown 
that this diverse body of work highlights the nature of cinema as a public practice, 
and that much of it concludes that particular identities are forged and asserted in
the collective space of cinema. Most of these studies, however, suggest that the 
formation of such identity is unique to the particular culture or audience under 
study.
Stewart (2003), for example, explores the significance of cinema-going for newly 
arrived black migrants from the segregated south to the integrated north of 
Chicago in the 1910s. In doing so, she powerfully argues that the cinema became 
an important venue in which an audience that had long been denied one could 
form and (re)negotiate a public identity for an audience that had long been denied 
one. In a contemporary context, as I began to discuss above, Boyle (2010, 2009) 
argues that attendees of ‘watch with baby’ screenings engage the cinema as a 
way to (re)constitute identities in light of their (new) roles as parents. Fundamental 
to this is the shared space of the cinema, considered by her participants to be a 
safe place in which to learn these new roles without fear of moral judgement. In 
her work on cinema-going in Bangalore, Srivinas (2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998) 
argues that the sociability she found so vital to the practice, and the multiple 
identities being asserted in the stratified space of the cinema, are unique to India. 
Puwar (2007) meanwhile, in her study of cinemas owned and attended by the 
Indian diaspora in 1970s Coventry, argues that a shared identity was being 
constituted and maintained not just by being at the cinema, but also because of 
the films watched. Not only does Puwar (2007) see this as unique to the 
community under discussion (and it no doubt was), in her case Puwar (2007) 
considers this sociability is a lost element of cinema, now that its ‘golden age’ has 
ended.
Having found a similar phenomenon across go-alongs, I would argue that while the 
identity might be specific to the audience and events under study, the forging of a
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(fleeting) collective identity in the shared space of the cinema is not. Instead, it is a 
fundamental part of all cinema as practice, albeit often in less perceptible ways 
than my example and those above. Further, my research strongly suggests that 
such identity formation does not happen in ways that can be mapped and 
predicted. We cannot say that because someone is middle class, for example, 
they will practise the cinema in particular ways. Instead, multiple dimensions of 
habitus -  class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, generational (to name but a few) -  
exist, and will be drawn out in different configurations depending on the cinema 
field. Indeed, across my work I was struck by this affinity between and across 
audiences not because I had predicted it would exist but because it existed in spite 
of other, powerful, ‘objective’ markers of difference.
As outlined in Chapter Five, in going to the cinema with participants I was able not 
just to explore their practice but also more readily interrogate my own, and I was 
frequently struck throughout my research by a sense of discomfort that appeared 
to stem from a subtle discordance between our dispositions, between habitus. It is 
this that my discussion of the spaces of cinema above begins to suggest and it 
links to a broader sense of embodied difference felt throughout fieldwork. During 
data analysis I realised that this boiled down to an almost determined neatness. 
This neatness generated an embodied affinity across a diverse group, an 
embodiment in relation to which my own comportment felt distinctly inelegant and 
clumsy. Examining this through Puwar’s (2001) understanding of the ‘somatic 
norm’ and Bourdieu’s modes of generation, I found that this ‘discordance’ spoke of 
different generations, of differently practised femininities. I suggested a shared 
mode of generation being enacted in the moment of cinema, one that I was not 
and could not be part of. My sense of this embodied affinity across participants
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was emphasised as we watched films together. I began to witness what seemed to 
be a shared affective dimension of cinematic habitus that - when analysed with 
participants’ stated preferences for particular kinds of film content - 1 understood to 
relate to a sense inculcated across life of appropriate or inappropriate images. 
Here, it generated a sort of pre-reflexive solidarity because the subtle bodily 
responses I witnessed amounted to an embodied assertion of taste -  a taste that 
stemmed from a shared cinematic history. It was this, I felt, that was being drawn 
out in the space of the cinema.
In this way, by studying cinema at the cinema, I was able to challenge my ideas 
about social difference and witness the multi-dimensional habitus at play in 
practice, as particular elements seemed to be pre-reflexively asserted, while 
others -  certainly important elsewhere -  were attenuated (Nayak, 2011;
Blakemore and Boneham, 1994). But the practical enactment of a mode of 
generation is not just about developing a sense of shared identity in the moment of 
practice. It is also an assertion of difference, in this case to previous modes of 
generation. Here, I think, the audience was practically negating the Fourth Age. 
Fundamental to this is the maintenance of a public identity in later life, and the 
constitution of a new public space of ageing. Importantly, however, this is not a 
conscious rejection. Instead, in the final analysis, what I am discussing is not 
resistance to ageing but maintenance of habitus, a habitus that significantly differs 
from the previous generational cohort.
Importantly the shared identity being pre-reflexively asserted through the body is 
not about a permanent, pre-determined, shared social label, it is instead that in 
this context certain shared elements of multi-dimensional habitus are drawn out. 
This builds on Hubbard’s (2002) argument that the desirability of particular 
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cinemas is based on the ‘riskless risk’ of being with people from the same social 
group. It does so by suggesting that such sameness and distinction are, in part, 
constituted in the moment of practice.
But my exploration of this question has significance outside of studies of film and 
cinema, too. It offers a contribution to fledgling work exploring the relationship 
between cultural and material ageing -  an approach to gerontology developed to 
bring the lived body back in to a discipline that had become dominated by theories 
of social and cultural construction (Twigg, 2012, 2004; Phinney and Chelsa, 2003; 
Harper, 1997). This work argues for recognition of the body not just as a receptor 
but a generator of meaning. Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) understanding of the habitus 
provides a way to build on such arguments as it suggests that the body is not just 
written on to by society but is shaped by it, so that the materiality of our body is 
always at once both social and personal.
Most significantly, Bourdieu (1977) argues that a shift in the value of capital across 
age-classes leads to a similarity in generational dispositions that can cut across 
the usually dividing lines of social class (1977: 78). As such, while the determined 
neatness I noticed could relate just to clothing, to appearance, what is at stake for 
me here is an embodiment that spoke to a differently practised femininity. It spoke 
of adherence to a ‘somatic norm’ (Puwar, 2001) that was (in the case of both me 
and participants) time stamped. Thus, it offers a way of understanding older 
bodies as differentiated without having to revert to purely biological explanations 
based on notions of ‘natural’ decline. Instead, we can see that symbolic capital of 
the body reduces in old age not just because the visible signs of biological ageing 
have negative connotations in a society that valorises youth, but also because our
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dispositions speak to earlier times. Our body becomes not just ‘old’ but ‘old- 
fashioned’.
In sum, different bodies practise cinema-going differently depending on practical 
logic that speaks to habitus. This habitus, however, is multi-dimensional and the 
difference implies is fleetingly determined in the moment of practice so that 
different dimensions are drawn out in particular social fields. As in all previous 
sections, the findings discussed here cannot be separated from my methodology. 
Being there, at the cinema, and studying spectatorship in the moment enabled a 
more fluid and contextual (although enduring) understanding of social difference to 
come to the fore. Similarly, it was my position at the cinema that enabled me to 
draw on my own embodied experience and bodily sensations, a positioning which 
led to many of the findings discussed thus far. I have, then, already begun to 
suggest the elements of my methodology that I found to be most productive but 
since it was a key question for this thesis, I end this chapter with a discussion of 
how we might empirically explore practice.
8.4. How might we explore practice empirically?
As my findings outlined above suggest, by studying cinema at the cinema I was 
able to generate a lived understanding that challenges and contributes to existing 
literatures. I developed such a methodology because, as Chapter Four outlines, 
adopting Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1977,1990a) has significant 
methodological implications. Concerned as he is with pre-reflexive and embodied 
knowledge, Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) main issue with conventional interviews or 
observation is that they can encourage the academic tendency of allowing a 
researcher’s own perspective and desire for certainties eclipse the logic of practice
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(1990a; 1977). In an interview, for example, he argues that ‘what is essential goes 
without saying because it comes without saying’ (1977:18): the inculcated 
embodied knowledge that guides practice being taken for granted by participants. 
As such, researchers are left understanding social practice as driven by a series of 
explicitly stated, objectively engaged, set of rules. Observation, Bourdieu (1990a: 
55) suggests, can be more productive but only if engaged reflexively, if the 
researcher acknowledges their own perceptive filters and recognises the 
temporality of practical logic thus avoiding presenting practice as a pre-existing 
‘fait accompli’. Such reservations about our ability to empirically study practice led 
me to ask the question above. In an attempt to develop a methodology that 
addressed some of these issues, I turned to a relatively new formulation of 
participant observation aimed at combining two methods to undertake interviews in 
the moment of practice: the go-along.
As I have indicated, by far the two most common methods adopted for studying 
film and cinema are desk-based film analyses or historical research. While work 
with film audiences has been growing since Barker and Brooks’ (1998) study of 
Judge Dredd, the majority is undertaken in focus group or interview contexts.
Unlike these methods, the go-along requires that you accompany a participant as 
they carry out the practice of interest — in this case cinema-going (Kusenbach, 
2003). I could only find two other contemporary studies that had engaged a form of 
participant observation at the cinema, and they both suggested that doing so 
offered powerful insights (Boyle, 2010, 2009; Srivinas, 2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998). 
Reading both after having conducted my research I was struck by similarities in 
our findings despite quite different research contexts and engagements with 
different theoretical frameworks. Srivinas (2010a, 2010b, 2002,1998) and Boyle
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(2010, 2009), too, emphasise the significance of the embodied audience, raise the 
fluidity of film meaning in the moment of viewing and highlight the relevance of the 
public space of the cinema to such a process. I have outlined above some of the 
ways my project talks to their findings. One of the ways I hope to build on their 
studies is methodologically — in drawing out and interrogating such an approach 
and engaging a specific methodological framework to do so.
Chiming with Bourdieu’s (1977,1990a) concerns about social science 
methodology, literature on the go-along emphasises the method’s ability to access 
pre-reflexive, embodied perception (Moles, 2008; Anderson, 2004; Kusenbach). 
With embodied knowledge increasingly of interest to researchers attempting to 
overcome the Cartesian dualism, the go-along is not the only method engaged on 
these terms. What the go-along offered a study of cinema was not just being there 
and drawing on my body in observation or interviewing and considering the bodily 
responses. Instead, it offered a way to do both in situ. It enabled me to watch what 
people do as well as listen to what they say about what they do. In this way, I 
could explore cinema from the body in the moment but also generate a sense of 
the wider temporalities of cinema through our conversations.
In combination with informal pre-go-along interviews, it was this that enabled me to 
generate an understanding of cinematic habitus, and of the embodied affinity that 
led to my suggestion that a mode of generation is being practically enacted at the 
matinees. By being there, at the cinema, I was also able to develop an 
understanding of the space more fluid than that previously proposed in the 
literature. In sum, it emphasised the interaction between film, body and space in 
the moment of practice -  an interaction fundamental to the understanding of 
cinema being proposed here. But while I found the go-along key to these findings,
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it is important to acknowledge that this was despite the method on paper seeming 
rather inappropriate for a study of cinema. Indeed, Kusenbach (2003), goes so far 
as to argue that, ‘the unique potential of the go-along method cannot be fully 
developed when applied to settings in which informants pursue stationary, internal 
activities’ (2003: 477). While there was a fair amount of walking with participants in 
my study, there was also a substantial period of each go-along spent sat relatively 
still, as we watched the film together. In this way, my research meant I didn’t just 
engage the go-along to explore cinema, but also engaged cinema to explore the 
go-along.
As the discussion above suggests, I found a virtual mobility at the cinema that 
appeared to produce many of the same insights as the traversal of material space 
encouraged. Such a discovery meant the method inadvertently led me (through 
Bruno, 2002, and Friedberg, 1993) to think about the virtual journeys taken 
through film. Conversations following films suggested that these journeys were 
methodologically generative in a way similar to the actual mobility of our walking 
through the space. As my discussion of cinematic habitus above suggests, 
information that had not arisen in interviews -  and which I would never have 
thought to ask about -  emerged in post-film conversation. These revelations in 
part fleetingly exposed the pre-reflexive knowledge of habitus, and it seemed that 
the spatio-visual cues of the film had brought such information to the fore, in much 
the same way as the built environment drawn on in ‘walking with’ (Pink, 2007a; 
Kusenbach, 2003).
What I would like to argue here, then, is that although we are sitting down when 
we watch films, we are nevertheless mobile. I argue this on two counts. First that, 
as Wylie (in Merrimen et al., 2008) notes, there is a mobility to ‘our own breathing
bodies shifting about in these seats, our eyes, flicking about this room’ (2008:
203). Indeed, as Lorimer points out, ‘mobility can be the continual flux of sitting 
still* (2008: 206). Second, I would like to suggest -  as my discussion above and in 
Chapter Seven argues -  that we do not need to be in traversing physical space to 
go elsewhere. This is relevant to the question above because although the cinema 
context offers a good opportunity to make this point, it speaks to the relevance of 
go-alongs to a broad range of practices that might otherwise not be empirically 
explored in this way. For example, a similar argument could be made about 
watching sport, attending a concert, listening to the radio, visiting the theatre and 
so on. Indeed, Bissell (2009) has made a similar point about sleeping train 
passengers. Having cinema as an example is fortuitous, however, because of the 
existing work exploring film’s virtual mobility (Bruno, 2002; Friedberg, 1993).
In this way, despite this potential problem with the method for a study of cinema, I 
found that many of the insights promised in the literature rang true in my research 
context. However, I found that it did so on quite different terms to those suggested. 
Pink (2008a, 2007a), for example, argues that in walking with participants, her 
body becomes a tool for empathy, an empathy that stems from shared sensorial 
experience. My experience of the method was perhaps less smooth. Although thus 
far unacknowledged in the literature, the nature of the go-along requires that the 
researcher inserts themselves into the regular practice of another -  an insertion 
that ‘invokes the physical awkwardness of the body’ (Coffey, 1999: 73). And while 
initially I found this awkwardness, this disruption, a downside of the method as 
practised I in fact came to see it as fundamental to the findings of my study. I, too, 
came to a form of embodied empathy but it was an empathy based on difference 
in the face of ostensibly shared sensorial experiences.
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In walking through the space of the cinema, for example, it was precisely the 
disruption of my own embodied perception that enabled me to recognise the 
fluidity of such spaces in practice and their co-constitution with practising bodies. I 
was able in these moments to perceive the space differently, but this shifted 
perception stemmed from an acknowledgement of difference that enabled me to 
overcome the assumption that the spaces I co-constitute are also those that others 
experience. I think, perhaps, that the key reason for this was because I was 
studying a practice in which I engage outside of a research context, in cinemas I 
know. It was in this way that my own pre-reflexive practice and practical logic was 
challenged because, by doing the cinema differently, the elements outlined above 
were emphasised. As such, while I would like to suggest that the go-along is a 
productive method through which we can empirically explore practice, I would like 
to emphasise that it is most effective when we tune into these differences and 
engage it to learn not just about participants’ practice, but our own.
Adopting such a methodology to explore cinema is surprisingly innovative. And if 
this thesis makes no other contribution, I hope that it at least helps to broaden the 
methodological tools engaged to study film and cinema. By being at the cinema 
the integrated importance of the space of viewing, the bodies of the audience and 
the film on the screen is more readily recognised. Witnessing the interrelation 
between them in the moment of practice contributes to understandings of each 
individually, and emphasises the fleeting co-constitutive nature of their meanings.
In engaging all of this throughout this thesis, I hope to not just have spoken about 
cinema but also to have evoked a sense of being there -  an insight possible 
precisely because of my methodology.
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8.5. Proposing a geography of cinema33
To adopt Bourdieu’s (1977) understanding of practice is to inherit a concern for the 
body and for the spatial, acknowledging that representations are not experienced 
in universal ways because they play out differently in different habitus. By offering 
a way of combining the subjective and objective elements of practice, Bourdieu’s 
(1977,1990a) concept of habitus provided a useful basis from which to attempt to 
develop an understanding of cinema that neither focuses entirely on what is seen 
or on what is done but instead takes both into consideration. Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice allowed me to read cinema in a particular way that highlighted how our 
past practice impacts on that in the present in implicit as well as explicit ways. This 
helped me to make sense of the bodily relationship to the screen and relate it to 
wider debates about the nature of cinematic space and the meanings of film. Of 
course, following Bourdieu’s framework almost certainly also meant I missed out 
on other elements of cinema but I would hope in this thesis to have at least begun 
to encourage recognition that the co-constitution of the viewing body, the film on 
the screen and the spaces of viewing are fundamental to cinema as practice.
To generate this understanding of cinema, I have attempted to combine lessons 
from academic literature thinking through the body, film and space. Such 
engagement has led to a wide-ranging discussion and, while I hope it has 
generated a provocative exploration that encourages further conversations 
between disciplinary fields, it also inevitably left out many of their insights. My 
purpose has not been to present a coherent, total whole of what cinema is. This, of 
course, is impossible to capture. It has rather been an attempt to approach cinema
go
Lukinbeal and Zimmerman’s (2008) edited collection is entitled A Geography of Cinema but the 
focus remains films.
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as social practice to generate insights not yet gained through more conventional 
avenues which tend to access film and cinema from one or two of the three 
elements I have tried to capture.
The rare instances that all three have been considered, as in Srivinas’ (2010) and 
Boyle’s (2010) work, indicate that the moment film becomes cinema is irreducible 
to either one. Despite lacking the close attention to each element found in 
literatures devoted to them, I hope that my work contributes to the project begun 
by Boyle (2010) and Srivinas (2010) by offering a theoretically engaged 
exploration of cinema-going as practice in the present. By focussing on the older 
female body, I hope that this project extends understandings of embodied 
spectatorship to consider diversity and positioning as vital to the ways in which film 
becomes cinema through the body. By doing this, the opposition between pleasure 
and suffering suggested in the opening argument -  between negative 
representations on the screen and the positive implications of cinema-going -  
becomes a dialectic that resides in the practising body through which film 
becomes cinema.
I am not the first to suggest such an integrated analysis. While analyses of film 
texts remains a core part of film studies, many have argued that the significance of 
film is over-emphasised in our understanding of cinema. For example, in her oral 
history of British cinema-going in the 1930s and 1940s, Kuhn (2002) found that 
films rarely featured in her participants’ memories. She argues that this insight 
‘raises significant questions not only for the methodology and concerns of 
research in cinema history, but also for the broad field of film studies’ (2011: 85), 
exposing as it does a discrepancy between the field’s focus on film and the socio- 
spatial nature of cinema. Confronted by such questions Maltby et al’s (2011, 2007)
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solution is to suggest the ‘new cinema history’, a move that encourages ‘bottom-up 
approach [to] lived cinema cultures’ (Meers et al., 2010: 272), and an 
acknowledgment that, ‘for most audiences, for most of the history of cinema, their 
primary relationship with ‘the cinema’ has not been with individual movies-as- 
artefacts or as texts, but with the social experience of cinemagoing’ (Maltby and 
Stokes, 2007: 2). In this context, Maltby and Stokes propose a distinction be made 
between film history ‘an aesthetic history of textual relations between individuals or 
individual objects’ and cinema history — ‘the social history of a cultural institution’ 
that focuses on ‘accounts of how the commercial institution of cinema operated ... 
and the socio-cultural history of its audiences’ (2007: 2).
Apart from the historical focus -  and the different understandings that such a focus 
inevitably produces -  this approach to cinema is not dissimilar to that which I am 
proposing here. One rare example of a contemporary study of cinema on these 
terms from geography is Hubbard’s (2002) study of cinema-going in Leicester, 
undertaken to explore the coincident rise of the multiplex in out-of-town locations 
and the revival of cinema-going in Britain. But, while Hubbard’s (2002) study 
powerfully suggests the different insights gained when geography offers a social 
understanding of cinema, such an approach has remained absent in the discipline 
since its publication (Aitken and Dixon, 2006). Despite its growing influence in film 
studies, then, the geography of film remains relatively untouched by an interest in 
cinema as practice, and resolutely focused on the film text (Dixon et al, 2008). If I 
can make one recommendation at the end of this thesis, I would like to propose 
that, alongside the geography of film, we put effort into generating a geography of 
cinema. Unlike Maltby et al’s (2011) new cinema history, however, my research 
suggests that the geography of cinema should emphasise its nature as a spatial,
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embodied, social practice. It should incorporate the film on the screen in analyses 
but recognise that cinema is not defined by this alone. Most importantly, having 
conducted this study, I would like it to recognise cinema as collaboration between 
the bodies in the audience, the film on the screen and the spaces of viewing.
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Appendix Two: Questions used as a framework for interviews
Below is a list of the questions I went to interviews with in case conversations were not 
forthcoming. It is perhaps unnecessary to highlight that they in no way represent the 
entirety of topics discussed and were intended more as triggers where needed than they 
were to generate a consistency in answers.
1. Please tell me your age, name and where you live
2. Were you employed?
- If so, how old were you when you retired?
- How have you found it?
3. Could you talk a little bit about your life?
- Where you grew up?
- Who with?
- Did you go to the cinema a lot?
4. Describe the last time you went to the cinema
5. Tell me about your favourite films
6. Tell me about the Rio/Picturehouse matinees
- How long have you been attending?
-Why?
- Do you attend alone or with others?
7. Do you have a favourite cinema (it can be from any time in your life)?
- If so, please explain why
8. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me?
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